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PREFACE
This document summarizes the final results of the $100, 000 five-month
SOAR-IIS study activity and was prepared by McDonnell Douglas Astronautics
Company supported by TRW, Inc.
This study (Contract NASA-MSFC, No. NAS8-28583) addresses six major
tasks that (1) assess and resolve specific tradeoff issues in the Shuttle-
payload -facility interface, (2) analyze the impact of payload vs. Shuttle
ancillary equipment provided for accommodations and services, and (3) pro-
vide an early definition of requirements and accommodations for the future.
The study focuses on the specific tasks by evaluating four classes of payloads
to determine detailed requirements in the generic areas of:
* Shuttle-delivered automated spacecraft (e. g., EOS)
* Shuttle/Tug-delivered spacecraft (e. g., ATS/SMS/DSCS-II)
* Man-tended spacecraft (e. g., LST)
* Sortie missions
This document fulfills the requirements of MSFC-DPD No. 299 (dated
March 1973), Line Item MA-04, Documentation Report, Final Task.
Questions regarding this briefing should be directed to:
* Wilbur E. Thompson, COR/SOAR-IIS Study
Marshall Space Flight Center
Attention: PD-SA-P
Huntsville, Alabama 35812
Telephone: (205) 453-5586
0 Louis O. Schulte
McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
Attention: BSFO, Mail Station 13-2
Huntington Beach, California 92647
Telephone: (714) 896-4063
* P. D. Brooks
McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
Attention: A61-110
Huntsville, Alabama 35812
Telephone: (205) 881-0611
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Section 1
INTRODUCTION
The Shuttle Orbital Applications Requirements (SOAR) studies were performed
in parallel with the evolution of the Shuttle and Tug designs. In general, the
studies were broad overviews, with in-depth analysis only in selected areas
to clarify difficult interface situations. NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center
funded and managed the studies, which include:
* SOAR-I (February 9 to December 8, 1971 - $400, 000), which
covered manned modules, automated spacecraft, and pallet-
mounted experiments.
* SOAR-II (April 7, 1972 through April 6, 1973 - $400, 000), which
was constrained to automated spacecraft and upper stages including
the reusable Tug.
* SOAR-IIS (April 7, 1973 through September 6, 1973 - $100, 000),
which is a limited effort concentrated on select areas identified dur-
ing SOAR-II as needing additional study.
The objectives for the SOAR-IIS study were (1) to assess and resolve specific
Shuttle/payload/facility interface tradeoff issues, (2) to analyze the impact
of payload versus Shuttle ancillary equipment provided for accommodations/
services, and (3) to provide an early definition of requirements and/or
recommendations to support the Orbiter SRR and for future analyses.
Figure 1-1 shows the tasks and the schedule of the IIS effort and its important
milestones.
The study focused on the specific tasks of interest by evaluating four classes
of payloads to establish detailed requirements in the generic areas of:
A. Shuttle-delivered automated spacecraft (i.e., EOS).
B. Shuttle/Tug-delivered spacecraft (i.e., ATS/SMS/DSCS-II).
C. Man-tended automated spacecraft (i. e., LST).
D. Sortie missions.
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FIGURE 1-1
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Figure 1-2 depicts the general flow of the SOAR-IIS study. It must be
recognized that this effort consists of six somewhat independent tasks that
are loosely knit together. These tasks, as shown, investigate specific areas
of interest identified as being desirable in SOAR-II. The study approach
utilizes payload data developed or assimilated in the earlier study of SOAR-II,
and additional updated information from other current studies. Much of the
data documented for SOAR-II in MDC reports G4471 through G4481 is still
valid if taken in context of the more recent changes to the Orbiter. This
earlier data is not in general repeated in this report. The study plan describ-
ing the tasks accomplished has been formally documented (see Report
No. MDC G4497), dated April 1973.
The study team assembled for the SOAR-II Supplementary Study consists of
the McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company, responsible for Shuttle
applications and payload integration, Space Tug, and the Shuttle, plus TRW as
a subcontractor for automated spacecraft detailed requirements. In perform-
ing the study, this team applied the results of SOAR-I/II and other current
Tug and DOD STS Payload Interface Study activities.
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FIGURE 1-2
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The study was performed based on the following NASA guidelines:
1. Existing payload hardware programs shall be reviewed as necessary
to update reference sources of detailed subsystem/component
monitoring/ checkout characteristics and requirements.
2. Payloads analyzed in detail will include a representative set of
Shuttle class payloads such as (a) Shuttle/Tug-delivered automated
spacecraft, i. e., EOS, (b) Shuttle-delivered spacecraft, i. e., ATS/
SMS/DSCS-II, (c) Man-tended automated spacecraft, i. e., LST, and
(d) Sortie missions, i. e., sortie laboratory.
3. Sufficient depth of payload definition will be needed to enable
adequate penetration of analysis in the checkout, control, and
monitor requirements area.
4. The baseline sortie laboratory to be used in study efforts will be as
defined in latest MSFC sortie laboratory documentation.
5. The Space Shuttle shall be considered as having a mission specialist
station and one or more payload specialist stations with functional
and equipment requirements to be determined. Selected basic
functions pertaining to caution/warning will require routing to the
mission specialist station.
6. Location options for payload monitor, control, or checkout equip-
ment include Orbiter cargo bay, Orbiter crew compartment (flight
deck and specialist stations), ground (launch or mission control
facility), and combinations of these.
7. Where existing or planned ground facilities become a consideration,
the Kennedy Space Center will be assumed to be the launch base.
8. On-orbit operation shall be considered for "Shuttle-attached"
payloads and for payload activities that take place before release
of an automated spacecraft/Tug payload.
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Section 2
SUMMARY
The SOAR-IIS study effort involves representative Shuttle mission applications,
with emphasis on select interface analyses.
The SOAR-IIS study is intended to have general application to a wide range of
mission classes, as shown in Table 2-1. For meaningful data to be obtained
on the interfaces and analyses being investigated, specific payloads have been
adequately defined and examined. The spacecraft shown are representative
of various classes. It is beyond the scope of the study to examine all the
missions of the NASA traffic model to an equivalent depth. Previous
SOAR-II investigations have analytically demonstrated the validity of using
representative spacecraft that typify several missions.
TABLE 2-1
40394
SOAR - IIS MISSIONS
MISSION REPRESENTATIVE
CLASS NAME SPACECRAFT
I SHUTTLE DELIVERED AUTOMATED SPACECRAFT EOS
II SHUTTLEITUG DELIVERED SPACECRAFT ATSISMSIDSCS-II
CRYOGENIC SPACE TUG
III MAN-TENDED AUTOMATED SPACECRAFT LST
IV SORTIE MISS IONS SORTIE LABORATORY(S)
AND PALLETS
5
The Shuttle and spacecraft under investigation are in various stages of
definition ranging from conceptual design to hardware and are literally
changing daily. Because the major hardware elements involved in this study
are not finalized, it is important to identify the source of the data being used.
Table 2-2 identifies the spacecraft and Tug sources and the Shuttle and traffic
model being used for the study. Data from the literature have been used in
many cases to amplify or clarify the information presented in the basic
reports, which have been used as a point of departure.
TABLE 2-2
i40330
SOAR-IIS MISSIONS/REFERENCES
* SHUTTLE DELIVERED AUTOMATED SPACECRAFT
EOS* - REF: EOS DEFINITION PHASE REPORT, GSFC, AUGUST 1971
: SHUTTLE/TYPICAL PAYLOAD INTERFACE STUDY, GSFC RI.
OCTOBER 25, 1972
* SHUTTLE/TUG DELIVERED SPACECRAFT
ATS* - REF: APPLICATIONS TECH. SAT. H/I SYSTEM FEASIBILITY REPORT.
LERC. JUNE 1972
SMS* - REF: SYNCHRONOUS METEOROLOGICAL SATELLITE SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
DOCUMENTS, VOL 14; GSFC, OCTOBER 71- FEBRUARY 72
DSCS-II - REF: SUPPLEMENTAL DATA PACKAGE FOR AUTO. SPACECRAFT
INTEGRATION, AEROSPACE - REV. A, OCTOBER 1972
TUG* - REF: SOAR-II FINAL REPORT MDC.G4473, VOLUME III. APRIL
* MAN-TENDED AUTOMATED SPACECRAFT
LST* - REF: LST PRELIMINARY STUDY, MSFC; FEB. 25. 1972; FINAL DEC. 15, 1972
PHASE A DESIGN UPDATE, MSFC. APRIL 1973
* SORTIE MISSIONS
SORTIE LAB - REF: SORTIE CAN CONCEPTUAL DESIGN, MSFC, MARCH 1, 1972
: SORTIE LAB USERS GUIDE, MSFC, APRIL 1973
* SHUTTLE TRAFFIC MODEL
REF: MSC SHUTTLE RFP, MSC NO. TE72-FM-71, MARCH 21,1972*" AND
TRAFFIC MODEL TMX-64731
* SHUTTLE
PAYLOAD ACCOMMODATIONS - REF: JSC.07700, VOL XIV. APRIL 13, 1973
*DELIVERY MISSIONS ONLY "* NEW MODEL EXPECTED IN JULY
Configurations identified for each of the four mission classes (Table 2-1)
to aid in the integration and interface analysis tasks are discussed in the
following listing.
I. Shuttle-Delivered Automated Spacecraft
The Earth Observation Satellite (EOS) as depicted in Figure 2-1 was selected
for detailed study in SOAR -II/IIS because it represents the polar class of
spacecraft and taxes the Shuttle's capability to deliver a payload into low
Earth orbit. The data previously published in the SOAR-II final reports
6
FIGURE 2-1 39321
SHUTTLE DELIVERED AUTOMATIC SPACECRAFT
ANTENNA -- SOLAR
ARRAY
SENSOR BAY PALLET-TRUNNION OMS-KIT 11)
EARTH OBSERVATION SATELLITE SOAR-II GSFC 1971
2,600 LB 6.958 LB
RADAR
37 FT
SOLAR
ARRAY
SUBSYSTEMS
TERRESTRIAL EARTH ORBITING SOAR-IIS GSFC 1972/73
SATELLITE NO. 68 11,740 LB
10,000 LB
(MDC G4471 through G4481) is based on the general configuration shown in the
upper half of this chart. Design studies are continuing on the EOS at GSFC.
As a program, the EOS may involve as many as 20 missions of various con-
figurations with different experiments and objectives. The 6B, a land-viewing
satellite, is shown here as being representative of this class. The IIS con-
figuration, as shown (lower), would exceed the presently defined Shuttle cap-
ability (April 73 - JSC-07700), but that fact is not relevant for the particular
analysis being performed. In the future, the Orbiter polar capability may be
increased or the payload weight may be reduced or modified to accomplish this
particular mission.
II. Shuttle/Tug Delivered Spacecraft
There are three geosynchronous spacecraft studied in SOAR-II for which
considerable data is available. All these spacecraft were used in the
generation of requirements for this mission class. They include the ATS,
the DSCS-II, and the SMS. A detailed definition of these spacecraft is avail-
able in the SOAR-II final reports and in the referenced documentation. The
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Cryogenic Space Tug is the propulsive stage for these missions. Both the
Tug and Tug/DSCS-II are also being studied by MDAC under separate con-
tracts, and supporting data have been utilized as applicable (Figure 2-2).
III. Man-Tended Spacecraft
The large space telescope (LST) as shown in Figure 2-3 is representative of
a man-tended spacecraft system. The configuration shows the LST in
position for a delivery mission. The LST is delivered to a 28. 5-degree-
inclination by a 330-nmi-altitude orbit. The LST is representative of large
spacecraft involving a large, 3-m optical system. It has three functional
elements: (1) an optical telescope assembly (OTA), (2) a scientific instrument
package (SIP), and (3) the support systems module. The LST systems and
operations are described in detail in the SOAR-II final reports and in the
referenced documentation.
IV. Sortie Missions
The sortie mission configuration shown in Figure 2-4 represents a class that
may consist of as much as 50 percent of the NASA Orbiter traffic model. The
FIGURE 2-2 39323
SHUTTLE/TUG DELIVERED SPACECRAFT
144 FT
SOLAR ATS F-
ARRAY
6 FT
WAVEGUIDE
2, 510 LB 63, 319 LB
14.6 F( DSCS 11 TUG
2,520 LB (2) 63, 366 LB
10.3 FT
75 IN.
585 LB
60, 200 LB
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FIGURE 2-3
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FIGURE 2-4
39320
SORTIE MISSIONS
SORTIE LAB
DOCKING PALLET * ASTRONOMY (AS)
MODULE
* SOLAR PHYSICS (SO)
I * HIGH ENERGY ASTROPHYSICS (HE)
* ATMOSPHERE AND SPACE PHYSICS (AP)
DOCKING MODULE * EARTH OBSERVATIONS (EO)
TUNNEL * EARTH AND OCEAN PHYSICS (EOP)
* SPACE PROCESSING APPLICATIONS (SPA)
* COMMUNICATIONSINAVIGATION
RESEARCH LAB (CNRL)
SORTIE PALLET * LIFE SCIENCES 
(LS)
OBSERVATORY * SPACE TECHNOLOGY (ST)
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Sortie Laboratory is shown with and without a tunnel. The tunnel is being
considered as an approach to controlling the center of gravity for the missions.
The sortie missions may also be pallet-only missions. They encompass
10 areas of discipline as indicated, and they include 46 representative sortie
payloads and as many as 250 missions. The Sortie Laboratory is basically
self-providing and has minimal interface requirements in the areas under
examination in SOAR-IIS.
The six tasks completed in this study are summarized in the following section.
The key results determined for each task are as follows:
Task 1 - Payload Operations Pad vs. VAB Installation
. . . ."To identify interface operational considerations and payload
benefit which may influence alternative approaches to installation,
removal, and integration of the payload into the Orbiter. "
* Vertical installation is preferred from a payload point of view.
* Integration functions are relatively insensitive from mission
class to class.
Task 2 - Payload Checkout/Control Requirements
. . . "To define requirements and perform trade studies relative to the
MSS/PSS and desired ground system implications for prelaunch."
* A common group of control and monitoring equipment can be
utilized for a wide range of payloads examined.
* The MSS should control the Tug; the PSS controls all other
payload activities.
* The Orbiter cabin allocation for PSS is adequate for required
equipment.
* The Orbiter/PSS can provide valuable supplemental assistance
to ground control status to determine payload condition prior to
deployment.
Task 3 - Payload Interface Requirements
. . . "To define complete electrical interfaces for selected payloads.
to determine payload GSE requirements and. . . to define standard
interface panel requirements. "
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* Orbiter service panel allocation for payload cables/fluid lines
are adequate for missions examined.
* Payload bay cable installations vary from class to class but
may be standardized within a given class.
* The LPS should process spacecraft stage (Tug) data after
Orbiter mating for use by launch control; however, separate
payload data transfer lines should be available to the user
facilities when on the launch pad.
Task 4 - Payload Design Operations Impacts
. . . ."To assess the EVA operations and design impacts on the payloads
associated with the Orbiter airlock/docking module and payload
contamination."
A. Docking Module Analysis
* The use of a docking module constrains on-pad payload access.
* Docking module on-orbit transfer operations increase risk in
rescue - other viable solutions warrant further considerations.
* Concurrent EVA/IVA operations are not recommended.
B. Contamination Analysis
* Spacecraft requiring high-quality cleanliness (10, 000 or better)
must provide own sensor protection.
* Orbiter bay should be lined to provide a visually clean surface
to ensure cleanliness.
* Operations related to Orbiter effluents must be controlled during
critical payload operations.
Task 5 - Payload Venting Requirements Analysis
. . . . "To evaluate payload venting requirements for all phases of the
Shuttle missions."
0 The nominal payload venting required an Orbiter umbilical
plate venting capability.
* The Shuttle criteria on payload fluids management and payload
safety requires amplification.
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Task 6 - General Interface Assessments and Safety
. . . ." To perform analytical studies in the area of payload placement
and retrieval characteristics and to evaluate impact of Shuttle safety
criteria."
A. Payload Placement and Retrieval Analysis
* The SAMS manipulator payload placement and retrieval capability
is acceptable to the payloads examined.
* The SAMS payload deployment times may take about 30 minutes.
* The swing table has payload service growth in placement/
retrieval.
B. Shuttle Payload Safety Criteria Analysis
* Payload safety management has varied and important payload
impacts.
* Payload safety design criteria can be demanding.
* The proposed (NASA) payload safety criteria levels are in some
cases greater than the basic Shuttle requirements.
* i Payload safety criteria are needed for the total scope identified by
NASA Headquarters Safety Directives (e. g., Shuttle and payload
safety and public safety) for all mission phases.
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2. 1 TASK 1 - PAYLOAD OPERATIONS - PAD VS. VAB INSTALLATION
The purpose of this task is to identify a preferred approach for installing the
payload into the Shuttle Orbiter payload bay, based on operations analysis of
the four payload classes considered in the study. Results of this analysis
are presented in Appendix A.
The current payload/Orbiter integration model defined in the Shuttle baseline
plan requires that payloads be installed in the horizontal position at the
Orbiter maintenance and checkout facility (MCF) approximately eight days
before Shuttle launch. A contingency payload integration mode is available
whereby payloads can be installed in the payload bay at the launch pad while
the Orbiter is in the vertical position.
The following aspects of Pad vs. MCF installations were addressed with
respect to payload operations:
A. Baseline Shuttle ground operati6ns
1. Payload integration functional requirements
2. Payload integration operations impacts to Orbiter turnaround
constraints.
B. Influence of Orbiter operations on payload installation
1. Orbiter orientation
2. Orbiter location
C. Influence of payload operational requirements on installation
1. Payload checkout
2. Payload servicing
Recommendations resulting from the task analysis are as follows:
A. Vertical installation of payloads at the launch pad are preferable.
This preference is consistent with current spacecraft designs relative
to handling points, propellant systems, and thruster catalyst beds,
and also reduces handling of the spacecraft. This approach offers
the following advantages from a total payload (satellite plus stage)
operational standpoint:
1. Allows continuous access to payloads through launch minus two
days
2. Reduces Tug fleet size for Class II payloads by one Tug
3. Reduces payload ground operation time by seven days
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4. Simplifies payload/Orbiter interfaces for Class I and II payloads
5. Reduces payload integrated systems test requirements.
B. Payloads can be installed at the MCF in the horizontal position per
the Shuttle baseline plan if the following inherent operational and
cost disadvantages are accepted:
1. Limited or no access for seven days after payload/Orbiter
integration is completed
2. Larger Tug fleet size
3. Increased payload ground operations time from notification to
launch requirement
4. More complex payload/Orbiter interfaces for Class I and II
payloads
5. Increased payload integrated systems test requirements.
6. May require spacecraft modification or special handling.
The analysis presented in Appendix A is summarized in the following
paragraphs.
Each payload class was reviewed with respect to the functions required to
accomplish the payload-Orbiter integration. The integration functions are
effectively insensitive to the payloads in the classes analyzed. Each of the
payload classes exhibits the same general integration functions.
Orbiter orientation was found to have only a minor effect on integration
operations. All payloads studied are capable after being mated with Tug of
being positioned in either the horizontal or vertical position from a structural
point of view.
In the Class I and II payloads, however, which employ hydrazine propulsion
systems, horizontal positioning during handling and installation has the ten-
dency to create thruster injector-fouling catalyst "fines" in radial pointing
thrusters whose catalyst beds are above the injectors. These payloads must
assume a unique position in the payload bay to avoid this problem, which in
turn must be reflected in the payload-Orbiter umbilical interface configuration.
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Vertical installation of all payload classes at the launch pad involves a rail-
mounted manipulator which "bear-hugs" the payload during installation (per
JSC 07700). Manned access for umbilical connection before installation is
required, which imposes severe GSE constraints on access on both the payload
bay and manipulator.
The location of integration has rather significant effects on all classes of
payloads.
For Class II, Tug-delivered payloads, on-pad installation of payloads
reduces the KSC Tug fleet size by one Tug.
Additionally, if the payloads are installed at the MCF, the payloads are
virtually inaccessible for about seven days after installation until the Shuttle
arrives at the launch pad. This effective seven-day down-time could have
significant implications for DOD payloads that have strict constraints on
"time -from -notification-to -launch. "
Installation of time-critical equipment in the sortie laboratory is compromised
if payload integration occurs in the MCF nine days before launch. Current dock-
ing module design precludes access to the interior of the sortie laboratory after
its installation in the payload bay. A change must be made in the docking mod-
ule design or provisions must be made for an access hatch in the sortie labora-
tory to accomplish last-minute installation of such equipment at the launch pad.
Work done on the Cryogenic Tug Study currently being performed by MDAC
indicates that for the anticipated KSC launch schedule for Class II payloads,
the Tug fleet size can be reduced by one if payload-Orbiter integration occurs
at the launch pad.
This savings can be accomplished due to the seven-day reduction in the
overall Tug maintenance and turnaround time.
Once payload and Orbiter have been integrated, an abbreviated payload inte-
grated systems test (IST) is desired after every major physical move involving
the payload to verify that system functional integrity has been maintained.
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Maintenance and checkout facility (MCF) installation of payloads involves
two such operations:
A. Transportation from the PSA to the MCF and subsequent integration
with the Orbiter
B. Erection of the Orbiter for mate with the external tank and subse-
quent rollout to the launch pad
and prefers an IST after each of these operations in the MCF and at the pad.
On-pad integration involves only one such operation (transportation from the
PSA to the launch pad and subsequent installation in the lower environmental
enclosure and rail-mounted manipulator) and requires only one IST at the pad.
Equipment to perform an IST in the MCF is not required.
Payload-Orbiter integration in the MCF results in increased complexity of
payload-servicing GSE. Although these payloads require minimum servicing
before arrival at the launch pad (environmental control and battery trickle
charge), if the payload is installed at the MCF, payload GSE that provides
these services must be compatible with post-integration operations such as
Orbiter erection and with the Shuttle mobile transporter.
On-pad installation of payloads reduces the complexity of GSE, and GSE need
only be compatible with the payload and its transporter.
The majority of payload services (pressurization of the high-pressure vessel
and loading of cryogenic gas and liquid) will occur at the launch pad regard-
less of the payload-Orbiter installation method adopted for safety reasons.
If payloads are installed at the launch pad (Figure 2-5), it is anticipated
that installation of flight support equipment in the payload bay will still be
required at the MCF. These operational requirements were identified and
timelined for each payload class and are typically expected to require between
6 and 12 hours to accomplish.
Examples of these M.CF activities are the installation, pressure test, and
performance of an integrated systems test of the Sortie Laboratory docking
module.
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FIGURE 2-5 40297
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SHUTTLE READY
ABBREVIATED PAYLOAD LAUNCH
INTEGRATED SYSTEMS *
TEST
PAYLOAD/ORBITER>
INTEGRATION
The current Orbiter baseline allocates 18 hours for MCF payload-dedicated
operations, and no conflict with the Orbiter turnaround is anticipated.
Integration and installation functions for each payload class were defined from
which functional flows and timelines were developed. It was found that from a
time and schedule standpoint payload/Orbiter integration is essentially
independent of payload class.
Integration of payloads at the launch pad typically requires about 24 hours to
complete. Of this, about 14 hours of in-bay access are required. The
current Orbiter baseline allocates only eight hours of in-bay access. There
are however no known STS-imposed constraints that would preclude an
additional six hours of on-pad, in-bay access.
The functional requirements for integration installation of each payload class
and its associated flight support equipment were defined. These requirements
were then developed into functional flows and timelines to determine the over-
all differences in time and schedule required for the four payload classes.
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Although each payload class has its own peculiar type and quantity of flight
support equipment and interfaces, it was found that integration time is essen-
tially independent of payload class. All payload classes require about
24 hours to accomplish normal horizontal integration in the MCF, Figure 2-6.
The STS ground-processing baseline allocates 18 hours in the MCF for
payload/Orbiter integration. Payload/Orbiter integration operations can be
made compatible only by performing six hours of payload operations in
parallel with Orbiter operations on a noninterference basis.
Integration of payloads in the MCF does not eliminate the requirement for on-
pad, in-bay access to the payloads.
After arrival at the launch pad, it is anticipated that about 16 hours of payload
operations will be required. Of this 14 hours, eight hours of in-bay access are
required to perform payload integrated system testing, protective cover
removal, and IFJ installation (if required).
FIGURE 2-6
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The present Orbiter baseline currently allocates eight hours of in-bay access,
and no incompatibility with the Orbiter launch pad activity requirements is
anticipated.
From an Orbiter turnaround standpoint, it makes little difference whether
payload/Orbiter integration occurs at the launch pad or at the MCF. In
either case, if the Orbiter baseline turnaround schedule is met, the potential
impact on schedule is about six hours. However, if the 12-hour estimate for
installation of the flight support equipment at the MCF is correct, the current
allocation of 18 hours for MCF payload operations could be reduced to 12
hours, and launch-pad operations (currently allocated at 31 hours) could be
increased to 37 hours, resulting in no impact on the overall 231-hour Orbiter
turnaround schedule. On-pad payload/Orbiter integration therefore would be
preferred.
2. 2 PAYLOAD CHECKOUT/CONTROL REQUIREMENTS
Use of the Space Shuttle for delivery into orbit of automated, man-tended, and
Sortie Laboratory spacecraft imposes interface and equipment requirements
to satisfy the Shuttle system safety criteria and to provide the operational
capability to accomplish in-flight processing of the spacecraft.
The purpose of this task is the expansion of the SOAR II definition of the flight
support systems and equipment required to facilitate Shuttle transport of
automated Shuttle-delivered, automated Shuttle/Tug-delivered, man-tended,
and sortie-mission spacecraft, (mission Classes I through IV, respectively).
The flight support system definition is influenced primarily by implementation
of an on-board C &W (caution and warning) system and the system required to
accomplish in-flight checkout/monitoring/processing of the mission model
spacecraft. Equipment definition is driven directly by system definition
(requirements), but, beyond this point, it is also governed by consideration
of operational aspects as related to assessments of human (astronaut)
capabilities to perform.
The Checkout/Control Analysis is summarized in the following sections.
Detailed analyses are presented in Appendix B.
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The approach used to arrive at the total system definition was as follows:
* Derivation of Safety (Caution and Warning), and Control and
Checkout requirements for each mission class.
* Definition of the system needed to satisfy the derived requirements.
* Establishment of support computer functional allocations and
attendant machine and software requirements.
* Estimation of resources (power and energy) required from the
Shuttle.
* Definition of PSS and MSS operational/functional activities.
* Formulation of representative PSS and MSS designs for payload.
management.
The significant conclusions resulting from performance of this task are as
follows:
A. A common block of equipment is feasible to satisfy the basic
requirements of satellites primarily because the similarity in
satellite systems is ultimately reflected in the final requirements.
B. Shuttle-managed checkout (limited ORT) is a valuable supplemental
tool in assisting controlling agencies (on the ground) to determine
satellite systems health for LEO satellites.
C. Shuttle-derived checkout of geosynchronous satellites is directed
primarily to monitoring housekeeping data and C&W activities.
D. Operational and equipment analyses indicate a preference for
satellite management at the PSS, and Tug management at the MSS,
with the driving factor being the geosynchronous missions wherein
the payload comprises a multiple-vehicle combination.
E. The Shuttle cabin volume allocation is sufficient to accommodate
installation of the satellite-required FSE in the PSS.
F. Power-energy allocation of 50 kWh for payload usage is insufficient
(SOAR II conclusion) as further evidenced by the EOS requirement
for 49. 8 kWh with no allowance for contingency holds.
2. 2. 1 Safety
C&W display requirements were established for each mission class through
examination of payload systems to establish hazardous items/systems
(Table 2-3 and Figure 2-7) and evaluation of these items by generated C &W
20
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TABLE 2-3
CANDIDATE C AND W FUNCTIONS
SYSTEM/FUNCTION HAZARD
1. COMMAND SYSTEM
. UPLINK SIGNAL PRESENT POTENTIAL OF ULTIMATE ACTUATION OF DEPLOYMENT DEVICES OR INJECTION
OF CONTAMINANTS INTO PAYLOAD BAY AND/OR TUG ENGINE IGNITION
b. COMMAND EXECUTE POTENTIAL OF ACTUATION OF DEPLOYMENT DEVICES OR INJECTION OF
CONTAMINANTS INTO PAYLOAD BAY AND/OR TUG ENGINE IGNITION
c. INPUT POWER SAME AS .. AND 1.b
2. ORDNANCE SYSTEM
. ARM POTENTIAL OF FIRING ORDNANCE DEVICES
b. FIRE RELAY STATUS SAME AS 2.a
3. ACS MODE POTENTIAL OF INJECTING CONTAMINANTS INTO PAYLOAD BAY
4. MOMENTUM DEVICES POTENTIAL DAMAGE DUE TO DEVICE FRAGMENTATION
5. PROPULSION SYSTEM
a. PRESSURES POTENTIAL TANK RUPTURE
b. TEMPERATURES POTENTIAL TANK RUPTURE
c. LEAKS CONTAMINATION IN PAYLOAD BAY
6. THRUSTER TEMPERATURE INDICATIVE OF CONTAMINANT INJECTION INTO PAYLOAD BAY
7. SEPARATION SWITCHES POTENTIAL OF SEQUENCING SATELLITE DEPLOYMENT SYSTEMS
8. DEPLOYMENT SWITCHES POTENTIAL OF DAMAGE FROM LOOSE HARDWARE
9. SEQUENCER STATUS SAMEAS7
10. DUMP LINES STATUS POTENTIAL OF DUMPING CONTAMINANTS INTO PAYLOAD BAY
11. VENT LINES STATUS POTENTIAL OF VENTING CONTAMINANTS INTO PAYLOAD BAY
12. ELECTRICAL UMBILICAL STATUS LOSS OF PAYLOAD CONTROL BY ORBITER
13. PROPULSION UMBILICAL STATUS LOSS OF PROPULSION SYSTEM CONTROL
14. TILT TABLE STATUS SAME AS SB.
15. POWER SYSTEMS
a. PRESSURES POTENTIAL OF SOURCE RUPTURE
b. TEMPERATURES POTENTIAL OF SOURCE RUPTURE
c. VOLTAGES HIGH VOLTAGE ARCING
d. CURRENTS POTENTIAL OF SHORT CIRCUITS
16. TRANSMITTERS OUTPUTS POSSIBLE ACTUATION OF ORDNANCE DEVICES
17. ENGINE IGNITION INHIBIT POTENTIAL ENGINE IGNITION IN PAYLOAD BAY
FIGURE 2-7
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criteria. The C&W hardwire display requirements are shown in Tables 2-4
through 2-7 for each mission class. C&W criteria are summarized in
Appendix B. Backup C&W data are realized via on-board processing of the
payload telemetry signal (PCM). Payload telemetry signal characteristics
are summarized in Table 2-8.
2. 2. 2 Orbital Readiness Testing/Checkout
Each class of mission payloads was examined to determine Shuttle-attached
and released ORT sequences. The following mission phases and configura-
tions were considered:
* Attached to Shuttle during prelaunch, ascent, and LEO periods
* Released from Shuttle at LEO
* Geosynchronous station attached to Tug (Class II only)
* Geosynchronous station released from Tug (Class II only)
Table 2-9 presents a summary of the resultant checkout activities for the
mission classes. A more detailed delineation is provided in Table 2-10.
The prime benefits of performing Shuttle-controlled attached checkout
(Table 2-11) of satellite systems are exemplified by the EOS mission.
Figure 2-8 provides a description of the hardwired system utilized to accom-
plish pre-Shuttle release experiment systems checks.
EOS A has six experiments containing some 40 channels or detectors; EOS B
has four experiments with 36 channels. Under conditions of normal satellite
operation, the detector outputs are amplified by photo multiplier tubes (PMT's)
or solid-state devices, and their outputs are conditioned for entry into the
data-processing systems. The processing systems multiplex the conditioned
signals in accordance with stored sequences, digitize the data samples, and
perform processing to reduce data rates. Since each operation performed
on the analog data must be reversed to provide a data display, and data rates
reach 30 MPBS in the multi-megabit operation multiplexer system (MOMS),
a simpler experiment interface exists if detector outputs are transferred in
analog format to the payload specialist station (PSS) where they can be
selectively displayed in an amplitude/time format (A Scope) or as an image
using a scan converter and conventional CRT. Use of the PSS for the tests
22
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TABLE 2-4
1 0CAUTION AND WARNING-SATELLITES 4o4
MISS ION CLASS
I II III
FUNCTION (EOS) (ATSISMS/DSCS) (LST) ASSIGNMENT ANNUNCIATORS
ORDNANCE SAFE-ARM * * * *(2) * WARNING 2
PROPELLANTIGAS PRESSURE *(2) * * *(2) * CAUTION
PROPELLANTIGAS TEMPERATURE *(2) * *(2) e(2) * CAUTION
DEPLOYMENT SWITCHES * * * *(2) * WARNING 2
DUMP LINES STATUS * * * (2) - WARNING 2
VENT LINE STATUS * * * *(2) - WARNING 2
LEAK DETECTION* * * * *(2) - WARNING 2
*LEAK DETECTION IS DERIVED FROM COMPUTER PROCESSING
OF SYSTEMS' PRESSURES AND TEMPERATURES
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TABLE 2-5
CAUTION AND WARNING-TUG
FUNCTION ASSIGNMENT ANNUNCIATORS
TANK PRESSURES (6) CAUTION
TANK TEMPERATURES (6) CAUTION
ACCUMULATOR PRESSURES (2) CAUTION
ACCUMULATOR TEMPERATURES (2) CAUTION
FUEL CELL PRESSURES CAUTION I
FUEL CELL TEMPERATURES CAUTION 1
DUMP LINE STATUS (2) WARNING 2
VENT LINE STATUS (2) WARNING 2
ELECTRICAL UMBILICAL STATUS WARNING 1
TUG LATCH STATUS WARNING 1
ENGINE IGNITION INHIBIT WARNING 1
COMMAND SYSTEM INHIBIT WARNING 1
*LEAK DETECTION (6) WARNING 6
*LEAK DETECTION FROM COMPUTER PROCESSING
OF SYSTEMS' PRESSURES AND TEMPERATURES
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CAUTION AND WARNING-FLIGHT 40450-3
SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
MISSION CLASS
I II III IV
FUNCTION (EOS) (ATSISMSIDSCS) (LST) (SL) ASSIGNMENT ANNUNCIATORS
HOLDING TANK PRESSURE * * * * - - CAUTION
(OPTION)
HOLDING TANK TEMPERATURE * * * - - CAUTION
(OPTION)
TILT TABLE LATCH STATUS - 0 * * - CAUTION
C&W POWER SOURCE NO. 1 * * * * * * CAUTION
C&W POWER SOURCE NO. 2 * * * * * * CAUTION
MSS/PSS CONTROL POWER * * * * * * CAUTION
*LEAK DETECTION (OPTION) * * * * - - WARNING 1
TIE DOWN STATUS - - * * * WARNING 1
*LEAK DETECTION FROM COMPUTER PROCESSING
OF SYSTEMS' PRESSURES AND TEMPERATURES
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TABLE 2-7
CAUTION AND WARNING-SORTIE LABORATORY 4
FUNCTION ASSIGNMENT ANNUNCIATORS
*OXYGEN TANK PRESSURE (2) CAUTION
*OXYGEN TANK TEMPERATURE (2) CAUTION
*HYDROGEN TANK PRESSURE (2) CAUTION
*HYDROGEN TANK TEMPERATURE (2) CAUTION 1
*NITROGEN TANK PRESSURE CAUTION
*NITROGEN TANK TEMPERATURE CAUTION
*FUEL CELL STACK TEMPERATURE CAUTION
DOCKING MODULE PRESSURE CAUTION
COMPARTMENT OXYGEN WARNING
COMPARTMENT CO2  WARNING
*FUEL CELL STACK TEMPERATURE CAUTION
H20 QUALITY WARNING
*ELECTRIC POWER WARNING 1
COMPARTMENT PRESSURE CAUTION
COMPARTMENT TEMPERATURE CAUTION
*CLOCK WARNING 1
*COMPUTER (FAILURE) WARNING 1
*LEAK DETECTION (7) WARNING 7
*INDICATES FUNCTIONS TO SHUTTLE INTERFACE
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TABLE 2-8
40370
DATA REQUIREMENTS
MISSION CLASS
IVI II I
SORTIE
EOS **ATS DSCS SMS TUG LST LAB
DATA RATE (BPS) *1K-12.5K 384 250 194 51KI 51.2K/ UNDF
1.6K 1.6K
BITS PER WORD UNDF 9 8 9 UNDF 818 UNDF
MAIN FRAME  UNDF 9 1.024 2.97 UNDF 0.02/1 UNDFPERIOD (SECS)
FRAME SYNC UNDF IN 1ST 16 1ST4 1ST2 UNDF 4/4 UNDF(WDS)
MAIN FRAME UNDF 368 32 64 UNDF 1281200 UNDF(WORDS)
DWELL MODE PROBABLE YES PROBABLE YES UNDF PROBABLE UNDF
FORMAT UNDF B10-L NRZ-L UNDF NRZ-L UNDF UNDF
SUBCOMMUTATION UNDF LAST 16 64 & 128 32 & 64 UNDF UNDF UNDF
WORDS 16 DEEP
*VARIABLE -SELECTABLE BY PROGRAMMING; **ATS F&G; ATS H&I UNDEFINED
indicated provides the benefits of real-time control; i. e., it provides the
opportunity to vary instrument settings during passage over truth sites until
they are correct rather than programming adjustments, waiting for a remote
tracking station to come into view, dumping the data, waiting for the data to
be transferred to the laboratory, calculating new settings after evaluation,
and then repeating the process.
The primary benefit for attached checkout of the LST systems stems from the
fact that the total satellite activation/calibration period by ground control
includes a 150-hour wait period for thermal stabilization of the optics, which
then coupled with the activation procedure exceeds the normal seven-day
Shuttle stay time. Thus, an early measure of LST performance is required
to permit return of a malfunctioning spacecraft with the delivery Shuttle.
As previously stated, attached checkout of geosynchronous satellites is
restricted to monitoring of housekeeping data and C&W parameters. These
restrictions stem basically from consideration of satellite thermal operating
limits, difficulties in achieving operational configurations, e. g., deploying
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TABLE 2-9
CHECKOUT/ORT SUMMARY
ALL MISSIONS
* POST SHUTTLE INTEGRATION INTERFACE FUNCTIONAL TEST (LAUNCH SITE)
* CAUTION AND WARNING AND HOUSKEEPING DATA MONITORING (CONTINUOUS
FROM SHUTTLE INTEGRATION THROUGH PAYLOAD RELEASE)
EOS AND LST MISSIONS
* ATTACHED SATELLITE SYSTEMS CHECKS AT LOW EARTH ORBIT BY SHUTTLE CONTROL
* ORBITAL TEST PLAN PERFORMANCE SUBSEQUENT TO RELEASE FROM SHUTTLE BY
GROUND CONTROL
GEOSYNCHRONOUS MISSIONS
* SATELLITES
ORBITAL TEST PLAN PERFORMANCE AT GEOSYNCHRONOUS STATION BY GROUND
CONTROL
TUG
* ATTACHED TO SHUTTLE
NAVIGATION DATA DURING SHUTTLE ASCENT
COMMAND SYSTEM CHECKS
FUEL CELL ACTIVATION
GUIDANCE SYSTEM UPDATE
* RELEASED FROM SHUTTLE
AUTO SELF CHECKS
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TABLE 2-10
CHECKOUT/ORT SUMMARY
LOW EARTH ORBIT
MISSION PRELAUNCH ASCENT TO LOW ATTACHED TO SEPARATED FROM
CLAS (ON SITE) EARTH ORBIT SHUTTLE SHUTTLE GEOSYNC ORBIT
INTERFACE TEST CAW MONITOR CAW MONITOR ORT IORBITAL TEST PLANI
IEOSI *C&W MONITOR HEALTH DATA HEALTH DATA GROUND CONTROL
HEALTH DATA ORT ISHUTTLE CONTROL) SHUTTLE SCORTIASSIST
POWER
DEPLOY TEST
COMMAND/DATA
EXPERIMENTS
SATELLITE TUG SATELLITES AND TUG SATELLITES AND TUG TUG SATELLITES
*INTERFACE -INTERFACE *C&WMMOITOR CAWMONITOR *AUTO SELF CHECKS *ORT IORBITAL TEST PLANI
TEST TEST * HEALTH DATA HEALT DATA GROUND CONTROL
caW CSW __ __W TUG ESCORT
MONITOR MONITOR
HEALTH * HEALTH TUG TUG
ALU S DATA DATA NAVIGATION DATA FUEL CELL CHECKS
TUGI* AOT ANDACTIVATION
: SYSTEMS TURN ON
SGUIDANCE UPDATE
* COMMAND/DATA
* INTERNAL TEST
* INTERFACE TEST C&W MONITOR * CAW MONITOR e ORT (ORBITAL TEST PLAN)
*CWMONITOR HEALTH DATA HEALTH DATA GROUNDCONTROL
III HEALTH DATA ORT (SHUTTLE CONTROL) SHUTTLE SCORT/
ILST) ACECMT
DEPLOY TEST
COMIAN D/DATA
EXPERIMENTS
IV A INTERFACE TEST *C&WMONITOR * WMITOR(SORTIE LA) I C&WMONITOR EXPERIMENT
OPE RATION
ORT IS: OBSERVATION OF DATA RESULTING FROM A SPECIFIC SYSTEM INPUT (STIMULUS)
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TABLE 2-11
40518
ORBITER ATTACHED CHECKOUT BENEFITS
* EXPERIMENT CHECKOUT DURATION COMMENSURATE
WITH ORBITER STAY TIME
* ALLOWS REAL-TIME ADJUSTMENT OF EQUIPMENT VARIABLES
OVER TRUTH SITES
* AVAILABILITY OF UNPROCESSED DETECTOR OUTPUTS
SIMPLIFIES CHECKOUT EQUIPMENT
FIGURE 2-8
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arrays and antennas, and the potential of time criticality in regard to phasing
to achieve proper longitudinal station. Subsequent to arrival at geosynchro-
nous orbit, orbital test plan performance would be performed (current
procedure) via ground station control with Tug acting as escort.
2. 2. 3 Summary of Control/Display Requirements
Tables 2-12 through 2-14 provide a summary of control and display require-
ments stemming from satisfaction of safety, ORT/checkout, and general
operational requirements such as deployment preparations and test
preparation.
2. 2. 4 System Definition
The equipment/system that satisfies the mission classes' control and display
requirements is shown in Figures 2-9 and 2-10. The DSCS systems is
categorized as the worst case because two satellites are involved (in addition
to Tug), which requires interleaving and demultiplexing equipment to handle
data from both satellites, and DOD communication security equipment.
TABLE 2-12
IS 40368
CAUTION AND WARNING RELATED CONTROLS
ISATELLITES MISSION CLASS
I II III IV
FUNCTION (EOS) (ATS/SMS/DSCS) (LST) (SL)
ORDNANCE SAFE-ARM * * * * (2) *
PROPELLANT DUMP * * 0 * (2)
PROPELLANT VENT * * * * (2)
N2 TANK VENT 0 - -
TUG SORTIE LABI
HYDROGEN TANK PRESSURIZE - * - 0
HYDROGEN TANK DUMP - 0 0 0 - 0
HYDROGEN TANK VENT - 0 0 0 - 0
OXYGEN TANK PRESSURIZE - 0 - 0
OXYGEN TANK DUMP - 0 0 0 - 0
OXYGEN TANK VENT - o e * e
COLD HE TANK VENT - 0 0 0
AMBIENT HE TANK VENT (2) - 0 0 0
FUEL CELL CONTROL (2) - 0 0 0 - 0
N2 TANK VENT - - - - -
[PAYLOAD BAY I
HOLDING TANK VENT (OPTIONAL) * 0 0 0
HOLDING TANK DUMP (OPTIONAL) * . 0 *
HOLDING TANK PRESSURIZE (OPTIONAL) * 0 0 0
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TABLE 2-13
SATELLITES AND SORTIE LAB CONTROL 40499
AND RELATED MONITORING FUNCTIONS
MISSION CLASS
I II III IV
CONTROL MONITOR (EOS) (ATS/SMS/DSCS) (LST) (SL)
TIE-DOWN RELEASE RELEASE SECURE * - - *
COLD GAS VENT OPENED/CLOSED
HYDRAZINE VENT OPENED/CLOSED * * *
HOLDING TANK DUMP OPENED/CLOSED * * * *
(OPTIONAU
SSA SAFE-ARM SAFE/ARMED * * * * *
ELEC. UMBILICAL RELEASE DISCONNECTED/CONNECTED * - -
PROPULSION UMBILICAL DISCONNECTED/CONNECTED * -
RELEASE
TRANSFER TO INTERNAL POWER INTERNAL/EXTERNAL* * * 0 *
EXTERNAL POWER EXTERNAL/INTERNAL" 0 * * * * 0
TRiCKLE CHARGE (OPTIONAL) ON-OFF 0 0 * 0
TELEMETRY SYSTEM ON-OFF 0 0 0 0 0 0
TRACKING SYSTEM ON-OFF 0 0 0 0
COMMAND SYSTEM ON-OFF 0 0 0 0 0
COMMON
TABLE 2-14
i~s ' 40369
TUG CONTROL AND RELATED MONITOR FUNCTIONS
FUNCTION CONTROL MONITOR
IMU ON-OFF ON-OFF
IMU PREHEAT ON-OFF ON-OFF
GUIDANCE COMPUTER ON-OFF ON-OFF
TELEMETRY SYSTEM ON-OFF ON-OFF
TRACKING SYSTEM ON-OFF ON-OFF
COMMAND SYSTEM ON-OFF ON-OFF
POWER SYSTEM INTERNAL- EXTERNAL INTERNAL-EXTERNAL
POWER SELECT BATTERYIFUEL CELL INTERNAL-EXTERNAL
ELECTRICAL UMBILICAL RELEASE (STATUS)
PROPULSION UMB ILICAL RELEASE (STATUS)
TILT TABLE TIE- DOWN RELEASE (STATUS)
TILT TABLE RELEASE (TUG) (STATUS)
FUEL CELL SHUT OFF VALVES (2) OPEN-CLOSE OPEN-CLOSE
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FIGURE 2-9
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2. 2. 5 Commonality Assessment
Commonality of equipment usage was assessed to establish equipment
sources, i. e., GFE- or user-(program) supplied. The results are shown
in Table 2-15.
It is generally recommended that most of the equipment should be GFE,
inasmuch as it is apparent that basic satellite requirements can be satisfied
by a common block of equipment. Variances in satellite systems/
requirements are handled through software changes, overlays for nomen-
clature differences on C/D panels, and by management of the electrical
interface through the patch panel. (Figures 2-9 and 2-10.)
2. 2. 6 MSS/PSS Equipment Allocations
Equipment allocations were established for the MSS and PSS based primarily
on a determination of the items of equipment involved during the various
phases of the mission profile and an assessment of the operators' capabilities
to perform the functions on the basis of the degree of activity during flight and
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TABLE 2-15
EQUIPMENT ALLOCATION
ITEM SUPPLIER/CLASS REMARKS
COMPUTER GFE (BASIC) ALL MISSIONS REQUIRE FOR SYSTEMS DATA
CRTS PROCESSING
KEYBOARD
ANNUNCIATOR PANEL GFE (BASIC) ALL MISSIONS REQUIRE FOR C&W DISPLAY
C&W PROCESSOR
INTERCOMM PANEL GFE (BASIC) REQUIRED FOR ALL MISSIONS
PCM DECOMMUTATOR GFE (BASIC) REQUIRED FOR ALL MISSIONS FOR SYSTEMS
PCM SIMULATOR DATA PROCESSING
PATCH PANEL GFE (BASIC) REQUIRED FOR ALL MISSIONS
CONTROL AND DISPLAY PANEL GFE (BASIC) MISSION CLASSES HAVE SIMILAR REQUIREMENTS.
USE OVERLAYS FOR NOMENCLATURE CHANGES
POWER CONDITIONING GFE (BASIC) REQUIRED FOR ALL MISSIONS
A/D CONVERTER GFE (BASIC) MISSION CLASSES HAVE SIMILAR REQUIREMENTS
SPECIAL PURPOSE EQUIPMENT USER (UNIQUE) REQUIREMENTS/SYSTEMS CHARACTERISTICS
ENCODER ARE WIDELY DIVERSE
DECRYPTER/DEMULTIPLEXER
DSCS-2 CONTROL AND
DISPLAY MODULE
MULTIPLEXER
EXPERIMENTAL CHECKOUT EQUIP USER (UNIQUE) WIDELY DIVERSE REQUIREMENTS
WIDEBAND RECORDERS
OSCILLOSCOPES
SCAN CONVERTER
RECORDERS GFE (BASIC) REQUIRED FOR ALL MISSIONS
DIGITAL
VIDEO
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the presumed degree of training of the operators. The Class II missions
(geosynchronous) were used for this analysis because the Tug involvement is
the most taxing with regard to the magnitude of operators' activities and
required skills. Analysis of the Class II mission timeline (Figure 2-11)
resulted in the judgment that the numbers of Tug-related activities that occur
at low Earth orbit during the 20- to 25-minute deployment period should be
performed at a station relieved of satellite-related functions. The MSS was
therefore selected to provide Tug control, because Tug is a segment of the
STS and it was judged that the MSS operator would. be well trained in Tug
systems. Relief of satellite activities for the MSS is achieved by assigning
satellite control to the PSS. The basic PSS was then configured as a function
of mission by the addition of equipment or kits to support all payloads exclusive
of the Tug. This allocation allows the MSS to remain in a static condition
independent of payload and devoted solely to the Shuttle Transportation System
(STS) elements, Orbiter and Tug. PSS manning would be dependent upon pay-
load sophistication with three- as well as four-man Orbiter crews considered
possible.
A summary of MSS/PSS responsibilities/activities is presented in Table 2-16.
Representative equipment installations were developed for the PSS and MSS
to determine the practicality of installing the required equipment in the
Shuttle cabin volume allocated to the PSS. Table 2-17 provides a list of the
required equipment with salient features. Figure 2-12 provides a PSS layout,
and Figure 2-13 shows a typical installation.
Tug control/display needs are satisfied by complementing the baseline Shuttle
facilities (computer, CRTS, keyboard, etc. ) with the four items of equipment
shown in Figure 2-14, i. e., control and display panel, PCM simulator, PCM
decommutator, and caution and warning processor.
2. 2. 7 Payload Power/Energy Requirements
Estimates of payload power and energy requirements were established by
reviewing equipment operating times throughout the mission flight profile,
commencing with a transfer from ground power to Shuttle power at T minus
30 minutes. These estimates are shown in Figure 2-15. It should be noted
that the figure reflects only power requirements for payload systems and
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FIGURE 2-11
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TABLE 2-16
40376
EQUIPMENT ALLOCATIONS
MISSION CLASS
STATIONIEQUIPMENT I II III IV
PS I FUNCTIONS
*BASIC
CONTROL/DISPLAY PANEL SATELLITE CONTROL AND DISPLAY EXPERIMENT
COMPUTER/CRTS CONTROL AND
KEYBOARD I DISPLAY IF/AS
DATA PROCESSOR II REQUIRED
C&W PROCESSOR
POWER CONDITIONING
DIGITAL RECORDER I
VIDEO RECORDER I
*UNIQUE
COMMAND ENCODER I
ENCRYPTER SPECIAL PURPOSE FUNCTIONS AND/OR
DECRYPTER/DEMULTIPLEXER USER SUPPLIED EQUIPMENT
DSCS PANEL
EXPERIMENT TEST EQUIPMENT I I
INTERLEAVER I
*BASIC ORBITER SYSTEMS CONTROL AND DISPLAY
(BASELINE SHUTTLE
EQUIPMENT) MANAGEMENT OF PAYLOAD SERVICES
* UNIOUE I
TUG MISSION MODULE N/A TUG CONTROL N/A N/A
CONTROL DISPLAY PANEL AND DISPLAY
C&W PROCESSOR
DATA PROCESSOR
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TABLE 2-17
PSS EQUIPMENT CHARACTERISTICS
POWER WEIGHT VOLUME
ITEM (WATTS) (POUNDS) (INCH 3) I.D. N;O.
3ASIC
CRT (2) EACH 80 100 1458 1
KEY3OARD 15 15 500 2
DISPLAY/CONTROL PANEL 15 15 168 3
COMIPUTER/TAPE RECORDER 150 50 7.3 4
ANNUNCIATOR PANEL 5 10 80 5
INTERCOMM PANEL 3 6 150 3
PCM SIMULATOR 5 10 160 7
PATCH PANEL - 20 200 8
POWER CONDITIONER 25 20 448 9
PCM DECOMMUTATOR 50 20 400 10
C&W PROCESSOR 15 10 100 11
DIGITAL RECORDER 30 25 2,700 12
VIDEO RECORDER 100 40 2,700 13
A/D CONVERTER 5 3 100 17
SPECIAL PURPOSE
WIDEDAND RECORDER 50 22 050 15
SCAN CONVERTER 150 100 8,490 16
DECRYPTER/DEMULTIPLEXER 21 19 128 18
ENCRYPTER 11 9 128 19
COMMAND ENCODER 5 10 128 20
DSCS-II CONTROL & DISPLAY 35 20 420 21
A OSCILLOSCOPE 40 20 640 22
MULTIPLEXER 10 10 128 23
*THERMAL GENERATOR SERVICE UNIT 15 290 17,280 14
*N/R FOR STUDY MISSION CLASSES
FIGURE 2-12
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FIGURE 2-13
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FIGURE 2-15
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MSS/PSS equipment, leading to a reiteration of the SOAR-II conclusion that
the Shuttle energy allocation to LEO payloads (50 kWh) is insufficient in
that power for other operations (such as deployment) may be charged to
the payload, and no margin of energy is available for contingency holds.
2. 3 TASK 3 - PAYLOAD INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS
The purpose of this task was to define cable and service requirements between
the payload/Orbiter and payload GSE. The task was approached by initially
developing data transfer, control, and power requirements for four classes of
payloads consisting of the EOS, LST, synchronous-orbit spacecraft, and Tug
and the Sortie Laboratory. These, in turn, were based upon operations
analyses conducted in Task 2, which were performed to define mission and
payload specialist console functions and equipment. The electrical require-
ments were then transformed into cable segments between payload bay inter-
faces, after conducting implementation trades and the segments interfacing
with GSE used in conjunction with fluid interfaces to establish the payload
service panel design. As a final study product, payload bay cable installations
were developed, and interfacing launch area tests and GSE were identified.
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Key results of the study are the following:
* Separate payload data transfer lines (non-interleaved bit streams)
should be available to user facilities when payloads are on the
launch pad.
* Orbiter service panels have adequate area but cable run diameters
are limited for Tug-launched payloads.
* Payload bay cable installations vary with mission class but may be
standardized within a given class.
* The launch processing system should process spacecraft and Tug
data after Orbiter mating for use by launch control.
* DOD and NASA payload/Tug maintenance and checkout ground
operations flows should be similar.
2. 3. 1 Cable Harness Requirements
Interface connections within the payload bay were developed for study payloads
based upon previously defined requirements for prelaunch testing and
monitoring, orbital readiness testing, safety criteria, and operations such as
deployment. The connections, illustrated by Figure 2-16, were developed on
an equipment segment basis. The electrical interface functions for each seg-
ment were then identified by source or system, characteristics, the originating
requirement, and the number and types of wire to be used. The cable harness
back to the payload specialist station was found to contain the following
quantities of wire: EOS, 4 #12 and 114 TSP; LST, 4 #12 and 52 TSP; Class II,
2 #12 and 73 TSP; Laboratory, 12 #12, 95 TSP, 1 Coax. When the wires
contained within the T-26-minute connector cable are added to the forward
bulkhead connector cables, the diameter of the bay cable run is seen to be
appreciable.
2. 3. 2 Data Transfer Analysis
Prior to actually assigning the latter column quantities, a trade was performed
to select the method of data transfer. General criteria for data transfer were
reviewed, and its applicability to development of payload bay wiring was
discussed. The status of Tug and Orbiter data transfer system design was
also reviewed, inasmuch as the bay wiring should be compatible with these
systems. The result of the analysis and trade are shown in Table 2-18.
Bi-phase level was selected for the modulation scheme, and TSP wiring was
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FIGURE 2-16
EQUIPMENT INTERCONNECTION - EOS AND LST
ISHUTTLE CABIN I PAYLOAD BAY DEPLOYMENT
A IJ-BOX B PLATFORM
PSS
FH C D
MSS DEPLOYMENT
Il CAB I N- B AY  PLATFORM
I INTERFACE , - UMBILICAL
PANEL SERVICE PANEL CONNECTION
SHUT TLE I (T-26)
SYSTEMS I I E GROUNDGROUND
TABLE 2-18
DATA TRANSFER TECHNIQUE SELECTION
ICABLE TYPEl
ALTERNATIVE BANDWIDTH WEIGHT COST NOISE ATTENUATION
TSP TO 10 MHz 1 TO 2 LB/100 FT $18/500 FT 56 DB AT 1 MHz, 53 DD AT 10 MHz
COAX TO 500 MHz 15 TO 20 LB/100 FT $100/500 FT 38 DB AT 1 MHz, 51 D3 AT 10 MHz
ISELECTION: TSP FOR DIGITAL DATA
MODULATION TYPE
NO. OF ALTERNATIVES COMMONLY USED AC COUPLED SELF CLOCKING
23 HRZ-LEVEL NO NO
BIO - LEVEL YES YES
BI -POLAR* YES YES
ISELECTION: BIO- LEVEL
*LEAST COMMON
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selected over coaxial as the transfer medium. A tradeoff between the use
of multiplexing and hardwire revealed an expected weight/volume crossover
at 28 channels in favor of the time-sharing system, although the cost of the
latter was always higher. It was the approach selected on the basis of a
number of factors, including compatibility with current payload design,
computer control, and display control. panel availability. Cable character-
istics were also reviewed, resulting in the selection of standard round cable
rather than flat or belted varieties, standard NASA 40 Mxxx series connec-
tors, and Teflon-insulated wiring in the Shuttle cabin and Kapton-insulated
wiring in the payload bay.
2. 3. 3 Payload Bay Installation Drawings
Following the trade studies, cabling schematics were developed for each of
the mission classes (as illustrated by Figure 2-17) together with cable wire
lists (illustrated by Table 2-19). Junction box layouts were also prepared
as source material for the payload bay cable installation drawings shown in
simplified form in Figure 2-18.
2. 3. 4 Service Panels
Following the definition of payload bay cables and routing installations,
concepts for the GSE/service panel were developed, as shown in Figure 2-19,
on the basis of connector separation, available hardware, and operations.
The selected panel configuration embodies the use of existing flight-qualified
hardware, the separation of signals by function, and the separation of signals
by vehicle. The panels also incorporate fill and vent lines for the fluid and
gas interfaces chosen by mission class in Tables 2-20 and 2-21.
On the basis of the signals brought out to the T minus 0 and T minus 26-
minute service panels (and their originating test or operational requirement),
interfacing electrical aerospace ground equipment (EAGE) was identified at
the launch pad or launch umbilical tower (LUT), mobile transporter and
Orbiter integration facility.
39
FIGURE 2-17
1EOS/LST EQUIPMENT CABLING
L ca I DEPLOYMENT PLATFORM
POWER POER -POW2ER ,
4 SIGALS SIGNALS 12SIGNALS 6
4, 5A SIGNALS SIGNALS
EPEXP R D DATA -BOX EXPDATA EOS
A EXP E DATA EXP DATA LST
COAX
1 POR T A 1 PLATE
12S LS TFORM UMB20 1 I.FINI
CONTROL ATE
MSS SIGNAONTROL A61-20 
1-1/2 IN.
15R COAX U T 26SERVICE 
PANEL
, P MEXPERIMENT DNTATA CABLES N/R FOR 
LST
S P RM CABINTRAY -20 1 ININTERFACE
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS PANEL
TABLE 2-19
EOS/LST CABLING DEFINITION
CAOLE L.D. FUNCTION PINS-GAGE CONN. DIAMETER
1, 2 3 POWER 4-12 1-1/2 IN.
4, 5 6 SIGNALS 61-20 1-1/2 IN.
4A, 5A, 6A SIGNALS 61-20 1-1/2 IN.
7, 3, 9 EXPERIMENT DATA 61-20 1-1/2 IN.
-7A, 8A, 9A EXPERIMENT DATA 26-20 1IN.
10, 15 RF (GROUND MULTIPLE COAX 1-1/2 IN.
11 POWER 8-12 1-1/8 IN.
12 SIGNALS 55-20 1-3/8 IN.
13 POWER (GROUND) 8-12 2 IN (2)
14 SIGNALS (GROUND) 61-20 1-1/2 IN.
14A SIANGLS (GROUND) 32-20 1-1/8 IN.
15 RF(GROUND) MULTIPLE COAX 1-1/2 IN.
16, 16A PLATFORM CONTROL 32-20 1-1/8 IN.
16Z PLATFORM CONTROL 55-20 1-3/8 IN.
17, 18 VIDEO MULTIPLE COAX 1-1/2 IN.
19 POWER 6-12 1-1/2 IN.
20 SIGNALS 620 5/8 IN. *N/R FOR LST
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IFigure 2-18. 41420
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TABLE 2-20
40384-1
PAYLOAD LIQUID INTERFACES (INTERIM)
MISSION CLASS
I II II III IV
ATSISMS
EOS DSCS-II TUG LST SORTIE LAB SPECIAL
N2 H4 PRELOADED- PRELOADED-
DRAIN RQD DRAIN RQD
(NOT THRU (NOT THRU
PANEL) PANEL)
LH2  - 1-2" FILL/DRAIN - TBD
1 - TBD DUMP
(MAY NOT BE
RQD)
LO2  - 1-2" FILL/DRAIN - TBD
1- TBD" DUMP
(MAY BE IN
INFL IGHT ONLY)
ECS - - USES SHUTTLE MJS REQUIRES
ECS - NO PAD RTG THERMAL
REQMN'T CONTROL
TABLE 2-21
40384
PAYLOAD GAS INTERFACES (INTERIM)
MISSION CLASS
I II II III IV
ATSISMS
EOS DSCS-II TUG LST SORTIE LAB SPECIAL
N2  PRELOADED- PRELOADED- PRELOADED - USES SHUTTLE
NO PAD NO PAD NO PAD N2 -NO PAD
REQ MN'T REQMN'T REQMN'T REQMN'T
HE - 1-1/2" COLD HE
1-1/2" AMB HE
G002  - 1-112" VENT - USES SHUTTLE
1-2" FILL GO2-NO PAD
REQMN'T
GH2  - 1-112" VENT
1-2" FILL
AIR 10,000 CLASS PURGE MAY
10,000 CLEANLINESS BE RQD
CLASS IF LST (POS P)
CLEANLINESS SHROUDED
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2. 3. 5 Pad Electrical Aerospace Ground Equipment (EAGE)
The EAGE required at the LUT, which interfaces with the payload service
panel, is seen to be the following:
A. RF Amplifiers
B. Video Amplifiers
C. Line Amplifiers for Serial PCM and Commands
D. Voice Communications Relay Equipment
E. Battery Chargers
F. Payload Power Supplies
G. Command Decoders and Relay Drivers
H. Remote Multiplexers
I. Patch Panel and Distribution Equipment
2. 3. 6 Mobile Launcher Equipment
The only interfaces with the Orbiter and payload service panels appear to be
the following:
A. Battery Charge and Monitor
B. Caution/Warning Monitor
2. 3. 7 Orbiter Maintenance and Repair Facility
No requirements for service panel access have been found in the Orbiter/
maintenance and repair facility, with the exception of battery chargers and
caution/warning monitoring.
2. 3. 8 Launch Area Operations
Tests or operations, test or interface connectors, and GSE were identified
for the Tug, payload processing, and payload servicing facilities to provide
a more complete understanding of the launch area operations. Facility
sheets containing the name of the test or operation, the connectors involved,
and the GSE equipment required were prepared as illustrated by Table 2-22.
The difference in the handling of DOD and NASA payloads was discussed, and
a recommendation made that one flow pattern be established.
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FIGURE 2-19
SERVICE PANEL OPTIONS - ELECTRICAL
OPTION 1 OPTION 3
SPECIAL PURPOSE 000 FLIGHTQUALIFIED
CONNECTOR 000 CONNECTORS
ELECTRICAL * MIXED FUNCTIONS I FUNCTION SEPARATION
FUNCTIONS 0 MULTIPLE VEHICLES ( MULTIPLE VEHICLES
GASFLUID (GF)
FUNCTIONS(GF)
OPTION 2 SPECIAL PURPOSE OPTION 4
CONNECTORS 00 FLIGHTQUALIFIED
*MIXED FUNCTIONS 00 J CONNECTORS
* TUG ONLY * FUNCTION SEPARATION
SPECIAL PURPOSE G/F VEHICLE SEPARATION(CG/F) I CONNECTOR (G/F)
0 MIXED FUNCTIONS
0 SATELLITE ONLY
TABLE 2-22
ISPACECRAFT PROCESSING
FACILITY TESTS/EQUIPMENT
TEST OPERATION CONNECTION EOUIPMENT
REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM LEAK TEST TEST CONNECTOR 1 RCS TEST SET
BATTERY INSTALLATION, CHARGE, INTERFACE CONNECTOR 2 BATTERY CHARGER AND PANEL
MONITOR
INTERNAL/EXTERNAL POWER TEST INTERFACE CONNECTOR AND 3 POWER SUPPLY AND CONTROL
TEST CONNECTOR UNIT
INTEGRATED SYSTEMS TEST INTERFACE CONNECTOR AND 4 DATA ACOUISITION, DISPLAY /
TEST CONNECTOR CONTROL PANEL COMPUTER
SCF COMPATIBILITY TEST INTERFACE CONNECTOR 5 COMMAND PROCESSOR, ENCRYPTION/
DECRYPTION EQUIPMENT
COMMUNICATIONS PERFORMANCE NONE 6 GROUND STATION
TEST
SOLAR ARRAY ILLUMINATION TEST TEST CONNECTOR 7 CHECKOUT DRAWER, DISCRETE
CONTROLS AND DISPLAYS
COUNTDOWN TIME TEST INTERFACE CONNECTOR 4
PROPELLANT LOADING AND FIRING TEST CONNECTOR 1 2ND SET
TEST
PREINSTALLATION MATING INTERFACE CONNECTOR 8 TUG/ORBITER SIMULATORS
SIMULATION
SAFE AND ARM DEVICE TEST INTERFACE CONNECTOR 9 ORDNANCE TEST DRAWER
ORDNANCE INSTALLATION FLIGHT SYSTEMS 10 NONE
LRUTESTS NONE 11 LRUTESTCONSOLES
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2.4 TASK 4 - PAYLOAD DESIGN OPERATIONS IMPACTS
The purpose of this task is to identify payload design and operations impacts
that result from incorporating a docking module in the Orbiter payload bay
and, to expand the contamination control requirements identified in the
SOAR II Study for payloads identified as involving 10, 000-class cleanliness
standards.
The detailed analysis for each of these subtasks are included in Appendices D
and H, respectively.
2.4. 1 Docking-Module Analysis
The results of the analysis included in Appendix D are summarized below.
The docking module configuration included in the Shuttle PRR baseline was
used as the basis for the study analysis. It is recognized that subsequent
configuration changes are under consideration, such as
* Straight-through crew compartment/docking module/payload access
* Aft-located SAM's/
These configuration modifications do not, however, affect the analysis
results.
It is estimated that up to 66 percent of the Shuttle traffic model could
potentially utilize a docking module, and that on-pad access to these mission
payloads during launch operations will be required. Requirement for payload
access is anticipated for (among others)
* Replacement of failed system components
* Installation of time-critical equipment
* Protective cover removal
* Connection of test connectors for performance of payload integrated
system tests
As indicated in Figure 2-20, in-bay access to payloads is precluded for Shuttle
missions on which docking modules of the PRR configuration are flown.
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FIGURE 2-20
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FIGURE 2-21
CONCURRENT SHIRTSLEEVE AND EVA/IVA 40415
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(WITH OR WITHOUT
PALLET)
CASE 1: SHIRTSLEEVE MAINTENANCEIEVA CASE 2: SORTIE LABIEVA
CASE 3: SORTIE LABIEVA CASE 4: SORTIE LAB/IVA
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The four combinations of concurrent shirtsleeve and EVA/IVA operations
studied are illustrated in Figure 2-21. It was assumed that for all cases,
a backup EVA crewman would be fully suited and standing by in the Orbiter
airlock during EVA and IVA operations. A nominal crew size of four was
assumed; however, a larger crew would not affect analysis results.
Each of the four cases was examined to determine the acceptability of
concurrent shirtsleeve and EVA/IVA operations.
Concurrent operations are not recommended for missions utilizing a docking
module because a high potential risk exists for the crewin the event of an
emergency requiring shirtsleeve or EVA/IVA crew return to the crew
compartment.
The following three rescue modes (identified in Figure 2-22) were considered:
A. Docking with manipulator assist: The disabled Orbiter is equipped
with a docking module. The rescue Orbiter is launched with a docking
FIGURE 2-22
S40417
DISABLED ORBITER RESCUE OPERATIONS SCENARIO
--- I t-- 15 FT
rc~ c~- - -t -4-- -
A. DOCKING WITH MANIPULATOR ASSIST RESCUE
S30FT
B. DOCKING MODULE TRANSFER RESCUE
C. EVA RESCUE (NO DOCKING MODULE)
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module which, after the two Orbiters rendezvous, is docked with
the module of the disabled Orbiter with the assistance of the rescue
Orbiter SAMS. Shirtsleeve rescue is then effected.
B. Docking module transfer: The disabled Orbiter is not equipped with
a docking module. The rescue Orbiter is launched with two docking
modules. After rendezvous, the rescue Orbiter transfers and
installs one docking module in the payload bay of the disabled
Orbiter and then docks to it with assistance from the rescue
Orbiter SAMS. Shirtsleeve rescue is then effected.
C. EVA rescue: Does not depend on the existence of a docking module.
For shirtsleeve rescue from an Orbiter that was not launched with a docking
module, three payload Orbiter configurations affect rescue operations.
For two of the three configurations, the disabled Orbiter payload must be
jettisoned before docking module transfer operations, whereas only one
configuration requires payload jettison for EVA rescue operations. Adoption
of an emergency egress EVA hatch in the crew compartment and/or the
payload or payload/Orbiter access tunnel would entirely eliminate the
requirement for payload jettison.
Because of the complex operations involved in jettisoning the payload of the
disabled Orbiters coupled with the complexity of docking module transfer and
assembly, EVA rescue operations are preferred. Additionally, in the event
that rescue operations are required, it is highly probable that the crew of the
disabled Orbiter would be in their pressure-suits as a precautionary measure.
Docking module analysis conclusions and recommendations are summarized
as follows:
* Docking module constrains on-pad payload access and involves high
risk for rescue operations.
* Concurrent EVA/IVA operations endanger both the EVA/IVA and
shirtsleeve payload crew.
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0 Potential solutions/recommendations for further consideration -
Accept higher risk operations
Fly docking module on all missions and accept shorter
payloads (impacts -20 percent of missions)
Consider EVA escape hatch in Orbiter crew compartment
Reconsider airlock/docking port in Orbiter crew compartment.
The detailed operations required for the Orbiter to perform docking with
another orbital element were not included in the analysis because detailed
docking module design and configuration information is unavailable. For
Shuttle docking missions, it was assumed that docking is accomplished with
assistance from the Shuttle attached manipulator system.
The docking module analysis task of the SOAR-IIS study was based on the
Shuttle PRR docking module concept as depicted on R. I. Drawing No.
VL70-003115. Subsequent to completion of this analysis, R. I. Drawing
No. VL70-004094 depicting the revised docking module baseline design was
received. This revised design is presented in Figure 2-23. A review of the
revised baseline module revealed that the results of analyses conducted
utilizing the PRR baseline module remained unaffected with except
regarding the permissible length of payloads stowed in the payload bay and
accessibility to payloads through the module prior to launch.
The dimensional characteristics of the PRR docking module permitted
stowed payloads of 52 ft in length. The revised baseline module design
reduces the permissible length of payloads to 51 ft 5 in.
Physical interference of the crew compartment/payload bay hatch with the
retracted docking tunnel prevented access to payloads through the docking
module from the crew compartment before launch, when the PRR module
concept was utilized.
The revised docking module assembly baseline has eliminated this interfer-
ence and allows straight-through access to the payload from the Orbiter crew
compartment while the docking tunnel is retracted. All payloads attached to
the module are therefore accessible internally before launch.
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FIGURE 2-23
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2. 4. 2 Contamination Analysis
In general, spacecraft cleanliness requirements tend to become more
stringent as program definition progresses. This trend was evident during
the SOAR studies, where cleanliness requirements for seven baseline
spacecraft increased while none decreased. Experience with past programs
such as Skylab has shown that if contamination control techniques are not
introduced at the design definition phase, significant schedule and funding
impact may be encountered. Hence, it is the purpose of this analysis to
contribute to the definition of Shuttle contamination control requirements as
early as possible in its program time frame. The complete contamination
analysis is presented in Appendix H.
During the course of the SOAR-II study, the most stringent spacecraft
cleanliness requirement identified was class-10, 000 per Federal Standard
209A - Clean Room and Work Station Requirements, Controlled Environment.
A review of the SOAR-II payloads reveals three spacecraft that require
10, 000-class cleanliness: the Large Space Telescope (LST), Earth
Observatory Satellite (EOS), and High-Energy Astronomy Observatory-C
(HEAO-C) mission. (Program and configuration definitions of HEAO-C have
undergone major changes since its evaluation in SOAR-II; therefore, this
payload was not included in the detailed examination afforded the other two
spacecraft.)
The SOAR-II studies identified potential contaminant sources, examined Orbiter
effluent discharges, and identified methods of controlling spacecraft con-
tamination. Since ten different spacecraft were considered, the contamina-
tion control measures were general in nature in order to be all-encompassing.
In this study, the cleanliness requirements of the LST and EOS have been
examined in greater detail, and recommendations made specifically for these
two spacecraft. These specific control measures are the most stringent to
be encountered; however, many subsystem elements such as star trackers
and radiometers are common to other spacecraft as well, and recommenda-
tions should be applicable to them also.
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An important question regarding contamination control at the point in Shuttle
development is which contamination control measures are best assumed by
the Shuttle as opposed to the spacecraft. This study has attempted to
provide insight into this matter.
Several important inferences can be made from past contamination control
methods. First, many of the Skylab precautions and control measures are
due to its continuous generation of effluents, which is somewhat analogous
to the period when the Orbiter is in the payload vicinity. After Orbiter
departure, however, on-orbit contamination sources can be expected to be
reduced to insignificance. Second, the ATM was built, checked out, and
transported in a continuously maintained 10, 000-class cleanliness environ-
ment over a period of two years. Even so, certain instruments not further
protected by localized 100-class purges required cleaning before launch.
The adequacy of a certain atmospheric particulate cleanliness level is
therefore dependent upon the length of exposure of critical components.
ATM experience would suggest that 10, 000-class cleanliness may be too
stringent for an entire spacecraft, while it is inadequate for sensitive optics.
Third, many optical instruments have sealed optical paths so that external
contamination is basically a problem only at the light entrance window.
Fourth, while specification of atmospheric cleanliness levels per Federal
Standard 209A may be adequate to ensure desired cleanliness in ground-based
clean rooms, a surface cleanliness level is also necessary for the Shuttle
payload bay to avoid gross secondary emissions during liftoff and boost.
The Shuttle effluents and their sources have been identified and defined by
Rockwell International. The effluent characteristics are described in the
Appendix H, Table H-3. These effluents consist of particulates and gases
generated from the external tank system, the solid rocket boosters, and the
Orbiter systems (e.g., pyrotechnics, RCS, EPS, ECLSS, etc.).
The optical surfaces on the LST and EOS are the most contamination-
sensitive areas exposed to the environment. Contamination has been cate-
gorized into four types as listed in Table 2-23. Film deposits, in which the
contaminant contacts and spreads over the optical surface, are caused by
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TABLE 2-23
V lls 40477
CONTAMINANTS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON OPTICS
TYPE MAJOR EFFECTS
FILM DEPOS ITS REDUCES SPECTRAL BANDWIDTH (ESPECIALLY UV)
(OILS, WATER REDUCES MIRROR REFLECTANCE
OUTGASSING
RCS EFFLUENTS) DEGRADES RESOLUTION
PARTICLE DEPOSITS SCATTERS LIGHT
(DUST, WATER DECREASES SIGNAL-TO-NOISE RATIO
DROPLETS
ICE CRYSTALS REDUCES MIRROR REFLECTANCE
RCS EFFLUENTS)
MOLECULAR CLOUDS DECREASES SIGNAL-TO-NOISE RATIO
(H2, N2, 02, NH3  ABSORBS SPECIFIC WAVELENGTHS
RCS EFFLUENTS
OUTGASS ING)
PARTICULATE CLOUDS SCATTERS LIGHT
(WATER DROPLETS CREATES FALSE OBJECTS
ICE, DUST) DECREASES SIGNAL-TO-NOISE RATIO
adhesion condensation. Particulate deposits are caused by dust, liquid
droplets, ice crystals, and other materials that adhere to the optical
surfaces. Molecular clouds can be expected from outgassing and RCS
exhaust, and particulate clouds created by Orbiter effluents such as water
droplets, dust, ice, etc.
The contamination-critical elements of the LST and EOS are shown in
Figures 2-24 and 2-25. Both involve large optical systems. The LST involves
a 3-m primary Cassegrainian mission system with special imaging systems.
Orbital operation of the Large Space Telescope (LST) under conditions free of
Earth atmosphere obscuring effects will result in three distinct improvements
over ground-based telescopes: (1) objects previously too dim may now be
seen, (2) light wavelengths previously obscured (principally ultraviolet below
0. 3 lim) may now be sensed, and (3) optical resolution can be improved to the
point where it is limited by design state-of-the-art rather than by the
environment.
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FIGURE 2-24
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FIGURE 2-25
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Clearly, the introduction into the LST environment of contaminants that
encroach upon its sensitivity, spectral bandwidth, or resolution power tends
to obviate its purpose and usefulness to the scientific community.
The Earth Observatory Satellite (EOS) mission objective is to provide a space
platform for testing experimental sensors and spacecraft subsystems. Later
EOS flights can be expected to become increasingly operational with more
emphasis given to the sensed data rather than the sensors. Typical instru-
ments to be flown on the EOS are listed. The thematic mapper is perhaps
one of the more sensitive to contamination, being a catoptric system that
uses a 40-cm-diameter primary mirror.
Both the LST and EOS contain scientific and spacecraft instruments that
necessitate meticulous design, fabrication, and handling to maintain a high
degree of cleanliness. The cleanliness levels specified or implied for each
program are significantly more stringent than will be provided in the Shuttle
Orbiter bay. During deployment or maintenance operation, a less predictable
and perhaps uncontrollable environment will be encountered. It therefore
appears unreasonable to impose more-stringent particulate cleanliness
requirements on the Orbiter bay than the presently specified 100, 000-class
level. Rather, it is proposed that the spacecraft contain provisions to ensure
that cleanliness levels are maintained in an unclean.environment. Various
control methods have been examined and suggested methods made, as listed
in Table 2-24, in order to ensure that proper cleanliness is maintained
throughout the mission.
Similarly, the requirements imposed on the Orbiter by the payload are
minimized in Table 2-25.
The 100-class particulate cleanliness level is considered adequate for the
Orbiter bay, assuming more stringent spacecraft requirements will be met by
spacecraft systems. Unless a spacecraft bag is employed (which could become
quite complicated for retrieval), a payload bay surface cleanliness should also
be specified consistent with the 100, 000-class clean atmosphere. A 50-percent
relative humidity maximum is recommended to suppress arcing and chemical
55
TABLE 2-24
Iis SUGGESTED LST AND EOS CONTAMINATION 4458
CONTROL METHODS
LST EOS
X POSITIVE INTERNALAP EXCEPT WHEN OPERATING
X 10K CLASS CLEAN, 30% HUMIDITY AIR PURGE WHEN MANNED
X 10K CLASS CLEAN, DRY GN2 PURGE WHEN UNMANNED
X X CLEAN BAG USED DURING GROUND HANDLING
X X INHIBIT ORBITER DUMP, VENT, AND RCS (IF PRACTICAL)
X X AUTOMATED PROTECTIVE COVERS USED ON CRITICAL SENSORS
X X SPACECRAFT APPROACHED BY ORBITER FROM SELECTED
DIRECTION
X X ALLOW SEVERAL DAYS FOR OUTGASSING AND CLOUD
DISPERSAL
TABLE 2-25
40389
sSUGGESTED ORBITER CONTAMINATION
CONTROL REQUIREMENTS
*PAYLOAD BAY
100, 000 CLASS CLEAN ATMOSPHERE
OVISUALLY CLEAN SURFACES (SMOOTH LINING PREFERRED)
*50% MAX RELATIVE HUMIDITY
*PAYLOAD MANNED SERVICE PROVISIONS
100, 000 CLASS CLEAN ATMOSPHERE
*10 PPM LOW VAPOR PRESSURE (102 MM HG) NON- PARTICULATES
015 PPM HIGH VAPOR PRESSURE, HARD TO OXIDIZE NON-,PARTICULATES
030% MAX RELATIVE HUMIDITY
100,000 CLASS CLEAN AREA (E.G, DOCKING MODULE)
*ORBITER EFFLUENTS
NO DUMPING OR VENTING NEAR PAYLOAD
*RCS INHIBIT DURING CRITICAL MAINTENANCE PERIODS
SMALLER (25 LBF) THRUSTERS ANDIOR LARGER ATTITUDE DEAD BAND
*NEW OR MORE STRINGENT THAN EXISTING REQUIREMENT
reactions. Orbiter effluent discharge should be inhibited in the spacecraft
vicinity where possible. RCS inhibit using smaller thrusters, such as the
25-lbf engines recently incorporated, alleviate much of the RCS contamina.-
tion problem.
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2.5 - TASK 5 PAYLOAD VENTING REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS
The objective of the payload venting analysis is to determine the impacts on
the payload and on the Shuttle of payload venting. The payload-associated
fluid flows throughout the various mission phases can be appreciable, and in
some cases critical flows are dependent upon either the rigor of payload
safety requirements or the Shuttle's capability for vent installations and
operational constraints on venting. Payload safety requirements that call for
all payload pressure vessels to provide pressure-limiting relief vents can be
a key factor. Conditions where design conditions will permit no-vent opera-
tions may relieve some payload impacts. The definition of the Shuttle vent
services to the payloads is an evolving activity with many basic features yet
to be defined. The complete venting requirements analysis is presented in
Appendix E.
The representative mission classes have fluid types as listed in Table 2-26
that may be involved in payload venting. The major quantity flows are the
payload bay cooling gas flows and the purge gas flows generally involved with
all payloads and the propellants in the Space Tug. The other venting flows
are small and expected to be intermittent during the mission as indicated by
Table 2-27.
Reactive and hazardous fluid vents such as hydrazine, hydrogen, and batteries
will require dedicated vent piping overboard in the Orbiter with associated
disconnects when the payload is separated from the Orbiter in orbital delivery.
Examination of the total management of payload fluids, which includes loading,
venting, unloading, and dumping, shows that all usually are interrelated and
frequently have common plumbing. Simplification of the payload Shuttle inter-
faces leads to multiple-use piping.
For piped flows, the common solution tends to focus on the Orbiter exterior
umbilical panels, which may be suitable for payload fill and drain operations.
Their suitability for vent and dump operations may be limited.
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TABLE 2-26
II 40465
PAYLOAD EFFLUENTS DISCHARGE
PAYLOADS FLUIDS YPES
I EOS YES YES YES YES YES VENTS POSSIBLE
II ATS YES YES YES YES YES VENTS POSSIBLE
SMS YES YES YES YES YES VENTS POSSIBLE
DSCS-II YES YES YES YES YES VENTS POSSIBLE
TUG YES POSSIBLE YES YES YES YES VENTLINES
III LST YES -YES YES YES VENT LINES PROBABLE
ANCILLARY YES YES YES YES VENTS POSSIBLE
EQUIPMENT
USED ON
CLASSES I,
II, III
IV SORTIE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES VENTLINES PROBABLE
LAB
AUG 73
TABLE 2-27
EFFLUENTS PROBLEM
EFFLUENTS
AMOUNT
SPACECRAFT TYPE (LBSI TIME FLOWS CONTROLLED VENTING
EOS
GSFC EOS PROJECT HYDRAZINE 100 * ORBIT TRIM (1/30 DAYS) THRUSTERS CAN BE FIRED AS
OFFICE AND GN
2  50 * ATTITUDE CONTROL WITH COLD GAS NECESSARY TO USE UP REMAIN-STATIONKEEPING WITH HYDRAZINE ING GAS
SMS
SFC PHASE-B STUDY HYDRAZINE 72 INITIAL ADJUST = 6 BURN-OFF IS POSSIBLEJANUARY 1970 SIC ORIENT = 5 =
E-W STATIONKEEP = 3
N-S STATIONKEEP= 37 =
NUTATION CONTROL = 15 =
STATION RELOCATE = 5 =
ATS.H.I
ATS-H/I SYSTEM HYDRAZINE 180 HYDRAZINE IS BACKUP SYSTEM FOR UNLOAD- BURN-OFF IS POSSIBLE IN THEORYFEASIBILITY REPORT SECONDARY ING THE GYROS AND FOR 1 LONGITUDE RESPOSI-VOL II. JUNE 1972. SYSTEM TIONING MANEUVER, LIFE TIME IS 1 YR PLUSLEWIS RES CENTER 1 REPOSITIONING, OR 2 YR W/O REPOSITIONING
LST
NASA TM X4726 GN
2 (COLD 43 EMERGENCY/BACKUP SYSTEM ONLY. ALSO NO PROBLEM VENTING GASPHASE-A FINAL GAS) USED AS PRIMARY FOR DOCKING MANEUVER BECAUSE COLD GAS THRUSTERS
REPORT (VOL. 5, AGENA THRUSTERS USED ARE INACTIVE (I.E.. NO HEAT IS
DSCS-II
DSCS-II AREA HYDRAZINE 120/ST.AS NECESSARY. EVERY 21 DAYS AFTER ON- THRUSTERS CAN BE BURNED
TRW ORBIT. MOST FUEL USED FOR REPOSITIONING CONTINUOUSLY TO USE UP ALLON DEMAND. INITIAL STATION ACOUISITION FUEL
S22 =, STATIONKEEPING = 50-60 =
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The present definition of the Orbiter overboard venting for payloads is shown
in Figure 2-26. The three Orbiter umbilical panels, one forward and two aft
on the sides, are the main piping accesses. The ten bay atmosphere dis-
charge vents and ingestation ports are the main "unpiped" flow paths. There
are potentials for boat-tail piped outlets, although presently only Shuttle out-
lets are specified. Uncontrolled flows within the payload bay must not hazard
the bay doors to an overpressure condition and structural damage.
Nominal payload venting appears to be workable, provided the Orbiter can
accept venting outlets at the exterior umbilical panels or for some vents in
the Orbiter boat-tail. In general, payload fluids venting will be special
situation flows for safety requirements and only minor outgassing, free-flight
propulsion, or inerting flows prior to retrieval are envisioned after launch.
The Shuttle criteria in payload safety and Shuttle ability to accept payload fluids,
vent, fill, drain, and dump operations remain indefinite. The Shuttle defini-
tions for items listed in Table 2-28 will materially contribute to confirmation
of payload vent plan acceptability or will point up the need for added design and
possible operations solutions.
2. 6 - TASK 6 - GENERAL INTERFACE ASSESSMENTS AND SAFETY
This effort consists of two analyses: Payload placement and retrieval, and
an analysis of shuttle safety criteria impacts on the payload. These analyses
are summarized in the following sections and presented in detail in
Appendices F and G.
2. 6. 1 Payload Placement and Retrieval Analysis
The objective of this analysis is to determine if the offered Shuttle character-
istics are adequate for the needed payload services in the operations of pay-
load placement and payload retrieval. The Shuttle baseline equipment and
operations concepts for payload placement and retrieval utilizes the manipu-
lator, SAMS, for payload movement out of the payload bay and for payload
release. After macro and micro rendezvous of the Orbiter with a passive
payload to be retrieved, the SAMS completes the final payload capture and the
subsequent payload restowing in the bay. The low velocities, accelerations,
and forces capabilities of the SAMS which is the final contact and the initial
contact with payloads results in "soft" release and "soft" dockings.
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FIGURE 2-26
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AP 1.8 PSI OUT
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TABLE 2-28 SHUTTLE CRITERIA FOR PAYLOAD VENTING
* DEFINITION OF PRESSURE VESSEL CRITERIA
- WHERE PRESSURE RELIEF AND VENTING IS REQUIRED
- WHERE NO PRESSURE RELIEF AND NO VENTING IS REQUIRED
- PAYLOAD CAUTION AND WARNING REQUIREMENTS, DIAGNOSE
CAPABILITY AND CONTROLS FOR PRESSURE VESSELS
* DEFINITION OF VENT FLUID ACCEPTABILITY
- NO QUALITY RESTRICTIONS
- QUALITY RESTRICTIONS
- QUANTITY RESTRICTIONS
FREE FLOWS
PIPED FLOWS
BAY DOORS CLOSED
* OPERATIONS MODE VENT LIMITATIONS
- PRELAUNCH - SAMS
- LAUNCH - EVA
- ABORT - DEORBIT/RE-ENTRY
- ORBIT - POST-LANDING
* VENT OUTLET LIMITATIONS
- FREE FLOW
- PIPED FLOW
LOCATION
TYPE OF VENT
MISSION MODE LIMITATIONS
* PAYLOAD BAY VENT SYSTEM INTERFACES
- PIPING RACEWAYS
LOCATION/SIZE
X DIRECTION. YZ DIRECTION
- WALL LOCATION/SIZE
- OVERBOARD OUTLET
LOCATION/SIZE
FEATURES
- BAY LINER FLUID BARRIER
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Payload placement events, Table 2-29, when focused upon the payload release
actions and the residual disturbances of the payload at release involve Various
potential contributors such as indicated in Figure 2-27. These potential pay-
load excitations are all minor (with the exception of the separation velocity)
because of the very low Orbiter and SAMS motions. The consequence is that
payloads may expect to experience much lower tipoff disturbances from
Shuttle departures, as much as one-third to one-fifth of those disturbances
possible in the present expendable launch vehicles.
The one exception to this low disturbances, the payload separation velocity of
1- to 5-feet per second is an erroneous mingling of separation performance
and tipoff disturbance in the Shuttle specifications, which should be treated
separately. Payload velocities of 1- to 5-ft/sec relative to the Orbiter can
be achieved in any of three ways: (1) the use of a stored energy device in
the SAMS to accelerate the payload (not now in the Shuttle SAMS concept),
(2) the Orbiter movement away from the payload by RCS thrusting, or (3) the
payload movement away from the Orbiter by payload thrusting.
In the consideration of other payload separation systems, swing tables or
tilt tables without the SAMS, payload placement may be equally " soft" as with
the baseline SAMS concept, or payload separation velocities may be used
which "harden" the separation, Table 2-30.
The elements of Shuttle payload retrieval detailed in Table 2-31 for the
Shuttle baseline concept involves an active Orbiter closing to a passive space-
craft. The conditions at payload capture involve Orbiter micro-station keeping
on the payload so that the SAMS completes the capture by a "soft" engagement.
Other payload capture concept options are possible, including the "hard" dock-
ing capture of the payload to the Shuttle docking module, Figure 2-28, and the
hard docking to a tilt table in the payload bay.
These "hard" docking conditions are required to stroke the normal docking
attenuation system, to remove any misalignments between the payload and the
docking face, and to complete the payload capture latching. The Shuttle base-
line SAMS capture concept, Table 2-32, involves Orbiter station keeping
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TABLE 2-29
S40466
SHUTTLE PAYLOAD PLACEMENT
EVENT SCOPE ASSOCIATED EVENTS BASELINE DEPLOYMENT CONCEPT
PAYLOAD FROM: PAYLOAD: SHUTTLE MANIPULATOR
DEPLOYMENT PAYLOAD LATCHED - ACTIVATION
IN PAYLOAD BAY - EARTH LINK
- STAR LINK
TO: - READINESS CHECKS
PAYLOAD READY
FOR RELEASE
PAYLOAD FROM: SHUTTLE: MANIPULATOR UNLATCH
RELEASE PAYLOAD READINESS - STABILIZATION
PLUS SHUTTLE - POINTING
READINESS - UNLATCHING
TO: PAYLOAD:
PAYLOAD RELEASE - STABILIZATION
FROM SHUTTLE - RESIDUAL MOTIONS
PAYLOAD FROM: SHUTTLE: ORBITER RCS TRANSLATION AND
SEPARATION MOMENT OF - CONTROL OF RCS ROTATION FROM PAYLOAD
FROM RELEASE EFFLUENTS
SHUTTLE - CONTROL OF OVER-
TO: BOARD DISCHARGES
SAFE SEPARATION
DISTANCE FOR PAYLOAD:
ACTIVATION OF - CONTROL OF EFFLUENT
PAYLOAD SYSTEMS IMPACTS ON SHUTTLE
- CONTROL OF HAZARDOUS
PAYLOAD SYSTEMS
FIGURE 2-27
ELEMENTS OF PAYLOAD TIP-OFF AT 40482
PAYLOAD RELEASE
RESIDUAL RATES IMPARTED TO DEPLOYED PAYLOAD BY SAMS
SAMS END EFFECTOR
EXCITATION FRICTION FORCESSEXCITATION
-SAMS POWER OF PAYLOAD
MOTION \
- RESPONSE TO
PAYLOAD DY-
NAMIC FORCES
- RESPONSE TO
ORBITER DY-
NAMIC FORCES END EFFECTOR
STORED ENERGY
IMPULSE
BOOM DISTORTION GENERATOR
FROM THERMAL
GRADIENTS IN SPECIFICATION
OCCULTATION CALLS FOR
1 < SEPARATION 5 FPSVELOCITY
RESIDUAL RATE
REFERENCED TO:
- SAMS? III ORBITER INSTABILITY
-ORBITER? BASELINE POTENTIAL
<0.50 POINTING 40.50 POINTING
<0.1 DEG/SEC <0.01 DEGISEC
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TABLE 2-30
CONSTRAINTS IN PAYLOAD RELEASE TIP-OFF 
40478
- SOFT SEPARATION < 0. 1 DEGISEC HARD SEPARATION <1.0 DEGI/SEC
< 0 1 FTISEC <5.0 FTISEC
- SHUTTLE VOLUME X <0.75 DEGI/SEC, SEPARATION VELOCITY21I5 FT/SEC
SPECIFICATION VOLUME XIV <0.15 DEGISEC, SEPARATION VELOCITY21_5 FT/SEC
- OPENING VELOCITY - VEHICLE SEPARATION: 1.0 FT/SEC
* VEHICLE PROPELLANT SETTLING: 5.0 FTISEC (TRANSTAGE)
- RELEASE <0. 1 FT/SEC 2  ALLOWS SATELLITE BOOMS AND PANELS TO BE
ACCELERATION EXTENDED AT RELEASE
4-37
TABLE 2-31
40461
ELEMENTS OF SHUTTLE PAYLOAD RETRIEVAL
EVENT SCOPE ASSOCIATED EVENTS BASELINE RETRIEVAL CONCEPT
PAYLOAD FROM: PAYLOAD BEACON. PAYLOAD: TUG CLOSING AV 70 NMI TO
MACRO INITIAL PAYLOAD - POSITION KEEPING 24 NMI
RENDEZVOUS LOCATION (UP TO - STABILIZATION ORBITER CLOSING 24 NMI TO 1 NMI
24 MILES) - COMMAND LINK
TO: PAYLOAD CONTROL
PAYLOAD LOCATED TRANSFER FROM
WITHIN ONE MILE GROUND TO ORBITER
OF ORBITER ORBITER MANEUVERS
PAYLOAD PAYLOAD: ORBITER: PAYLOAD:
-READINESS - STABILIZATION - STATUS LINK - SELF SAFING
FOR CAPTURE -COOPERATION - READINESS TEST - COMMANDED FROM GROUND
-PASSIVATION COMPLETION - COMMANDED FROM ORBITER
- FINAL APPROACH TO
30 FEET
PAYLOAD FROM: ORBITER: - ORBITER CLOSES 1 MI TO 30 FT
MICRO PAYLOAD ABOUT 1 MI - MANEUVERS TO 30 FT - MANIPULATOR CLOSES 30 FT
RENDEZVOUS TO: UPTOONETENTHFPS TO2FT
PAYLOAD FITTING
2 FT ENVELOPE
PAYLOAD FROM: ORBITER -2 FT SPHERE -MANIPULATOR CLOSES 2 FEET
CAPTURE ORBITER SYNCH- ENVELOPE
RONIZATION OF PAY- - ONE 0.01o PER SECOND
LOAD MOTIONS ERRORS
TO: MANIPULATOR-CLOSE AND
MANIPULATOR TO LATCH
PAYLOAD ENGAGE-
MENT AND CAPTURE
PAYLOAD STATUS PAYLOAD: ORBITER: PAYLOAD:
READINESS FOR - SYSTEMS PASSIVATION - LIMITATIONS ON - AUTOMATIC SEQUENCING
MOUNTING/STORAGE - INDEXING FOR MOUNTS MANEUVERS - RF ACCESS
- APPENDAGES TOWAGE - LIMITATIONS OF - NO HARDWIRE
-SAFETY INSPECTION MANIPULATOR LOCATIONS
PAYLOAD PAYLOAD DE-DEPLOYMENT, MANIPULATOR MOTIONS PAYLOAD:
MOUNTING IN MOUNTING AND LATCHING PAYLOAD FSE ACTIVATION - UMBILICALS MATED AFTER
PAYLOAD BAY MOUNTING
439
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FIGURE 2-28
PAYLOAD CAPTURE OPTIONS 40481
ACTIVE ORBITER
LTARGETNEAACTUGTRGET SOFT DOCK TILT TABLE
CLOSURE
MANIPULATOR
SERVICES
ORBITER BASELINE
ORBITER DOCKING MODULE
FSOFT LINEAR
TARGET HARD DOCK ACTUATOR TAFIGET INDEXING
DOCKG ->OCKING- Y AT
ODING CLOSURE ARXIAL E) INDEXING GENERALMOGDUL Q (RAN PURPOSE
PITCH /MANIPULATOR
SYAW YAW PITCH>5 PITCH PITCH 
S- SAMS
SIMPLIFICATION
TABLE 2-32 40483
PAYLOAD CAPTURE
HARD DOCKING SOFT DOCKING
ORBITER CLOSING SAMS CLOSING
*APPROACH VELOCITY 0.5 FT/SEC CONTACT VELOCITY >0.8 FTSEC
ANGULAR 1. 0 DEGISEC ANGULAR0. 1 DEGISEC
*CONTACT ORBITER STATION KEEPING
CLOSING VELOCITY 0.3 VC 0.5 FTISEC l-1 FOOT RELATIVE POSITION
LATERAL VELOCITY VL> 0.045 TO 0.075 FTISEC <0.35 FTISEC RELATIVE VELOCITY
PAYLOAD MOTION <45 FEET TARGET FROM ORBITER CG
0. 1 DEG/SEC (ANY AXIS) PAYLOAD MOTION
<1 DEG AMPLITUDE 0.01 DEGI/SEC
>1. 5 FT CORR IDOR <1 DEGREE AMPLITUDE (ANY AXIS)
MISALIGNMENT MISALIGNMENT - SAMS JAW
LATERAL ±0.5 FEET LATERAL ±2 INCHES
ANGULAR ±5 DEGREE ANGULAR SMALL (TBD)
ROLL 7 DEGREE ROLL SMALL (TBD)
STAND-OFF DISTANCE STAND-OFF DISTANCE AND MOTION(WHEN SAMS COMPLETES CAPTURE WITH A SOFT DOCK) (ORBITER STATION KEEPING ENVELOPE)
230 FEET <±1 FOOT
(<45 FEET FROM CG) <0.01 DEGISEC (ANY AXIS)
<0. 1 FTSEC
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stand-off position on the payload so that a relative position of ±1 ft, less
than 0.01 ft/sec 2 acceleration and less than 0. 1 ft/sec velocity permits the
SAMS grappler to close and capture. If this Orbiter performance can be
used for the regular docking engagement, it would be possible to design out
the "hard" docking conditions and "soft dock" all payload captures.
The function of the SAMS in the baseline payload placement and retrieval,
other than movement of the payload into and out of the payload bay, appears
to employ only a small fraction of its versatility. Simpler systems, such as
a linear actuator or docking faces, would suffice. In the SAMS, movement
of the payload into and out of the bay, the more positive tilt table would
reduce deployment times as well as retain other services such as umbilical
services. The SAMS does not appear to be justifiable for payload placement
and retrieval activities.
The conclusion that other capture options are competitive with the SAMS is
predicated upon the Orbiter micro-station keeping performance. If this
station keeping is not achieved, the capture tends toward hard docking. The
increased demands upon the SAMS could exceed its capabilities. There is no
Orbiter microstation keeping performance requirement presently listed in
the Shuttle Level II Volume X Specification. Can the Shuttle-Orbiter perform
as required for the baseline capture operation?
If the Shuttle performance is achieved, it appears that the payloads can satis-
factorily operate in placement and in retrieval.
Additional details on this analysis appear in Appendix F.
2. 6. 2 Impacts of Shuttle Safety Criteria on Payloads*
This task involves the determination of the impacts of Shuttle safety criteria
on payloads. Payload related safety criteria appear in fragmented form in
various Shuttle Level II specifications. The greatest detail in safety criteria
is presently undergoing active coordination from a draft version, 7 June, for
Section 11. 0 of Volume XIV which was used for this impact analysis. As a
*See Errata Note on bottom of page 71.
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consequence of the 7 June draft susceptibility to change; the impact conclusions
can only be indicative of the safety trends.
The draft criteria dealt with safety management and with specific safety
design features. The scope of payload safety covered includes the two) boxed
areas in Figure 2-29. The launch program areas, shown in the dashed box,
were largely omitted as were the other payload items outside of the boxes.
The relationship between the payload supplier and the Space Shuttle Program
Office (SSPO) were defined in the criteria draft as a two-party interaction as
sketched in Figure 2-30. The identification of a single payload spokesman
was made to sustain the two-party activities. Two general types of payloads
were recognized; one, a single payload which would be represented by a pay-
load supplier; and two, a multiple payload case where a designated owner/
operator for integrated payload would be selected. The SSPO assesses the
hazards presented by the payload supplier and accepts the risks. In the
course of these reviews, several areas of SSPO approvals are obtained. The
SSPO does not cover payload safety and hazards associated only with payload
mission objective achievement so long as the hazards do not affect mission
safety for the Shuttle/Payload integrated system.
In carrying out these safety management activities, the payload supplier is
accountable, Figure 2-31, to the SSPO for: (1) analysis including safety and
hazard analysis and the hazards tracking system, (2) corrective actions that
achieve hazard resolutions, (3) documentation for the various analyses, instruc-
tions, reports, procedures and etc., (4) conduct hazard reduction verification
tests, analyses, demonstrations, and (5) conduct the safety
reviews/assessments.
An examination of the responsible payload groups representing: (1) the sources-
the Sortie Lab, the Spacecraft/Satellite, the Space Tug, Propulsive Stages,
Flight Support Equipment and the Experiments and sensors (2) the handlers -
the payload packager, the payload integrator, the payload refurbisher, and (3)
the major payload sponsors such as NASA centers, DOD and etc, points up the
variety of payload safety interested parties. Some aspects of payloads safety
are treated early in the mission genesis - design solutions, others are
confirmed or demonstrated in tests at various development and packaging/
integration stages. It therefore is not readily evident that a single payload
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FIGURE 2-29
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FIGURE 2-31
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spokesman on safety can be practical. The uncertainty of a single spokesman
for payload safety opens up the question of whether also a single spokesman
can be assured for the Space Transportation System, Figure 2-32. The
possible sources of safety direction and payload safety review may be even-
tually focused into one authority so that the draft criteria objective of a two-
party safety operation could be realized. At present, the scope of the draft
criteria as generalized previously in Figure 2-29 does not appear to cover the
total safety needs. When total payload effectiveness and liability are con-
sidered as well as payload costs in procedures, documentation and time, pay-
load safety can become a significant management problem as suggested in
Table 2-33 for only the Shuttle related safety. The payload safety workload is
appreciable in the analysis, resolutions, reviews and demonstrations even
when it is accomplished "on-line. " If redo or retro work is involved,
especially where some sources of safety direction only become active later
in the flight readiness schedule, work and schedule impacts become serious.
Likewise, documentation and liabilities will influence safety costs particularly
for missions that involve several major payload components as suggested in
Figure 2-32.
The draft safety criteria includes specific design criteria items as well as the
safety management criteria just discussed. These design criteria are subject
to ongoing coordination changes; however, they can be generalized into three
areas as follows and as outlined in Table 2-34. Certain criteria appear to
exceed Shuttle features. This greater level of payload safety in itself may not
be undesirable especially considering the isolated in-payload bay conditions.
However, some criteria can impact Shuttle interfaces such as the caution
and warning audible signal or the need for a payload dedicated ground return
wire where the Shuttle uses a structural return. Also where payload safety
generates non-productive payload complexities and added costs, the payload
sponsor can challenge the need for a possible two-class safety arrangement,
Shuttle class and Payload class.
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TABLE 2-33
IIS 41371
PAYLOAD SAFETY ASSURANCE TASKS IMPACTS
WORKLOAD SCHEDULES
/ ANALYSIS
HAZARDS-SAFETY
- DEPTH ON-LINE INCORPORATION\
/ -TRACEABILITY
HAZARDS RESOLUTIONRETRO FIT, TEST, WOROR
HAZARDS TRACKING RETRO: FIT, TEST, WORK
SAFETY REVIEWS REVIEW
-FORMAL - INFORMAL
DEMONSTRATIONS
TESTS
PROCEDURES/INSTRUCTIONS / LIABILITIES
PREPARATION
DOCUMENTATION / RESPONSIBILITY FOR
SAFETY ASSURANCE ACTIVITY TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE\
SCHEDULE ' RELIABILITY/QUALITY
\ ASSURANCE
- \SHUTTLE DAMAGE
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TABLE 2-34
TABLE 2-34 SHUTTLE PAYLOAD SAFETY CRITERIA
CRITERIA MAY EXCEED SHUTTLE FEATURES SHUTTLE SPECIFIED
PAYLOAD CAUTION AND WARNING
- DETACHED PAYLOAD ACTIVE SILENT
- AUDIBLE SIGNAL LIGHT MATRIX
PAYLOAD JETTISON SILENT - ABORT
LANDING WITH PAYLOAD
AUTOMATIC PRESSURE LIMITS -
PAYLOAD TANKS SILENT
REDUNDANT FLUID LINES - WIRING PARTIAL
UMBILICAL ELECTRICAL
- SEPARATION FROM FLUIDS PARTIAL
- DEDICATED GROUND WIRE NO
NOISE LEVEL 72.5 DB 145 DB OASPL
VENTPAYLOAD FLUIDS UNRESTRICTED
VENT UNCLEAR
REMOTE PROPELLANT PRESSURIZATION SILENT - SHUTTLE HAS
ACTIVE RCS AND OMS
SCOPE OF CRITERIA UNCLEAR PERFORMANCE POSSIBLY EXCEEDS SHUTTLE SAFETY NEEDS
SHUTTLE SAFETY OBJECTIVES: CRITERIA STATES: PAYLOAD: COMMENT
ABILITY TO SUCCESSFULLY SILENT FAIL SAFE BASIC PAYLOAD REQUIREMENT
TERMINATE MISSION FOR SHUTTLE SAFETY
- INTACT CREW INFERRED FAIL OPERATIONAL/ WHEN DOES PAYLOAD RESIDUAL
- INTACT SHUTTLE SILENT FAIL SAFE OPERATIONAL CONDITION RELATE
- INTACT PAYLOAD SILENT TO SHUTTLE SAFETY?
REUSABLE SHUTTLE SILENT FAIL SAFE/FAIL SAFE SPECIFIC SOLUTIONS RATHER
OPERATIONS SAFETY PARTIAL THAN GENERAL
ASSOCIATED FUNCTIONS/ELEMENTS: JETTISON PAYLOAD (PAYLOAD IS BASICALLY SAFE)
GROUND SAFETY PARTIAL REMOTE PROPELLANT PRESSURIZATION
INDUSTRIAL SAFETY SILENT MICRO-BIOLOGICAL EXPERIMENTS
POPULATION SAFETY SILENT SELF SAFING NOT COVERED
PROPERTY SAFETY SILENT
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Another group of criteria appear to require payload safety performance in
excess of the Shuttle needs: the needs in the sense of payload hazard to
Shuttle successful mission termination, Table 2-34. A "fail safe" payload
appears to satisfy the basic requirement of the Shuttle on the payload. A
higher level of payload safety performance such as fail operational/fail safe
(draft paragraph 11. 2.2. 3a) or even fail safe/fail safe would appear to not
enhance the Shuttle's capability to successful mission termination. Payload
fail operational/fail safe features appear to be outside of the Shuttle safety
area of formal concern, although the payload feature may be desired by NASA
or others for other performance/assurance reasons. Likewise payload fail
safe/fail safe appears to go beyond Shuttle formal concerns. A fail safe pay-
load that is required to be jettisoned is being jettisoned for reasons other than
payload hazards to the Shuttle arising from a payload - initiated hazard. The
fail safe/fail safe concept is so broad that unproductive payload safety effort
may be involved, hence a workable arrangement would be where specific fail
safe/fail safe features are only levied on the payload; for example, a double-
walled sealed pressure vessel to contain micro-biological experiments while
in the Orbiter.
A third area is the uncertainty in scope of the criteria, Table 2-34. Shuttle
safety objectives are documented in Shuttle specifications, a one-for-one
correlation with the draft criteria is missing. Also other areas of mission
safety are not covered in the draft design criteria.
It is improper to be conclusive about the draft criteria and their payload
impacts except to observe that payload safety management is important and
deserves close attention. Likewise design and operations criteria are
important and warrant early refinements. Additional discussion of this
analysis appears in Appendix G.
ERRATA NOTE: The Safety portion of this report includes MDAC interpre-
tations of the NASA safety requirements contained in an early draft version
of Section 11, Vol. XIV, JSC 07700, and does not necessarily reflect the
NASA position. Subsequent to the analysis in this section, the JSC Safety
Office has advised that Shuttle safety criteria have been extensively revised.
The latest NASA documents should be consulted for the current safety criteria.
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Section 3
SUPPORTING RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY (SRT)
The SRT requi rements describe the supporting work that must be accomplished
in order to preclude a relatively high degree of performance or development
risk at the onset of Phase D development. The SOAR-IIS study was limited
in scope to specific tasks or analyses based on the select spacecraft and
missions described in the Section 2, Summary. These analyses resulted in
no new SRT items being identified. However, for reference three items
were identified and described in detail in the SOAR-II final report MDC G4480
(April 1973), Volume X, Section 5, that are still considered applicable to the
general areas of Shuttle payloads. These items are:
A. A contact heat exchanger to transfer heat from the payload to the
Orbiter radiator system.
B. Spacecraft and propulsive stage pressure vessel rupture bay and
warning device to provide early warning of impending failure.
C. Spacecraft and propulsive stage pressure vessels that do not produce
shrapnel upon rupture.
Eight other applicable items were described in a similar manner in the earlier
SOAR-I final report MDC G-2546 (December 1971), Volume VIII, Book III,
Section 5. These items are:
A. An image enhancement device to improve image quality electronically.
B. A high-density tape recording to handle missions involving high data
rate sensors.
C. A voice recognition interface with a computer controlled system to
simplify man-machine interfaces.
D. A high-density tape information retrieval and storage read/write
head.
E. An IMS storage address capability for displays and controls to
improve data accessibility from storage.
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F. Spacecraft man-machine servicing manipulator or other system to
perform on-orbit maintenance and repair operations.
G. Contamination analyses to determine contaminant sources and
sensors development to detect leakage, gases, etc.
H. A dynamics analysis for Shuttle mounted experiments requiring fine
pointing.
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Appendix A
PAYLOAD OPERATIONS ANALYSIS: PAD VS VAB INSTALLATION
The payload operations analyzed in the study involved the payload-to-Orbiter
installation operations including physical installation/removal and functional
integration for each of the four payload classes defined for analysis in the
study.
The overall study objective of the payload operations analysis was to identify
a preferred approach for payload installation into the Shuttle Orbiter payload
bay. The two installation approaches considered in the study were:
A. Horizontal installation at the Maintenance and Checkout Facility
(MCF). The Shuttle Program has currently baselined this installation
mode.
B. Vertical installation at the launch pad. The Shuttle Program currently
utilizes this installation mode for contingency on-pad payload change-
out only.
Selection of the preferred installation method was based on the following
approach:
o Review the baseline Shuttle ground operations.
o Determine the integration functions for each payload class.
o Develop integration flows and timelines for each payload class and
each integration method (horizontal and vertical) to identify impacts
to the Orbiter turnaround time constraints and benefits to payloads
resulting from the integration mode.
o Determine the influence of Orbiter orientation and location for each
payload class.
o Review the ground reviewing and checkout requirements for each pay-
load class.
The current Shuttle ground processing flow, presented in Figure A-1, baselines
horizontal payload/orbiter integration at the MCF. The significant elements in
the baseline flow which influences horizontal integration operations are as
follows:
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A. The Orbiter turnaround time is constrained to 231 working hours.
B. Eighteen hours are allocated for payload/Orbiter integration and
interface verification at the MCF.
C. Integration operations must be completed 125 working hours prior
to launch.
D. Eight hours are allocated for payload servicing at the launch pad.
E. The payload must be processed through the launch site facilities
described below.
A.1 PSA (PAYLOAD SERVICE AREA)
This general group of payload facilities provides for all payload operations
required prior to payload/Orbiter integration. Typical payload operations which
occur at this facility are:
A. Recieving and inspection
B. Final spacecraft integration and checkout
C. Ancillary equipment integration
D. Structural Interface Fixture checks
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E. Electronic Analog Unit Checks
F. Service Loading
G. Spacecraft/Upper stage mating
A.2 MCF (MAINTENANCE AND CHECKOUT FACILITY)
In addition to Orbiter maintenance / checkout operations, payload installation
into and removal from the Orbiter payload bay occurs at this facility with the
Orbiter in the horizontal position.
A.3 VAB (VERTICAL ASSEMBLY BUILDING)
This facility provides for rotation of the Orbiter (and its integrated payload)
to the vertical position for final integration with the external tank and SRM's
and checkout prior to transport to the launch area on the Shuttle mobile launch
platform.
A. 4 PAD (LAUNCH AREA)
This facility provides the final launch operations facilities for cryogenic
loading, final payload servicing (if required), crew boarding, and launch check-
out and countdown.
A.5 PAYLOAD INTEGRATION FUNCTIONS/FLOWS/TIMELINES
In order to successfully integrate each payload class with the Shuttle Orbiter
certain payload class peculiar integration functions must be performed. These
integration functions include those required by the payload itself as well as
its respective flight support equipment and associated software.
A key driver in the development of these integration functions is the level of
cleanliness which is required by the payload and which must be maintained dur-
ing integration and post-integration operations. Of the four classes of pay-
loads, two (EOS-Class I and LST-Class III) require specified particulate
cleanliness levels of 10,000 class or better. (It was assumed that the Sortie
Lab requires a particulate cleanliness level of 100,000 class and that its
pallet-mounted experiments employ localized contamination control if levels
better than 100,000 class are required.) Additionally, the LST (Class III)
requires a specified relative humididty level of <35%.
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Since the MCF is assumed to provide a 100,000 class particulate cleanliness
level and a relative humidity level of <50%, and because of relatively large
payload physical dimensions, it was further assumed that the EOS and LST would
both require a flight environmental shroud which is installed on the payload in
the Payload Service Area (PSA) prior to transportation of the payload to the MCF
for integration in the Orbiter. The EOS and LST are thus both integrated with
their respective shrouds attached and required installation functions and inter-
faces for the Class I and III payloads are necessarily similar.
For the above reasons, the Class I and III payloads were logically grouped in
order to develop their installation integration functions.
Another feature which influences the payload integration operations is the inter-
faces required by the payload during the integration process. A survey of each
payload class was made utilizing information developed in the SOAR II and the
DOD STS Payload Interface studies and the required payload interfaces which
were identified are tabulated in Table A-1.
A.6 HORIZONTAL INTEGRATION
In developing the integration flows and timelines for horizontal integration,
it was assumed that the MCF eighteen hour allocation does not include operations
involved in opening and closing the payload bay doors and that this period is
dedicated solely to the payload installation and integration operations. This
assumption has significant bearing on the amount of time available to perform
the integration operations since in the horizontal position, a total of eight
hours are required to open and close the doors as illustrated in Figure A-2.
The functional flows and timelines developed for each payload class generally
follow the integration scenario presented in Figure A-3 are shown in Figures
A-4 through A-9.
Development of the functional flows revealed that each payload class had, as
might be expected, its own unique flight support equipment and installation
integration functions. Examples of these unique characteristics are presented
in Table A-2.
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MCF PAYLOAD/ORBITER INTEGRATION ON-PAD PAYLOAD/ORBITER INTEGRATION
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TABLE A-2
PAYLOAD UNIQUE
CLASS EQUIPMENT
* Shroud support beam
I & III
* Shroud/cradle
* Aft bulkhead Tug support fitting
II * Tug LOX abort dump line
e Support beam/cradle
IV * Docking Module
FIGURE A-4
CLASS I & III PAYLOAD/ORBITER INTEGRATION TIMELINE
HORIZONTAL IN THE MCF
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FIGURE A-5
CLASS I & III PAYLOAD/ORBITER INTEGRATION FUNCTIONAL FLOW
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CLASS II PAYLOAD/ORBITER INTEGRATION TIMELINE
HORIZONTAL IN THE MCF
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Additionally, each payload class exhibits certain common integration functional
characteristics such as
A. Installation of payload peculiar control and display equipment at
the Orbiter crew compartment Payload Specialist Station (PSS) and
Mission Specialist Station (MSS).
B. Installation of payload peculiar Shuttle Attached Manipulator Systems
(SAMS) end effectors.
C. Installation of payload peculiar SAMS manipulation software programs.
D. Performance of a five hour post integration payload Avionics
Operational Test (AOT).
Although each payload class requires both unique and varied as well as common
integration equipment and functions, timelines of each payload functional flow
revealed that payload/Orbiter integration time and functional requirements are
essentially independent of payload class. For the payloads analyzed, between
22 hours and 26 hours are required to perform the following typical integra-
tion functional requirements:
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FIGURE A-8
CLASS IV PAYLOAD/ORBITER INTEGRATION TIMELINE
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A. Install flight support equipment in P/L bay
1. FSE/Orbiter avionics umbilicals
2. FSE/Orbiter/GSE avionics umbilicals
3. FSE/Orbiter fluid umbilicals
4. FSE/Orbiter structural mechanical interface
B. Install payload in P/L bay
1. Payload/Orbiter structural/mechanical interface
2. Payload/FSE structural/mechanical interface
3. Payload/FSE fluid umbilicals
4. Payload/Orbiter avionics umbilicals
5. Payload/Orbiter/GSE avionics umbilicals
6. Payload/Orbiter/GSE fluid umbilicals
C. Post installation payload avionics operational test
D. Installation of payload peculiar SAMS end effector
E. Integration of payload C&D equipment in crew compartment
F. Integration of payload software in Orbiter
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CLASS IV PAYLOAD/ORBITER INTEGRATION FUNCTIONAL FLOW
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The required payload/Orbiter integration time of 22 to 26 hours potentially
impacts the baseline 18 hour MCF allocation of 4 to 8 hours. In order to
remain within the allocated integration time, it is recommended that because
of the nature of the initial and final payload integration functions that,
where possible, payload and Orbiter operations be performed in parallel on a
non-interference basis.
A.7 VERTICAL INTEGRATION
In developing the integration flows and timelines for vertical integration at
the launch pad, it was assumed that the integration process would be performed
utilizing standard Shuttle provided payload changeout equipment located at the
launch pad as depicted in JSC 07700 Payload Accommodations document. This
equipment consists of a rail mounted manipulator capable of maneuvering the
payload in three orthogonal planes. This manipulator must also be capable of
rotating the payload with respect to the payload bay vertical centerline for
Class II payloads in order to accommodate manned access for the connection of
Tug flight support equipment.
Additionally, it was assumed that, after the payload is transported to the
launch pad from the PSA and installed on the manipulator in the launch pad
environmental shelter, an abbreviated five hour payload AOT would be performed.
This test serves to verify the functional integrity of payload systems after
the major transportation and handling operations required to prepare the pay-
load for integration with the Orbiter.
Considerations included in the development of on pad integration functional
operations were the requirements to extend, condition, and retract the launch
pad environmental enclosure to and from its Orbiter interface. It was assumed
that the enclosure exhibits the following characteristics:
Extension time -- 2 hours
Conditioning time -- 1 hour
Retraction time -- 1 hour
An additional consideration was the Orbiter payload bay door operational charac-
teristics while in the vertical position. These characteristics are illustrated
in Figure A-10.
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The functional flows and timelines developed for each payload class generally
follow the scenario presented in Figure A-11 and are shown in Figures A-12
through A-17T. It was assumed that for on pad payload integration that all
required payload flight support equipment had been previously installed in the
orbiter payload bay and that at the launch pad, the Orbiter completely ready
to accept the payload.
As in the case of horizontal integration at the MCF, development of integration
functional flows revealed that payload/Orbiter integration time and functional
requirements are essentially independent of payload class and requires between
24 hours and 26 hours of on pad operations. Of this time, between 12 and 14
hours of Orbiter payload bay access is required to install payload in P/L bay.
A. Payload/Orbiter structural/mechanical interface
B. Payload/FSE structural/mechanical interface
C. Payload/FSE fluid umbilicals
D. Payload/Orbiter avionics umbilicals
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E. Payload/Orbiter/GSE avionics umbilicals
F. Payload/Orbiter/GSE fluid umbilicals
The required in-bay access time of 12 to 14 hours impacts the baseline 8 hour
on pad access allocation by 4 to 6 hours. It is believed, however, that this
impact can be resolved for the following reason.
As indicated above, it was assumed that the necessary payload flight support
equipment is installed in the payload bay while the Orbiter is located at the
MCF in a manner similar to that of horizontal integration. These installation
operations require between 6 and 12 hours as indicated in Figure A-18. Since
the Orbiter baseline allocated 18 hours for these operations, Orbiter operations
in the MCF can be shortened by 6 hours and on pad operations can be increased by
6 hours thus eliminating the potential 6 hour on pad access impact and still
remaining within the overall Orbiter turnaround time of 231 hours.
A. 8 INFLUENCE OF ORBITER ORIENTATION AND LOCATION
Orbiter orientation during the payload integration process has a relatively
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minor influence on the payloads. Class I and Class II, which employ hydrazine
propulsion systems, require payload unique orientations in the payload bay such
that catalyst material within the spacecraft thrusters will be prevented from
migrative to and clogging the thruster injectors while in the horizontal posi-
tion. This unique orientation requirement imposes potentially complex payload/
Orbiter umbilical interface requirements.
Vertical installation of payload classes requires special access GSE which is
compatible with the launch pad payload manipulator device in order to permit
mating of payload/Orbiter and payload/flight support equipment interfaces. The
specific configuration of the manipulator device has not yet been defined,
however, it is believed that manned access to the payload bay with the device
in place at the payload bay will be extremely difficult.
Because of the configuration and physical location and orientation of the PSS
and 1SS consoles in the crew compartment, installation of payload control and
display equipment and software at these stations is preferred while the Orbiter
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is in the horizontal position. For either the horizontal or vertical payload/
Orbiter integration method, this equipment and software installation is recom-
mended to occur at the MCF.
The influence of Orbiter location (MCF vs pad) on the payloads is significant.
For Class II payloads which involve a Tug vehicle, installation location plays
a major role in sizing the Tug fleet required at the launch site. Information
developed for the cryogenic Tug study being performed at MDAC and presented in
Figure A-19 indicates that for the potential Class II payload launch rates at
KSC, installation of payloads at the launch pad two days prior to launch,
reduces the fleet size by one Tug.
Installation of all payload classes at the MCF approximately 8 days prior to
launch imposes significant access constraints on the payloads.
In the case of Class IV Sortie Lab payloads, installation of time critical
equipment must occur at the launch pad thus impacting on pad payload access
time constraints. If Class IV payloads are installed at the launch pad however,
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time critical equipment can be installed just prior to payload/Orbiter integra-
tion while the Sortie Lab is still in the environmental enclosure with no impact
to access time constraints.
In addition, after completion of payload/Orbiter integration, the payload bay
doors are closed and the payload is effectively isolated during post integration
Orbiter operations until the entire Shuttle arrives at the launch pad. This
isolation period consists of approximatley seven days. Until the Shuttle
arrives at the launch pad, there are several factors which are potentially
undesirable from the payload point of view. These are:
A. There is currently no specified environmental control of the payload
bay until arrival at the launch pad. Because of this, the payloads
which are not shrouded will require that protective covers which are
necessary to protect contamination and humidity sensitive equipment
will have to remain installed until just prior to launch. All of the
payloads require strict thermal control during launch site operations.
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During Shuttle/launch pad roll-out operations, no thermal control of
the payload bay is currently specified.
B. Spacecraft propulsion systems will probably be loaded and under a
blanket pressure and payload flight batteries will be installed prior
to integration. If payloads are installed at the MCF, safety monitor-
ing and control equipment which is compatible with post integration
Orbiter operations will be required. Additionally, should a space-
craft anomaly occur during these operations, it cannot be assessed
without impacting the Orbiter turnaround schedule.
C. Since flight batteries are installed prior to integration, if the
payloads are installed at the MCF, battery charging equipment which
is compatible with post integration Orbiter and Shuttle operations
will be required.
D. Post integration Orbiter operations in the MCF involve transfer of
the Orbiter to the VAB, erection, mating to the external tanks, and
transfer to the launch pad on the Shuttle mobile launch platform.
From the point of view of the payload, these moves and operations are
significant. After arrival at the launch pad, it is highly desirable
to perform an avionics operational test. This test verifies the
functional integrity of the payload systems after these major moves
and require access to the payload. Access to the payload is also
required to remove any non automatic protective covers and, if
required on payloads of current design, to install inflight jumpers
prior to launch.
These on pad operations require 16 hours as illustrated in Figure 8. Eight
of these 16 hours involve payload access.
On pad installation of payloads circumvents all of the above undesirable fac-
tors which result from payload/Orbiter integration at MCF.
A.9 INFLUENCE OF PAYLOAD SERVICING AND CHECKOUT REQUIREMENTS
Payload servicing requirements influence the desired mode of payload/Orbiter
integration. As discussed in the preceding paragraphs, no payload bay environ-
mental control provisions are currently specified for VAB or Shuttle
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transportation operations. MCF payload integration requires additional Orbiter
compatible environmental control GSE to maintain the payload bay within the
cleanliness, humidity, and thermal requirements specified by the payloads dur-
ing the 7 day transition period between the MCF and the launch pad.
It is assumed that the payload transporter which transfers the payload from the
PSA to the MCF for horizontal integration or the launch pad for vertical instal-
lation will provide the environmental and cleanliness control specified by the
payloads as recommended in the SOAR II study results.
Also, as discussed above, if payload installation occurs at the MCF, additional
GSE will be required to perform the necessary safety monitoring and control and
spacecraft battery trickle charging functions. This equipment must be compat-
ible with Orbiter erection and external tank mating operations as well as with
the Shuttle mobile launch platform.
The remaining payload servicing requirements are insensitive to the method of
payload/Orbiter integration. Class I and II spacecraft hydrazine propellant
servicing is greatly simplified if propellant is loaded prior to payload/Orbiter
integration. This operation includes loading the payload to flight levels with
hydrazine and maintaining a blanket pressure of 30 to 50 psia on the propulsion
system until arrival at the launch pad where the system is pressurized to flight
pressure (about 600 psia).
These spacecraft employ relatively small amounts of hydrazine (200-300 lb) and
until current launch rate safety studies have been completed, KSC safety per-
sonnel have indicated that propellant preloading is tentatively acceptable.
All high pressure vessel pressurization and cryogenic gas and liquid loading of
payloads will occur at the launch pad and is thus independent of the payload
installation adopted. For payloads of current design, Orbiter payload bay
access is required to make the necessary GSE interfaces required to perform
these pressurization and loading functions.
Payload post integration checkout requirements potentially impact the quantity
of checkout GSE which is required.
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Each payload class requires (highly desirable) an abbreviated avionics opera-
tions test after every major move or operation. This test is estimated to
require about 5 hours to complete and verify the functional integrity of the
payload systems after each physical move.
If payload integration occurs at the MCF, an abbreviated AOT is required after
transportation to the MCF from the PSA and payload/Orbiter integration and again
after Orbiter transfer to the VAB, Orbiter erection and transportation to the
launch pad.
If payload integration occurs at the launch pad, only one post integration AOT
is required and the requirement for GSE necessary to support this test in the
MCF is eliminated.
A.10 PAYLOAD CONTINGENCY REMOVAL/CHANGEOUT OPERATIONS
An additional consideration of the study analyses was that of contingency on
pad payload removal and changeout operations.
Removal and changeout functional flows and timelines were developed for these
operations for the case of a "matched set" of payloads and are presented below
in Figures A-20 through A-24. Removal and subsequent installation of different
payloads at the launch pad was not analyzed since the scope of such an analysis
is beyond the capability of this study. The analysis of matched set payload
changeout operations did however reveal that at least 32 working hours would be
required to offset the changeout.
A-11 CONCLUSION
The results of this Pad vs MCF Installation analyses indicate that payloads are
capable of being integrated with the Orbiter at either location. It is con-
cluded however that payloads prefer vertical installations at the launch pad for
the following reasons:
o Allows continuous access to payloads through launch minus 2 days
o Reduces Tug fleet size for Class II payloads by one (1) Tug
o Reduces payload time from notification to launch preps by 7 days
o Simplifies payload/Orbiter interfaces for Class I and II payloads
o Reduces payload integrated systems test requirements.
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This conclusion also supports the conclusion presented in the SOAR II study
results which recommended that vertical integration at the launch area be
adapted as the nominal Shuttle baselined plan. This recommendation was based
on the following factors.
The rationale for MCF installation has been reported to be to reduce the prob-
ability of launch impacts late in the prelaunch operations. It is not apparent
that the baselined schedule meets this objective. Historical data on the un-
manned spacecraft shows that two of the major elements contributing to anomalies
are moving equipment around and subjecting the equipment (for an extensive
period of time) to conditions other than those for which it was primarily
designed. For the element involving spacecraft motion, direct access to the
payload should be provided as late as possible in the launch flow. For condi-
tion exposure, the payload ground operation would certainly benefit from instal-
lation into the bay as late as possible in the flow. Both of these factors
favor late installation of the payload into the Orbiter payload bay. Also, many
of the anticipated problem sources associated with "late flow" installation will
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FIGURE A-21
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be solved through the use of the Shuttle SIF and EAU's during the prelaunch pay-
load operations.
Another factor which should be considered is payload recovery from the returning
Orbiter. Several payloads desire recovery from the Orbiter as soon as possible
after Orbiter landing. Certainly Tug turnaround phasing with the Orbiter can be
enhanced by early recovery of the Tug at the Safing Facility (the KSC/Tug Study
has recommended this early recovery of the vehicle). If this operational pro-
cedure is baselined in the Shuttle flow the transfer of the payload installa-
tion function to the pad area would eliminate the requirement for payload hand-
ling equipment and support equipment in the MCF.
Additionally, the baselined launch pad payload installation would inherently
provide for the manned access at the pad.
A final factor involves the years of experience of the KSC personnel in launch
pad installation of the payload (presently the nominal procedure at KSC) with
the delivery vehicle. The problems (and costs) associated with the development
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of this type of baseline installation have already been solved, and changing
from MCF installation to pad installation represents "returning to the normal
mode" rather than perturbing established procedures.
A-31
Appendix B
PAYLOAD CHECKOUT/CONTROL REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS
B.1 REQUIREMENTS
An analysis was performed on the study mission model to determine the control
and monitor requirements for each payload based on satisfaction of STS safety
criteria (caution and warning) and provision of sufficient additional control
and monitor capability during all phases of the mission profile to accomplish
prelaunch preparation of the payloads, provide payload performance evaluation
during flight and provide conditioning of payloads for deployment and/or
emergency or normal return-to-Earth activities.
B.1.1 SOAR-II Summary
Results of the SOAR-II Study provided the general caution and warning (C&W)
requirements and system noted in Table B-1. More explicit C&W information was
generated by the SOAR-II special emphasis tasks for DSCS-II and Tug. Reference
SOAR-II, Volume III, MDC G4473, pp. 77 through 79.
SOAR-II results for checkout operations during the STS mission profile are con-
tained in the Appendix of SOAR II, Volume V, MDC G4475, and essentially offers
generalized checkout sequence and philosophies for the SOAR II mission model.
B.1.2 Safety
The various payloads and FSE (Flight Support Equipment) were surveyed on a con-
ceptual basis) to establish candidate caution and warning (C&W) functions.
This survey coupled with published SOAR-II data provided the system and hazard
identifications shown in Table B-2, which are essentially candidate C&W
functions.
The following are the criteria that were generated and utilized to evaluate
the candidate functions for inclusion on a composite C&W list.
A. All pressure vessels shall be monitored for pressure and temperature
on a C&W basis.
B. All other systems shall be assessed using a hazard analysis type
approach wherein a system/component fail operational-fail safe
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TABLE B-1
CAUTION AND WARNING
OPTION ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES
* INTEGRAL PROCESSOR & PANELS, DECREASED UNIT COMPLEXITY MAX. SYbTEMS PARTS COUNT
SIGNAL DISTRIBUTOR
- CENTRAL C&W PROCESSOR, MINIMIM COST, CONTROL SYSTEM DEPENDANCY ON
DEDICA ED PANELS CENTRALI.ZATION j S;NOLE UNIT
a ALL C&W HARDWIRED RELIABLE, SIMPLE rMAX. iWEIGHI INSTALLATION
C:OMPLEXITY
* ALL C,?W HARDWIFED WITH MAX. RELIA8ILITY ALLOWS MAX. COST
COMPUER BACKUP RANGE VARIATION
* * ALL WARNING HARDWIRED MAX. RELIAI31LITY WHERE MEDIUM COST, COMPLEXITY
NECESSARY AND WEIGHT
ALL C&W COMPUTER PROCESSED INTERFACE SI7MPLIFICATION
\ALLOCiYS RANGE VARIATION
*e AD/U.STABLE CONTROLS WTH MINIMUM CHANGE TIME LOWER RELIA:ILITY
LOCKS ON PROCESSOR
HARDWIt IRE!COMPONENT CHANGES NONE , CHANGE TI.E, MAX. COST.. _ I--. ,_  - ',AE -'- " , - eo__.
-
e AN;Ai.03 CIRCUITRY SIMPLE i4-EATER COST
SX-o DiGITAL CIRCUITRY SMALL SIZE :01' CONSTANT WII IIAOWIRE/
CHEAPPOACH
, , OVERLAY LEGENDS CHEAP "?\,ii 'CO.!SUING
* PROGRA,MMABLE LEGENDS - - - - rP.2J!UES PROG;.MIG
CONTROLS: 1. CHANEL SELECT (l-N) CISPLAYS: LIGHITS
2. OFFSET AD.JUST
(P"C-CESSOR) 3. RANGE ADJUST
4. LIMIU SELECT "LOW"
5. LIMIT SELECT "HIGH" X'iDICATE3 CHOICE
(CONTROLS) PUS-!TO-TEST
(PANEL) ABORT (C". ADI' I.OTS STATION)
MEASUREMENTS AND ASSIGNMENTS
Spacecraft
Sul,systm PRM HEAO C LST LDE DSCS-11 SMS ATSII-1 L3 S-77 EO5 S, ' S
Power 3 9 9 0 8 4 4 12 4 6
Corrr/Data 3 9 2 0 14 5 11 5 3 3
Ordnlance 0 0 0 0 2 2 6 16 0 0
Attitude Cont. 3 37 15 0 2 5 3 4 9 6 13
Sep. /Deploy I 0 0 0 2 1 4 3 4 4
Other 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
C: &W
Assigr.ment
Mi iin Spea. 3 2 2 0 6 5 12 21 6 6
iPa.L ad Spea. 1l 56 Z7 0 z8 15 29 46 17 26
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TABLE B-2
CANDIDATE C&W FUNCTIONS
SYSTEM/FUNCTION HAZARD
1. Command System
a. Uplink signal present Potential of ultimate actuation of deployment devices or injection
of contaminants into payload bay and/or Tug engine ignition.
b. Command execute Potential of actuation of deployment devices or injection of contam-
inants into payload bay and/or Tug engine ignition.
c. Input power Same as l.a and l.b.
2. Ordnance System
a. Arm Potential of firing ordnance devices.
b. Fire relay status Same as 2.a.
3. ACS Mode Potential of injecting contaminants into payload bay.
4. Momentum Devices Potential damage due to device fragmentation.
5. Propulsion System
a. Pressures Potential tank rupture.
b. Temperatures Potential tank rupture.
c. Leaks Contamination in nayload bay.
6. Thruster Temperature Indicative of contaminant injection into payload bay.
7. Separation Switches Potential of sequencing satellite deployment systems.
8. Deployment Switches Potential of damage from loose hardware.
9. Sequencer Status Same as 7.
10. Dump Lines Status Potential of dumping contaminants into payload bay.
11. Vent Lines Status Potential of venting contaminants into payload bay.
12. Electrical Umbilical Status Loss of payload control by orbiter.
13. Propulsion Umbilical Status Loss of propulsion system control.
14. Tilt Table Status Same as 8.
15. Power Systems
a. Pressures Potential of source rupture.
b. Temperatures Potential of source rupture.
c. Voltages High voltage arcing.
d. Currents Potential of short circuits.
16. Transmitters' Outputs Possible actuation of ordnance devices.
17. Engine Ignition Inhibit Potential engine ignition in payload bay.
characteristic is sufficiency for rejections of a candidate C&W
function.
Evaluation by these criteria resulted in the C&W function list shown in Tables
B-3 through B-6 for the study mission classes and the FSE.
No ordnance firing functions are included in the C&W list. This omission is
based on the premise that the safety and arming approach recommended by
SOAR-II for ordnance circuitry safing will be integrated into Shuttle era
satellite circuits for C&W rejection via item two of the aforementioned
criteria. Additionally, battery temperature and pressure are omitted based
on the premise that incorporation of an impact resistant battery cover and
facilities to absorb KOH (within the case) are included in satellite design
as recommended by the MDAC DOD payload interface study.
Designation of a particular C&W function as a caution or a warning item utilizes
the SOAR-II criterion wherein urgency is associated with warning functions and
immediate corrective action is required; caution functions are associated with
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TABLE B-3
I CAUTION AND WARNING-SATELLITES 4045-]
MISSION CLASS
I II III
FUNCTION (EOS) (ATSISMS/DSCS) (LST) ASSIGNMENT ANNUNCIATORS
ORDNANCE SAFE-ARM * * * e(2) * WARNING 2
PROPELLANT/GAS PRESSURE *(2) * * o(2) * CAUTION
PROPELLANTIGAS TEMPERATURE (.2) * (12) *(2) * CAUTION
DEPLOYMENT SWITCHES * * * o(2) * WARNING 2
DUMP LINES STATUS * * * o(2) - WARNING 2
VENTLINE STATUS * * * o(2) - WARNING 2
LEAK DETECTION* * * * o(2) - WARNING 2
*LEAK DETECTION IS DERIVED FROM COMPUTER PROCESSING
OF SYSTEMS' PRESSURES AND TEMPERATURES
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TABLE B-4
CAUTION AND WARNING-TUG
FUNCTION ASSIGNMENT ANNUNCIATORS
TANK PRESSURES (6) CAUTION
TANK TEMPERATURES (6) CAUTION
ACCUMULATOR PRESSURES (2) CAUTION
ACCUMULATOR TEMPERATURES (2) CAUTION
FUEL CELL PRESSURES CAUTION
FUEL CELL TEMPERATURES CAUTION
DUMP LINE STATUS (2) WARNING 2
VENT LINE STATUS (2) WARNING 2
ELECTR ICAL UMBILICAL STATUS WARNING 1
TUG LATCH STATUS WARNING 1
ENGINE IGNITION INHIBIT WARNING 1
COMMAND SYSTEM INHIBIT WARNING 1
*LEAK DETECTION (6) WARNING 6
*LEAK DETECTION FROM COMPUTER PROCESSING
OF SYSTEMS' PRESSURES AND TEMPERATURES
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TABLE B-5
CAUTION AND WARNING-FLIGHT 40450-3SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
MISSION CLASS
I II III IV
FUNCTION (EOS) (ATS/SMS/DSCS) (LST) (SL) ASSIGNMENT ANNUNCIATORS
HOLDING TANK PRESSURE * * * * - - CAUTION(OPTION)
HOLDING TANK TEMPERATURE * * * * - - CAUTION
(OPTION)
TILT TABLE LATCH STATUS - 0 * * - - CAUTION I
C&W POWER SOURCE NO. 1 * * * * * * CAUTION
C&W POWER SOURCE NO. 2 * * * * * * CAUTION 1
MSS/PSS CONTROL POWER * * * * * * CAUTION
*LEAK DETECTION (OPTION) * * * * - - WARNING 1
TIE DOWN STATUS * - - * * * WARNING 1
*LEAK DETECTION FROM COMPUTER PROCESSING
OF SYSTEMS' PRESSURES AND TEMPERATURES
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lis TABLE B-6
CAUTION AND WARNING-SORTIE LABORATORY 404504
FUNCTION ASSIGNMENT ANNUNCIATORS
*OXYGEN TANK PRESSURE (2) CAUTION
,OXYGEN TANK TEMPERATURE (2) CAUTION
*HYDROGEN TANK PRESSURE (2) CAUTION
*HYDROGEN TANK TEMPERATURE (2) CAUTION 1
*NITROGEN TANK PRESSURE CAUTION
*NITROGEN TANK TEMPERATURE CAUTION
*FUEL CELL STACK TEMPERATURE CAUTION
DOCKING MODULE PRESSURE CAUTION
COMPARTMENT OXYGEN WARNING
COMPARTMENT CO2  WARNING
*FUEL CELL STACK TEMPERATURE CAUTION
H20 QUALITY WARNING
*ELECTRIC POWER WARNING 1
COMPARTMENT PRESSURE CAUTION
COMPARTMENT TEMPERATURE CAUTION
*CLOCK WARNING 1
*COMPUTER (FAILURE) WARNING 1
*LEAK DETECTION (7) WARNING 7
*INDICATES FUNCTIONS TO SHUTTLE INTERFACE
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a condition or trend having the potential to ultimately present a hazard to
the Shuttle either through persistence or combination with subsequent planned
activities.
B.1.3 C&W Control and Display Requirements
The following approach shall be utilized for C&W function detection and dis-
play and is in consonance with the interpretation of C&W philosophy to be
utilized for Shuttle systems.
A. Primary C&W indications shall be derived from a dedicated hardwired
detection circuit/system.
B. Backup for the primary system shall be provided through management
of payload telemetry information (data management system). Where
backup information is not available via data systems, visual obser-
vation (via TV or direct) is a suitable substitute.
C. Caution functions may be logically grouped into a single annunciator.
Determination of the out of tolerance parameter shall be accomplished
via the data management system.
D. Warning functions shall require a dedicated annuciator for each
function.
E. Electrical control required for corrective action related to occur-
rence of a warning function shall be provided by a dedicated, hard-
wired, manual control circuit. Redundant control may be provided by
available computer systems in conjunction with payload command
decoder subsystems.
F. C&W out of tolerance conditions shall be indicated by both aural and
visual means. Warning indications shall be easily differentiated
with respect to caution indications.
Table B-7 presents the C&W related control functions required to
provide corrective action when necessary.
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TABLE B-7 40368
CAUTION AND WARNING RELATED CONTROLS
SATELLIES( MISSION CLASS
I II III IV
FUNCTION (EOS) (ATSISMS/DSCS) (LST) (SL)
ORDNANCE SAFE-ARM . * * (2) *
PROPELLANT DUMP * * * * (2)
PROPELLANT VENT * * * (2)
N2 TANK VENT * * - -
TUG SORTIE LAB
HYDROGEN TANK PRESSURIZE - * * -
HYDROGEN TANK DUMP - * * * -
HYDROGEN TANK VENT - * * * -
OXYGEN TANK PRESSURIZE - * * -
OXYGEN TANK DUMP - * * * -
OXYGEN TANK VENT - * * -
COLD HE TANK VENT - * * *
AM3 IENT HE TANK VENT (2) - * * *
FUEL CELL CONTROL (2) - * * -
N2 TANK VENT
PAYLOAD BAY
HOLDING TANK VENT (OPTIONAL) * * . *
HOLDING TANK DUMP (OPTIONAL) . . * .
HOLDING TANK PRESSURIZE (OPTIONAL) . . . .
B.1.4 Orbital Readiness Tests (ORT)
Each class of satellite mission was examined to determine an ORT sequence to
be performed during the mission delivery flight profile. For purposes of this
discussion, ORT is defined as a planned in-flight checkout operation performed
with the payload attached to Shuttle wherein a system response to a specific
commanded stimulus is evaluated through the observation of data. Therefore,
activities such as deployment preparations, health monitoring, etc., are
separated from ORT.
The broad classifications of payload systems that are candidates for Shuttle
attached ORT are summarized below.
Reaction Control Systems (RCS)
Command/Data Systems
Sensor Systems (gyros, star trackers, sun sensors, earth sensors)
B-7
Power Systems
Momentum Devices
Experiments
It is recommended that RCS thrusters be tested subsequent to payload release
from Shuttle for the following reasons.
A. Thruster derived moments from cold gas systems are probably un-
desirable while the payload is in the Shuttle and/or attached to
the Shuttle by the RMS.
B. Actuation of hydrazine or mercury ion thrusters in the payload bay
is prohibited by safety and/or contamination criteria.
Momentum devices generally require 4-8 hours for spin-up and have been identi-
fied as hazard items (Table B-2). It is therefore generally recommended that
these devices should remain inactive when payloads are in or in close proximity
to Shuttle. An exception to this general recommendation will be noted in the
case of the LST.
The remaining candidate ORT systems are discussed in the following material by
mission class.
B.1.4.1 Mission Class I (EOS)
With the exception of the systems noted in the previous discussion, it is rec-
ommended that the remaining systems of power, command data, sensors and experi-
ments be tested prior to release from Shuttle. This selection was based on the
fact that ground station contact times are severely restricted as noted in
Figure B-1 and Table B-8, and that hardwired checkout essentially circumvents
the high EOS experimental data rates (31 MBPS) and the limitations of the
Shuttle downlink capability (256 KBPS interleaved). It is suggested that the
aforementioned systems can be effectively tested during an integrated test
operation. A typical operational sequence follows:
A. Shuttle orient EOS toward Earth
B. Payload bay doors open
C. Raise EOS to vertical position
D. Deploy solar arrays
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TABLE B-8
EOS GROUND STATION CONTACT SUMMARY
STATION T1 (Min) T2 (Min)
Tamanarive 8.5 2.8 Maximum time with no contact 71.2 min. between
Alaska 10.4 6.7 Alaska and Goldstone during seventh and eight orbits.
Hawaii 9.2 3.6 Percent of time in contact during repetition cycle 26%
Johannesburg 9.4 4.5
Acenscion Is. 10.2 7.6 Cumulative average station contact time per day 364.6 min
Madrid 9.8 5.2
Guam 9.1 6.3 Average station contact time per orbit 25.6 min.
Orroral 9.3 5.0
Canary Is. 10.2 4.7 Minimum station contact time in repetition cycle
Bermuda 8.8 3.5 2.4 min. with Santiago in 14th orbit.
Quito 9.4 3.3
Cape Kennedy 10.9 4.3
Rosman 10.2 7.5
Goldstone 8.9 4.9
Santiago 9.1 2.4
T1 = Average station contact time per orbit
T2  = Minimum station contact time in repetition cycle
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E. Deploy sensor bays
F. Perform experimental measurements (power from Shuttle or satellite -
may be split to checkout solar arrays and/or batteries).
G. Retract solar arrays and sensor bays in preparation for deployment.
The EOS-A and B experimental sensors and their characteristics are summarized
in Tables B-9 and B-10. The experiment scanners require Earth pointing for
measurement/calibration. It is assumed this orientation will be provided by
Shuttle prior to opening of the payload bay doors.
The EOS high rate experimental data and housekeeping data systems are shown in
Figure B-2. The experimental interface system suggested to measure sensor out-
puts prior to entry into the high data rate system is shown in Figure B-3. The
indicated control functions are provided via hardwired command to the EOS
utilizing the spacecraft command subsystem. Utilization of this experiment
interface approach permits measurements of the EOS-A sensor outputs at the
following maximum frequencies.
Sensor Date Rate
Oceanic Scanning Spectrophotometer 4.6 KHz
Sea Surface Temperature Radiometer 9.2 KHz
Cloud Physics Radiometer 5.8 KHz
Upper Atmospheric Sounder 50 Hz
Atmospheric Pollution Sensor 8 Hz
Microwave Radiometer 400 Hz
For purposes of exercising the RF section of the command link, it is recom-
mended that at least a portion of the control functions noted in Figure B-3
be provided through the Shuttle baseline RF command uplink (2KBPS max.).
B.1.h.2 Mission Class II (ATS/SMS/DSCS with Tug)
The mission flight profile for geosynchronous missions is presented in Table
B-11. Shuttle attached ORT for geosynchronous missions is not recommended for
the following reasons.
A. It is unfeasible/impossible to release deployable elements due to
attachment to Tug and the inability to retract the deployed elements
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TABLE B-9
EOS A SENSOR CHARACTERISTICS
EOS-A
Oceanography/Meteorology
Wt. Power Description
Sensor (lb.) (Watts) Orbit Adjust Not Required Data Characteristics
Oceanic Scanning 60 20 Channels (0.4 to 0.7 m) 695 x 695 pixels, 8 bits/pixel
Spectrophotometer 45 IPOV 2km, 190 scan angle 1 Frame/1 43 seconds, 4.6 KHZ noise
(25 ave) bandwidth, 0.54MBPS Rate
Sea Surface Temperature 30 5 Channels (0.5 to 11.5 m) 2 5/HZ/IPOV, 10 bits/sample, 9.2 KHZ
Imaging Radiometer 45 IPOV 2km, 510 scan angle noise bandwith, 0.33 MBPS Rate
Cloud Physics Radiometer 70 40 5 Channels (0.75 to 2.125 m) 2 5/HZ, 10 bits/sample, 5.83 KHZ
IPOV 2.5km, 510 scan angle noise bandwidth, 0.22 MBPS Rate
Upper Atmospheric Sounder 56 40 Non-scanner, 4 or more 10 KBPS
channels
Atmospheric Pollution
Sensor 30 10 POV 50 x 50 400 BPS
355 freq. res. conical 10 KBS Rate
Passive Multichannel 513 (105 ave) (gilz) (km) + 450 scan
Microwave Radiometer 4.99 183
10.69 88
18.0 88
21.5 88
37.0 22
Other 11 -- --
TABLE B-10
EOS B SENSOR CHARACTERISTICS
EOS-B
Terrain Survey/Oceanography
Wt. Power Description
Sensor (lb.) (Watts) Orbit Adjust Required Data Characteristics
Oceanic Scanning 60
Spectrophotometer 45 Same See EOS A
(25 ave.)
Sea Surface Temperature
Imaging Radiometer 45 30 Same See EOS A
Thematic Mapper 265 140 7 Channels, 66 rad resh 6 Channels 4200 x 4200 pixels (7 bits/pixel)
(40 ave.) 1 Channel 1300 x 1300 pixels (7 bits/pixel)
70 (40 ave.) Wide Band Video Tape Rec. (31 MBPS at 85% scan efficiency)
30 min. record time
(30 mb/sec.)
50 50 Precision Altitude
Determination System
Upper Atmospheric
Sounder 50 40 See EOS A
Other 115 25 To be selected No Data
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prior to release from Shuttle; i.e., existing satellite design pro-
hibits deployment and retraction.
B. Low Earth orbit operations are somewhat time constrained due to the
criticality of the departure time for geosynchronous ascent and ther-
mal limitations of geosynchronous satellites.
C. The natural operational environment for the satellites is at geosyn-
chronous station where ground station contact time is continuous and
the satellite is in a fully operational condition.
It is recommended however that normal response of the Tug command system be
demonstrated prior to release from Shuttle primarily from a Shuttle safety
standpoint. An end-to-end check of this system requires RF command trans-
mission from Shuttle to Tug. Options available are usage of an antenna hat
on the Tug receiving antenna to accomplish an effective hardwired RF test or
usage of the normal Shuttle RF uplink system with suitable attenuation. The
latter option is selected primarily on the basis of avoidance of providing the
in bay antenna hat and the attendant mechanisms for hat removal and stowage.
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TABLE B-11
CLASS II, MISSION FLIGHT PROFILE
Phase Time
1i. Shuttle ascent to 50 ni. 8.8 min.
2. Shuttle 50 x 100 nmi. transfer orbit L3.7 mln.
3. Shuttle 100 x 100 nmi. intermediate orbit 88.3 min.
L. Shuttle 100 x 160 nmi. transfer orbit hh.7 min.
5. Shuttle 160 x 160 nmi. circularization 15.3 min.
6. Payload deployment (from Shuttle)
A. Payload in release position
(Umbilical connected)
B. Payload in release position
(Umbilical disconnected)
-7. Free-flying payload 160 x 160 nmi. orbit Variable
*8 . Phasing orbit 160 x variable nmi. Variable
9. Geosynchronous ascent 160 x 19,323 nmi. 318 nin.
10. Synchronous orbit
A. Satellite attached to Tug
B. Satellite separated from Tug
*Time varies dependent upon longitude of geosynchronous station.
TABLE B-12
LST SYSTEMS FOR ATTACHED ORT
o Communications/Data Handling
o Electrical Power and Distribution
o Attitude Control Sensors and System
o Navigation and Control System
o Deployables
Solar Arrays
Light Shield
o SIP Instruments (via LST self check logic)
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It is therefore recommended that this test be performed subsequent to raising
of the payload/tilt table to the 50 degree position to facilitate use of the
baseline Shuttle uplink system and to avoid RF radiation in the payload bay.
Testing in this posture requires a suitable payload-sun orientation via the
Shuttle control system to provide a suitable thermal environment for the
satellite(s).
B.1.h.3 Mission Class III (LST)
The recommended approach for Shuttle attached ORT of the LST is one of per-
forming verification of the systems shown in Table B-12. These recommenda-
tions stem from the fact that a 150 hour orbital wait period is required for
thermal stabilization of the LST optics. This period coupled with the nor-
mal activation/calibration time required for ground controlled completion of
released ORT by orbital test plan exceeds the normal seven day stay time of
the Shuttle. It is therefore recognized that an early assessment of LST
systems performance is necessary to permit return of a malfunctioning LST
to Earth via the delivery Shuttle.
It is also worthy of note that the latest planned Shuttle delivery trajectory
for LST (Table B-13) requires addition of the OMS kit in the payload bay.
This installation precludes installation of the docking module which prohibits
on-orbit man repair of a malfunctioning LST by the delivery Shuttle unless EVA
is utilized.
Testing of the LST is constrained for the first 48 hours of orbital life for
outgassing completion. Checkout of the optics is not feasible since 150 hours
are normally required for thermal stabilization prior to calibration. A
typical sequence for the LST attached ORT is shown in Table B-14.
It is recommended that the attached ORT be controlled from the Shuttle via the
same rationale used for EOS attached ORT. Ground station viewing time restric-
tions are not as severe as with the EOS mission but completion of the testing
which would commence during the 31st orbit would require the interaction of
numerous ground stations. The Shuttle controlled operation is recognized as
an improved operation.
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TABLE B-13
LST MISSION DELIVERY PROFILE
Altitude 330 nmi (611 km)
Inclination 28.50 (0.5 rad)
Phase Time
Ascent to 50 nmi 8.8 min
Transfer orbit (50 x 100 nmi) h3.7 min
Intermediate orbit (100 x 330 nmi) 44.1 min
Transfer orbit (100 x 330 nmi) 46.3 min
Operational orbit (330 nmi) (611 km) 194 min
two orbits for ephemeris data
TABLE B-14
LST ORBITAL OPERATIONAL SEQUENCE
On orbit arrival
EPS and distribution buses energized
OTA thermal system on
Open payload bay doors and erect LST
LST systems turn on
Attitude control systems checks (thrusters inhibited)
Erect sun shade
Deploy solar array
Power distribution and load check
Retract solar array
(h8 hour wait for outgassing-REF orbital arrival)
Energize SIP; verify instruments and power supplies
Orient optics away from sun
Remove contamination covers
Confirmation of release readiness
Transfer LST to internal power (batteries)
Eject and stow electrical umbilical
Deploy LST with Shuttle RMS
150 Hr. Wair period for tnermal stabilization (Ref. orbital arrival)
ORT by ground station and orbital test nlan
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B.2 INTEGRATED OPERATIONS
Integration of attached ORT activities into representative pad and flight
time lines is shown in Figures B-4 through B-6 for the study mission classes.
As a result of the payload Shuttle integration trades performed in Task 1,
payloads will probably be installed in the vertical Shuttle at the launch
site. Satellite propellant systems will have been loaded and pressurized
and ordnance will have been installed prior to this integration.
B.2.1 Mission Class I (EOS)
The first activity subsequent to satellite installation in Shuttle is perfor-
mance of a Shuttle payload functional interface test whose purpose is to
demonstrate the complete electrical interface between Shuttle and the EOS.
C&W and housekeeping data monitoring will be initiated at the same time and
will remain active until the satellite umbilicals are demated in preparation
for satellite release from Shuttle. Trickle charge will be supplied to the
satellite batteries. Satellite power requirements will be satisfied by ground
power until T-30 minutes at which time transfer will be made to Shuttle power.
The lift off configuration of the satellite is therefore one of quiescence with
the exception of power to the hardwired C&W system, the telemetry system and
the battery trickle charge. These conditions prevail until attached ORT is
initiated at approximately T+50 hours. Subsequent to completion of ORT (T+65
hours) deployment preparations are initiated and the satellite is released.
Deployment activities are summarized in Table B-15.
B.2.2 Mission Class II (ATS/SMS/DSCS with Tug)
The first integrated activity for the class II missions is performance of the
interface functional test as described for the class I mission. C&W and house-
keeping data monitoring are initiated at the same time and remain active until
demating of the Tug electrical umbilical which immediately precedes payload
release from the Shuttle. The AOT (Avionics Operational Test) is performed
following the interface functional test and is dedicated to performing launch
readiness confirmation of the Tug vehicle. Tug propellant loading is accom-
plished during the Shuttle countdown.
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The lift off configuration of the payload is as follows:
A. Satellite
1. C&W system activated
2. Telemetry system activated
3. Trickle charge from Shuttle
B. Tug
1. Inertial guidance system on in navigation mode viz., IMU and GC
are on
2. C&W system activated
3. Telemetry system activated
4. Trickle charge from Shuttle
These conditions prevail until the initiation of payload deployment activities
at the 160 nautical mile orbit. Deployment activities are summarized in
Table B-16.
B.2.3 Mission Class III (LST)
The integrated operations activities for LST are identical to the Class I EOS
mission with the exception that attached ORT is estimated at 10 hours as
opposed to 15 for the EOS.
Figures B-h, B-5 and B-6 provide the time lines for the previously integrated
activities. Figure G-7 presents a summary of activities for the mission class
payloads during the various phases of the flight profile.
TABLE B-15
CLASS I DEPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES
(Satellite in vertical position for attached ORT)
Retract solar arrays and sensor bays
Transfer satellite to battery power
Raise satellite to release position with RMS
Remove and secure electrical and propulsion umbilicals
Release satellite
Shuttle establish separation distance
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FIGURE B-4
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FIGURE B-5
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FIGURE B-6
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TABLE B-16
CLASS II MISSION DEPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES
Update Tug inertial guidance system with state vector data
(attitude, position, velocity, time)
Raise tilt table to release position
Terminate battery trickle charge
Perform attached ORT - (Tug command system checkout)
Remove and secure electrical and propulsion umbilicals
Release payload
Shuttle establish separation distance
Tug perform automated self checks, initiate rotisserie
flight mode
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uis FIGURE B-7
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Tables B-17 and B-18 present the control and related monitor functions required
for each mission class based primarily on operational considerations such as
ORT, deployment, ground testing, etc. These tables in conjunction with the
C&W requirements noted in Tables B-3 through B-7 provide the total payload
discrete control and display requirements.
B.3 EQUIPMENT SELECTION (MODE VARIATIONS)
Table B-19 provides a summary of mandatory functions/capabilities that are
required of on-board Shuttle equipment to provide in flight processing of
payloads.
Figure B-8 presents the SOAR II equipment system which essentially satisfies
the requirements in Table B-19 with the exception of experiment checkout capa-
bility. The purpose of the following is the generation of equipment selections
based on the requirements generated in the previous section which are somewhat
different from SOAR II results using the system shown in Figure B-8 as the
baseline.
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TABLE B-17
S SATELLITES AND SORTIE LAB CONTROL
AND RELATED MONITORING FUNCTIONS
MISSION :CIASS
I II III IVCONTROL MONITOR (1S) (AIS/SMS/SCS) ((I) (S)
TIE-DOWN RELEASE RLIIAS L/SCURL * - * *
COLD GAS VINT OPINLDI)/COSLD * *
HYDRAZINE VENT OPLNI.D/CLOSLD 0 * •
HOLDING TANK DUMP OPENED/CLOSLD 0 * * *
(OPTIONAL)
S&A SAFE-ARM SAFL/ARMED * * . . -
ELEC. UMBILICAL RELEASE DISCONNECTED/CONNECTED - -
PROPULSION UMBILICAL DI SCONNECTED/CONNECTED * * -
RELEASE
TRANSFER TO INTERNAL POWER INTERNAL/EXTERNAL * * *
EXTERNAL POWER EXTERNAL/INTERNAL * * * * * *
TRICKLE CHARGE (OPTIONAL) ON-OFF * * * *
TELEMETRY SYSTEM ON-OFF 0 0 0 0 0 0
TRACKING SYSTEM ON-OFF 0 0 0 0 0
COMMAND SYSTEM ON-OFF 0 0 0 0
' COMMON
IIS TABLE B-18 40369
TUG CONTROL AND RELATED MONITOR FUNCTIONS
FUNCTION CONTROL MONITOR
IMU ON-OFF ON-OFF
IMU PREHEAT ON-OFF ON-OFF
GUIDANCE COMPUTER ON-OFF ON-OFF
TELEMETRY SYSTEM ON-OFF ON-OFF
TRACKING SYSTEM ON-OFF ON-OFF
COMMAND SYSTEM ON-OFF ON-OFF
POWER SYSTEM INTERNAL-EXTERNAL INf[RNAL-FX RNAL
POWER SELECT BATTERY/FUEL CELL INTERNAL-EXTERNAL
ELECTRICAL UMBILICAL RELEASE (SATUS)
PROPULSION UMBILICAL RELEASE (STATUSI
tILT FABLE TIE-DOWN RELEASE (STA TUS)
TILT TABLE RELEASE (TUG) (STATUS)
FUEL CELL SHUT OFF VALVES (2) OPEN-CLOSE OPEN-CLOSE
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FIGURE B-8
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TABLE B-20 40370
DATA REQUIREMENTS
MISSION CLASS
I II III IV
EOS **ATS DSCS SMS TUG LST LAB
DATA RATE (BPS) *1K-12.5K 384 250 194 51KI 51.2K/ UNDF
1.6K 1.6K
BITS PER WORD UNDF 9 8 9 UNDF 8/8 UNDF
MAIN FRAME
PERIOD (SECS) UNDF 9 1.024 2.97 UNDF 0.0211 UNDF
FRAME SYNC
(WDS) UNDF IN1ST16 15T4 1ST2 UNDF 414 UNDF
MAIN FRAME(WORDS) UNDF 368 32 64 UNDF 128/200 UNDF
DWELL MODE PROBABLE YES PROBABLE YES UNDF PROBABLE UNDF
FORMAT UNDF B10-L NRZ-L UNDF NRZ-L UNDF UNDF
SUBCOMMUTATION UNDF LAST 16 64 & 128 32 & 64 UNDF UNDF UNDF
WORDS 16 DEEP
*VARIABLE-SELECTABLE BY PROGRAMMING; **ATS F&G; ATS H&I UNDEFINED
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B.3.1 C&W Processing and Display
Caution and warning (C&W) primary monitor criteria (Section B.1.2) are satis-
fied by the conceptual system shown in Figure B-9 which provides a dedicated
hardwired system including a display panel and aural indications. Backup for
the hardwired system is provided via computer processing of the payload tele-
metry signal and CRT display. Table B-20 presents the characteristics of the
satellite telemetry data by mission class which must be processed on board the
Shuttle to satisfy C&W monitor backup requirements and to provide the capa-
bility to process and display payload health and test data. Figures B-10 and
B-11 present the systems recommended to provide this capability. The DSCS
system is somewhat different since data from two satellites must be processed
and displayed which essentially adds the requirement for multiplexing and de-
multiplexing of the PCM telemetry hit streams in addition to the DOD communi-
cation security equipment.
Checkout of the systems for all mission classes and safety considerations dis-
cussed under ORT dictate that the capability to command each type of payload is
required onboard the Shuttle. It is therefore deemed mandatory that command
encoding equipment capable of controlling each mission model be installed in
the Shuttle. RF equipment included in the baseline Shuttle is sufficient to
provide verification of the housekeeping RF data link.
C&W related control (switching) requirements such as vent controls, dump con-
trols, are ground ruled as dedicated hardwired circuits. These requirements
as well as switching required for inflight operations such as deployment
activities are conveniently satisfied by a dedicated discrete control panel
which includes bi-level indications of switching status. These control and
monitor requirements are summaried in Table B-21.
Recording capability is recommended for the payloads onboard the Shuttle for
the following reasons:
A. Payload housekeeping data should be recorded so that a data sump can
be made to ground stations to provide data to the controlling agency
that was lost due to RF viewing constraints and to provide an his-
torical record of payload in bay performance.
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FIGURE B-11
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B. A record of C&W events, C&W related switching actions and deployment
switching activities is desirable.
C. Video recording capability is desirable to record video derived from
deployment activities and to record data displayed on the CRT. It
is also desirable to provide video recording capability in order to
record surveillance related to C&W backup viewing of propulsion sys-
tem lines, electrical umbilicals tie down systems, etc.
It is a foregone conclusion that computer facilities are required aboard the
Shuttle to provide support for payloads. Table B-22 provides a summary of
identified computer controlled operations by mission class.
CRT requirements are integrated closely with the noted computer operations in
that housekeeping data display is accomplished via a CRT. CRT is also re-
quired to display cargo bay video data from inspection, deployment activities,
etc. Some discussion has evolved concerning the option of one versus two CRTs
for payload data display and video information display. This study recommends
that two separate CRTs be provided for the aforementioned functions based on
the following rationale.
A. CRT display is required for C&W backup data display and should there-
fore be available on a continuous basis for this purpose.
B. Payload personnel (MSS or PSS) should have unrestrained payload
bay video access to determine/monitor the status of the payload
at any time.
B.2.3.1 Commonality Assessment
The mission classes C&W control and monitor and other control requirements
were surveyed to determine the total payload control and display requirements
in Shuttle. These numbers are summarized in Table B-21. Analysis of these
requirements leads to the following conclusions:
A. A satellite common C&W logic assembly and display panel is logical
based on the numbers required for each satellite. The maximum number
of annunciators is distorted by the two satellites-DSCS missions at
15. Common design dictates that the comparator section of the elec-
tronics be accessible and easily adjustable to provide a choice of
threshold values. Changes in nomenclature can be readily handled via
legend overlays.
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B. The control panel provided for satellite C&W related switching and
for other activities such as deployment preparations, evidences
sufficient similarity to be classified as common. Variances in
nomenclature can be handled by use of overlay legend assemblies.
C. The Tug C&W logic and related controls, and other controls should
be provided as Tug peculiar equipment since there is virtually no
similarity to spacecraft required equipment.
Table B-23 summarizes the recommendations related to classification of pay-
load required equipment as GFE or user supplied.
Information related to the command encoding units for several of the study
spacecraft is sparse. However, because of the wide diversity that generally
exists in command systems, viz., rate, word length, encoding schemes, modu-
lation, etc., and because of the requirement for security equipment for DOD
missions (DSCS), it is recommended that command encoding equipment be supplied
by the user until standardization of satellite command systems reaches a
degree wherein it is feasible to become Shuttle Supplied GFE.
TABLE B-22
COMPUTER FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
o CRT display control
o Data limit checks - analog and discrete
o Leak detection comnutation
o Processing of navigation data
o Guidance and navigation system updating
o PCM data processing
o Caution and warning limit checks
o Uplink, downlink control
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TABLE B-23
PAYLOAD FSE COMMONALITY ASSESSMENT
i. C&W processor (satellite) GFE Similarity in mission model requirements indicates usare of
C&W display panel a common assembly is warranted. Nomenclaute variances
handled by legend overlays.
2. C&W Processor (Tug) GFE Required for Class II Missions only. Classified as Tug peculiar
item. Virtually no similarity between satellite and "up, renuire-
ments.
3. Control panel (satellites) GFE Similarity in mission model requirem-nts indicates usage of a
common assembly is warranted. Nomenclature variances handled
by legend overlays.
4. Control panel (Tug) GFE Required for Class II Missions only. Classified as Tur necular
item. Virtually no similarity between satellite and Tug reouire-
ments.
5. PCM decommutator CFE Required for all mission classes for processJin of PCV data
for C&W redundancy and acquisition of housekeepin data.
6. Payload computer/CRTS GFE Required for all mission classes for CXW redundant disnlay
housekeepinp data display and display of nay]oad bay video
information.
7. Recorders
Digital OFE C&W events (alarms and switching) should be recorded on all
mission classes. Housekeeping data should he recorded to assist
ground stations in data acquisitin under pround station LOS
conditions.
Wideband GFE Highly desirable to record deployment activities (video) for all
mission classes and to provide canability to record experimental
data for purposes of assisting ground stations durine exneri-
mental orbital readiness tests by orbital test plan.
8. Command equipment User Wide diversity in encoding schemes and esuinment by mission
classes. DOD (DSCS) requires security eauinment. Ecuinment
should be user supplied until sufficient commonality exists
to warrant GFE classification.
9. Special purpose equipment User No mission commonality, program unique requirements.Experiment checkout equipment
Encrypters, decrypter:
Interleavers, demultiplexers
B.2.3.2 Mission Specialist/Payload Specialist Operations
The representative timelines established for mission classes in-flight opera-
tions (Figures B-4, B-5 and B-6) were analyzed for purposes of determining the
optimum allocation of equipment and responsibilities to the MSS and PSS.
The interpretation of the JSC allocation (Figure B-12) provides for primary
control and monitoring of the satellite systems at the MSS. Experimental con-
trol and monitoring of the satellite were allocated to the PSS.
SOAR-II recommendations for the MSS and PSS capabilities differ from the JSC
approach in that primary control and monitoring of the satellite was established
at the PSS (Figure B-13).
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FIGURE B-12
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B.2.4 Class II Missions
The Class II missions were selected to provide an assessment of operator
capabilities/responsibilities since it was judged to be the most taxing from
an operator/equipment viewpoint due to multiple vehicle involvement. Figure
B-14 presents a representative timeline for low Earth orbital operations for
the Class II (geosynchronous missions) with the period of interest commencing
at arrival at the 160 nmi. and continuing through payload release from
Shuttle.
The selection drivers for the MSS/PSS operational responsibilities are the time
constraints related to satellite thermal considerations and phasing for proper
longitudinal station, the numbers of different activities that are in progress
and an estimate of the skills that can be logically attributed to each opera-
tor, vix., MSS and PSS.
Activities during the noted period are generally expedited both prior to and
subsequent to payload bay door opening due to satellite thermal considerations
related to sun derived heating. (Class II satellite launches with expandable
vehicles typically utilize a slow spin derived from the delivery vehicle
during geosynchronous ascent to avoid exceeding satellite thermal limits.)
From inspection of Figure B-14, it is clear that the majority of preparatory
activities are Tug related (and will require the full attention of Tug con-
troller) and occur in parallel with housekeeping data monitoring and caution
and warning monitoring activities for both the Tug and satellite(s). Because
of the numbers of Tug activities that require performance in a relatively short
period (Figure B-14) it is suggested that Tug activities should be managed from
one station and that this station should be relieved of satellite related
management activities.
Based on an assessment that the MSS operator would be well trained in both
Shuttle and Tug systems, i.e., Tug is a component of the STS, it is recommended
that Tug activities are most efficiently managed from the MSS. Relief for this
station of satellite management activities is provided by assigning satellite
management to the PSS. This assignment also appears logical since it is assumed
the PSS operator would have a high degree of intelligence/training related to
satellite systems.
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FIGURE B-14 40376
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The following summarizes the PSS/MSS functional allocations based on the
established division of management activities.
A. Prime control and monitoring of the Tug is accomplished from the MSS.
B. Prime control and monitoring of the satellite is accomplished from
the PSS.
C. It is desirable to provide a parallel payload computer control by
keyboard from both the MSS and PSS. This feature allows the PSS to
assist the the MSS during anomaly derived diagnostic activity and
also permits the PSS to operate either the computer (Tug or satellite)
when the MSS is required for Orbiter vehicle activities.
As previously noted, this division of activities requires the MSS operator 
to be
well versed in the Shuttle and Tug systems and the Orbiter payload interface
and provides primary responsibility for the satellite to the PSS operator(s)
with the attendant burden of satellite systems intelligence.
The degree to which the capabilities of the payload specialist console are
exercised will depend upon the health of the satellites during predeployment.
Should satellite status data, being continuously monitored during this period,
evince a freedom from anomalies, the payload specialist will have a relatively
passive role in on-orbit proceedings. However, the occurrence of an 
out-of-
tolerance condition could result in consideralbe diagnostic activity in support
of ground analysis. Whether contingencies of this nature require a fourth crewman
will vary with the particular satellite being launched and the degree of training
provided the copilot or commander in subsystem design and operation (assuming one
or the other were to occupy the PSS station).
As a result of providing satellite systems management at the PSS for the driver
Class II missions, and the previously performed equipment commonality assessment
wherein it was shown a common block of FSE can satisfy basic satellite management
requirements. It appears desirable from a minimum cost standpoint, and the need
to maintain surveillance of Orbiter subsystems with the PSS, to manage satellite
systems/activities from the PSS for all mission classes. Thus EOS and LST (Classes
I and III respectively) are controlled via the PSS with the MSS providing management
of Shuttle supplied services. A summary of equipment and functional allocation is
provided in Figure B-15.
The SOAR-II version of the PSS shown in Figures B-16 and B-17 conceptually
satisfies the requirements of the SOAR-IIS missions and provides the desired
B-34
FIGURE B-16 38031
PAYLOAD SPECIALIST STATION
INTERCOMM 'PANEL
CRT MONITOR FAN
WARNING CONTROL AND TIME SIGNAL CONDITIONER
PANEL A+ DISPLAY PANEL
30.00
KEYBOARD
DIGITAL I - ASSY I PATCH PANEL
RECORDER 68.00 A/D CONVERTER
AND
UPOPER MULTIPLEXER
POWER
RECORDER 
/  
" MAINTENANCE
A- PANEL
30.00 A __24.000 28.00 P
PAYLOAD SPECIALIST PAYLOAD
STATION CONSOLE, UNIQUE CONSOLE SECTION A-A
BASIC
FIGURE B-17
BLOCK DIAGRAM - PAYLOAD SPECIALIST CONSOLE
CR33
ORBITER INTERCOMM
TO PAYLOADTRANSMITER NTER COMM FROM PAYLOAD AUDIO
PANEL RECEIVER
TO MSS COCKPIT
COMPARATOR WARNING
PANL SIGNAL CONDI-
FRAME TIONER AND
SYNCHRONIZER ITSERIAL PCM
SYNCHRONIZER ORBITER/DATA PAYLOAD
ADAPTER COMPUTER TOCOMM INTERFACE
AID PANEL
CONVERTER ANALOG
GENERATOR PANEL TO COMM PAYLOADSCOMMANDS
DECODERS
MAG ANTAPEAMPLIFIER CASSETTE 
RAUDATA
DISCRETE CONTROL
VIDEO CONTROLS, SIGNALS
TO DCLDCRT CRTO CL
COMM MONITOR MONITOR
I E I VIDEO
B-35
TABLE B-24
PSS EQUIPMENT CHARACTERISTICS
ITEM POWER WEIGHT VOLUME
(Watts) (Pounds) TInI) I.D. NO.
Basic
CRT (2) Each 80 100 1,458 1
Keyboard 15 15 500 2
Display/Control Panel 15 15 168 3Computer/Tape Recorder 150 50 768 4
Annunciator Panel 5 10 80 5Intercomm Panel 6 6 150 6
PCM Simulator 5 10 160 7
Patch Panel 20 200 8Power Conditioner 25 20 448 9
PCM Deco-mmutator 50 20 400 10
C&W Processor 15 10 100 11Digital Recorder 30 25 2,700 12
Video Recorder 100 40 2,700 13
A/D Converter 5 3 100 17
Special Purpose
Wideband Recorder 50 22 650 15Scan Converter 150 100 8,490 16
Decrypter/Demultiplexer 21 19 128 18
Encrypter 11 9 128 19
Command Encoder 5 10 128 20
DSCS-II Control & Display 35 20 120 21
A Oscilloscope 40 20 640 22
Multiplexer 10 10 128 23
Thermal Generator Service Unit 15 290 17,280 14
SN/R for Study Mission Classes
FIGURE B-18 40378
ORBITER CABIN ARRANGEMENT FOR PSS
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allocation of activity responsibility related to the analysis performed on low
Earth orbital operations, viz., PSS primary control/monitoring of the satellite.
Changes to the SOAR-II version of the PSS stem primarily from the improvement in
definition of operational and design requirements and chanPes in the volumetric
allowance in Shuttle for the PSS.
The equipment required to accomplish Shuttle processing of the mission class
satellites is shown in Table B-24. The latest Rockwell International version
of the Orbiter cabin arrangement for the PSS is shown in Figure B-18. An
exercise was performed to determine the feasibility of installing the required
equipment in the allotted volume.
Figure B-19 provides a typical equipment installation layout that includes not
only the basic equipment but also includes the unique or special purpose
equipment for all mission class satellites. The conclusion is therefore that
the Shuttle cabin volume allotted to the PSS is sufficient to handle satellite
FSE requirements and that no extraordinary geometric shapes are required for
the FSE to be accommodated in the Shuttle profile shown in Figure B-19. Figure
B-20 provides an illustration of the PSS console which demonstrates the wrap-
around configuration of the console again showing the total equipment instal-
lation. Equipment locations in the two figures (Figure B-19 and B-20) are
identical.
Assignment of Tug control to the MSS requires definition of Tug peculiar MSS
equipment requirements. A basic assumption is made that the baseline Shuttle
equipment such as computers, CRTS, keyboards and recorders are available for
allocation to the Tug vehicle for geosynchronous missions. Under this
assumption, Tug required equipment falls into the mission peculiar category
wherein its installation is optional for missions other than those requiring
a Tug. The Tug mission peculiar equipment is comprised of the following four
items:
A. Control and Display panel
B. PCM simulator
C. PCM decommutator
D. Caution and warning processor
A typical installation of the above noted equipment is shown in Figure B-21
for purposes of demonstrating the volume required in the MSS for the Tug
peculiar equipment.
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Payload equipment operating times were reviewed from the point of disconnection
of ground power (T-30 minutes) until payload deployment from Shuttle for
purposes of providing an estimate of average energy to be supplied by Shuttle
for payload usage. FSE power requirements were derived from the equipment
estimates shown in Table B-25.
B.2.5 Class I Missions (EOS)
The EOS mission requires 139 minutes for ascent to the 400 nmi orbit. The
liftoff configuration requires 585 watts for the PSS/MSS consoles, 20 watts
for EOS telemetry power and 18 watts for battery trickle charge. It is
assumed this power requirement will be initiated at T-30 minutes when transfer
is made from ground power to Shuttle power. With an 11 minute allowance for
ground hold time, the duration for this load is three hours.
Subsequent to arrival at the 400 nmi operational orbit, experimental ORT will
be conducted with the satellite hardwired to Shuttle (in payload bay - doors
opened) after the 48-hour outgassing period. It is estimated that the time
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required for the testing is 15 hours. During this 15 hour period, the power
demand increases by 340 watts for the experimental checkout equipment and an
additional 276 watts for satellite experiment equipment operation.
EOS energy requirements are therefore summarized at 51 hours x 613 watts and
15 hours x 1,229 watts for a total of 49.8 KWH.
B.2.6 Class II Missions (Tug with ATS/SMS/DSCS)
It is assumed for the Class II missions that deployment from the Shuttle pay-
load bay will occur as soon as possible after arrival at the 160 nmi orbit
due to satellite thermal considerations.
With this assumption, the mission profile becomes common with regard to
Shuttle power/energy requirements and the satellites need not be treated on
an individual basis.
Ascent to the 160 nmi orbit requires 186 minutes. Transfer to Shuttle power
from ground power should occur no later than T-30 minutes. With an allowance
of 14 minutes for a ground hold, the ascent power load of 1,557 watts persists
for 3.8 hours.
The power allowances for this phase are 662 watts for the PSS, 500 watts for
the MSS, 320 watts for the Tug and 75 watts for the satellites.
Upon arrival at the deployment altitude of 160 nmi., deployment and attached
Tug ORT activities will be initiated. Time allowance for this activity is
20 minutes. During this period fuel cell starting requires 800 watts for
15 minutes. Total energy requirements are therefore summarized at 4.4 hours
at 1,557 watts and 0.25 hours at 800 watts for a total of 7 KWH.
B.2.7 Class III Mission (LST)
Ascent for the LST to the 300nmi. operational orbit requires 142 minutes.
With transfer to Shuttle power no later than T-30 minutes and an 8 minute
hold allowance on Shuttle power, the time duration for the ascent power load
is three hours. The ascent power load is comprised of 585 watts for the PSS/
MSS consoles, 88 watts for the satellite telemetry system and 20 watts allowance
for trickle charge of the satellite's six batteries at a rate of 0.1 amperes.
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TABLE B-25
PSS- PAYLOAD EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS
ITEM POWER WEIGHT VOLUME
(Watts) (Pounds) (Inch 3 )
Basic
CRT (2) each 80 100 1,458
Keyboard 15 15 500
Display/Control Panel 15 15 168
Computer/Tape Reader 150 50 768
Annunciator Panel 5 10 80
Path Simulator 5 10 160
Patch Panel - 20 200
Power Conditioner 25 20 448
PCM Decommutator 50 20 400
C&W Processor 15 10 100
Digital Recorder 30 25 2,700
Video Recorder 100 40 2,700
A/D Converter 5 3 100
Special Purpose
Wideband Recorder 50 22 650
Scan Converter 150 100 8,490
Decrypter/Demultiplexer 21 19 128
Encrypter 11 9 128
Command Encoder 5 10 128
DSCS-II Control/Display 35 20 420
A Oscilloscope 40 20 640
Multiplexer 10 10 128
Is FIGURE B-22 40372
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Subsequent to arrival at the LEO altitude, two orbits are allocated for
determination of ephemeris data. During this period, initiation of limited
checkout of the OTA and SIP is scheduled using the LST built-in self check
logic. Checkout is limited due to the incomplete outgassing process which
requires approximately 48 hours for completion. The total limited ORT for
the LST is estimated to require 10 hours. Power requirements during this
period are increased by 300 watt allowances each for the OTA and SIP.
Total energy requirements are therefore summarized at three hours at 693
watts and 10 hours at 1,293 watts for a total of 33.7 KWH. The payload power
and energy requirements are summarized in Figure B-22. It should be noted
that for Sortie Lab, the primary Shuttle energy requirement is derived from
an allowance of 3 KW as specified in the literature.
It is important to note that the estimated EOS energy requirement at 50 KWH is
at the exact value presently allocated to payloads by the Shuttle. A reitera-
tion of SOAR-II recommendation to increase this allocation is therefore sub-
mitted in order to provide sufficient energy for on-orbit contingency holds
and to compensate for additional energy requirements beyond those considered
in the foregoing estimates that may be chargeable to the payloads.
B.2.8 Software-Computer Requirements
The payload computer (FSE) functional requirements are presented in Table
B-26. The following presents estimates of machine sizing and characteristics
to satisfy these requirements.
The Tug and satellite checkout software have basically the same requirements,
with Tug having additional navigation requirements (e.g., state vector update
of the navigation system and comparison of the Tug and Shuttle navigation
data). Sizing for each computer was based upon worst case (W/C) requirements.
The design requirements are described in the following table.
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TABLE B-26
COMPUTER FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
o CRT DISPLAY CONTROL
o DATA LIMIT CHECKS 
- ANALOG AND DISCRETE
o LEAK DETECTION COMPUTATION
o PROCESSING OF NAVIGATION DATA
o GUIDANCE AND NAVIGATION SYSTEM UPDATING
o PCM DATA PROCESSING
o CAUTION AND WARNING LIMIT CHECKS
o UP-LINK, DOWNI-LINK CONTROL
The operator interface with the systems consists of a keyboard and CRT dis-
play. Capability is provided to control/display PCM words, C&W parameters,
navigation data and the baseline data base.
The prime difference between Tug and Satellite PCM data is main frame format
and word size. The Tug has a fixed main frame format and word size, whereas
the satellite has a variable main frame format and word size for each mission
class payload. The size and timing estimates for the PCM decommutation
processor are based upon worst case bit rates, word size and main frame as
noted in Table B-27. PCM data will enter the computer by a DMA channel under
interrupt control and decommutated in real time.
The operator response to a caution indication is selection of PCM words in
groups. The selected group will be displayed and flagged with out-of-
tolerance conditions.
The leak detector processor continuously monitors up to 20 pressure and
temperature parameters. When an out-of-tolerance condition occurs, the data
is automatically displayed. The pressure and temperature parameters to be
monitored are included in the data base.
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TABLE B-27
DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
PCM DATA Tug Satellite
Bit Rate (BPS) 51.2K (W/C) 51.2K (W/C)
Bits per word 8 (W/C) 9 (W/C)
Main Frame (words) 384 (W/C) 512 (W/C)
Format Fixed Variable
Variables (max.) 220 (W/C) 100 (W/C)
DISPLAY
Type CRT CRT
Character Set Alphanumeric Alphanumeric
Code ASCII ASCII
Display Memory Yes Yes
KEYBOARD
Character Set Alphanumeric Alphanumeric
Code ASCII ASCII
COMPUTER U/D LINK
Bit Rage (BPS) 20K 20K
I/O Parallel Parallel
The processing navigation data is unique to the Tug system. The Tug FSE com-
puter will be linked with the main Shuttle computer and Tug Flight computer.
The main functions are to provide state vector update of guidance and navi-
gation and to compare navigation data between Tug and Shuttle systems. The
state vector update data is input by the operator via keyboard, then verified
by displaying the update. To compare navigation data, the operator will select
the required navigation parameters, which are then checked for out-of-tolerance
conditions and displayed.
The estimate of software requirements necessary for the on-board Tug and
satellite computers to satisfy processing requirements are shown in the Tables
B-28 and B-29. It is concluded that the Tug and satellite data can be
processed with a 16K, 16-bit word, 1 microsecond cycle-time machine wherein
a 4K memory block exists for growth capability in both computers.
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TABLE B-28
SATELLITE CHECKOUT SOFTWARE 40374
FUNCTION INSTRUCTION DATA BASE
EXECUTIVE 3795 360
CRT DISPLAY CONTROLLER 1200 600
DISCRETE AND ANALOG DATA PROCESSOR 900 80
(LIMIT CHECK AND CHANGE)
LEAK DETECTION (PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE) 400 360
ORBITER COMPUTER 450 75
UPIDOWN LINK
SATELLITE COMPUTER 525 75
UP LINK
PCM DATA PROCESSOR 520 1380
CAUTION/WARNING 465 45
(LIMIT CHECK AND CHANGE)
TOTAL 8255 2975
TOTAL MEMORY SIZE 11,230
lis TABLE B-29 40375
TUG CHECKOUT SOFTWARE
FUNCTION INSTRUCTION DATA BASE
EXECUTIVE 3795 720
CRT DISPLAY CONTROLLER 1200 600
DISCRETE AND ANALOG DATA PROCESSOR (LIMIT CHECK 900 80
AND CHANGE)
LEAK DETECTION (PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE) 400 360
NAVIGATION PROCESSOR (DATA COMPARISON) 200 100
GUIDANCE AND NAVIGATION SYSTEM UPDATE 200 40
ORB ITER COMPUTER UPIDOWN LINK 450 75
TUG COMPUTER UP/DOWN LINK 450 75
PCM DATA PROCESSOR 600 1320
CAUTION/WARNING (LIMIT CHECK AND CHANGE) 465 45
TOTAL 8660 3415
TOTAL MEMORY SIZE - 12,075
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Appendix B.1
GROUND STATION CONTACT TIMES
A computer evaluation of mission class ground station contact times was determined
using a 15 station STDN network (for the NASA missions) projected for the late
1970's. The specified network is option 15-A of Network Integration Study, Part
A, STDN No. 809, Networks Directorate, Goddard Space Flight Center, June 1972
and is comprised of the following stations:
Cape Kennedy (MIL) Santiago (AGO)
Bermuda (BDA) Rosman (ROS)
Canary Is. (CYI) Alaska (ULA)
Ascension Is. (ACN) Tanamariue (TAN)
Hawaii (HAW) Johannesburg (BUR)
Goldstone (GDS) Quito (QUI)
Orroral (ORR) Guam (GWM)
Madrid (MAD)
Contact time determination was performed in order to assess the effectiveness
and/or need for Shuttle controlled checkout of satellites as an aid to ground
controlling agencies (See checkout in Appendix B).
B.1.1 CLASS I MISSION (EOS)
The EOS delivery to the 400 nmi LEO at 98.40 uses the standard Shuttle trajectory
(shown below) which was used to determine the noted contact times.
Ascent to 50 nmi
Transfer orbit (50 x 100 nmi) 1/2 orbit
Intermediate orbit (100 x 100 nmi)
Transfer orbit (100 x 400 nmi) 1/2 orbit
Operational orbit (400 x 400 nmi)
Table B.1-1 provides a summary of time parameters compiled from the computer
data shown in Figure B.l-1.
B.1-1
B.1.2 CLASS III MISSION (LST)
The LST delivery to its operational orbit uses the standard Shuttle trajectory
described for EOS with the operational orbit being 330 x 330 nmi at 28.50
inclination.
TABLE B.1-1
EOS CONTACT SUMMARY
AVERAGE CONTACT TIME PER STATION PER REF BY STATION:
STATION AVERAGE CONTACT TIME PER STA. MIN. STA. CONTACT TIME IN
PER ORBIT REP. CYCLE
TAN 8.557 2.830
ULA 10.423 6.650
HAW 9.239 3.632
BUR 9.379 4.519
ACN 10.185 7.561
MAD 9.792 5.166
GWM 9.099 6.303
CRR 9.266 4.960
CYL 10.187 4.672
EDA 8.803 3.544
QUI 9.389 3.341
MIL 10.871 4.312
ROS 10.195 7.527
GDS 8.886 4.860
AGO 9.088 2.405
MAXIMUM TIME BETWEEN STATION COVERAGE:
71.17 Min. between ULA and GDS in orbits 7 and 8 respectively
PERCENT OF TIME IN CONTACT DURING REP (REPETITION) CYCLE: 25.8%
AVERAGE STATION CONTACT TIME PER DAY: 364.6 Min.
AVERAGE STATION CONTACT TIME PER ORBIT: 25.6 Min.
Table B.1-2 provides a summary of time parameters compiled from the data presented
in Figure B.1-2.
B.1.3 CLASS II MISSIONS
Class II missions (geosynchronous - ATS/SMS/DSCS) involve two totally different
ground networks. ATS and SMS utilize the NASA STDN net and their contact times
were therefore determined using the network specified for EOS and LST.
B.1-2
FIGURE B.1-1
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The DSCS missions (DOD) utilizes the stations listed in Table B.1-3.
B.1.3.1 ATS/SMS
The ATS contact times are presented in Figures B.1-3 and B.1-4 for the geosyn-
chronous longitudinal stations of 1150 W and 1400 W respectively.
SMS contact times are presented in Figure B.1-5 for the geosynchronous longitu-
dinal station of 95 0 W.
B.1.3.2 DSCS
The DSCS delivery missions which were considered were the geosynchronous stations
of 300W and 1750 E. Contact times are presented in Figures B.1-6 and B.1-7
respectively.
B.1-4
B.1.4 CONCLUSIONS
Significant results gleaned from evaluation of the contact data are summarized
in Figure B.1-8.
EOS contact time restrictions are judged to be somewhat severe at 26 minutes
(average) per orbit (99.7 minutes), although less severe than the coverage pro-
vided via the presently 6-7 station network stipulated in EOS phase definition
documents.
LST contact time at 42 minutes (average) per orbit (97 minutes) provides obvious
operational restrictions, but again, this time is increased over the coverage
planned for the LST mission which is 25.7 minutes (average) utilizing a ground
net comprised of CYI, ACN, ORR, GWM, HAW and GDS.
Geosynchronous mission coverage during operation at the 170 nmi departure orbit
is typically represented at 30% for NASA missions (Figure B.1-8) and 11% for the
DOD missions (DSCS) using the existing DOD facilities.
In the event that the envisioned TDRS system consisting of the TDRS and support
ground stations (two or three) is established, full coverage is anticipated for
all classes of missions with attendant elimination of operational restrictions.
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TABLE B.1-2
LST GROUND STATION CONTACT TIME
AVERAGE CONTACT TIME PER STATION PER ORBIT BY STATION:
STATION AVERAGE CONTACT TIME PER STA. MIN. STA. CONTACT TIME IN
PER ORBIT REP. CYCLE
ROS 8.441 3.687
MIL 9.692 5.717
BDA 9.184 3.964
TAN 10.317 4.667
GDS 8.889 3.336
BUR 10.442 6.663
ACN 8.701 5.450
HAW 10.123 4.688
QUI 9.189 4.661
GWM 9.397 6.111
AGO 9.741 6.589
MAD 8.014 5.562
ORR 8.861 5.035
CYI 10.316 7.083
MAXIMUM TIME BETWEEN STATION COVERAGE:
73.57 Min. between CYI and QUI in Rev. 40
PERCENT OF TIME IN CONTACT DURING REP (REPETITION) CYCLE: 44.2%
AVERAGE STATION CONTACT TIME PER DAY: 628.9 Min.
AVERAGE STATION CONTACT TIME PER ORBIT: 42.1 Min.
TABLE B.1-3
DOD GROUND STATIONS
DUAL TRACKING STATIONS SINGLE TRACKING STATIONS
NHS-New Hampshire KTS-Kodiak
(Manchester, New Hampshire) (Kodiak, Alaska)
VTS-Vandenberg IOS-Indian Ocean
(Lompoc, California) (Mahi, Seychelles)
HTS-Hawaii GTS-Guam
(Kaena Point, Hawaii) (Guam)
B.1-7
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GROUND STATION CONTACT TIMES
PARAMETER CLASS I (EOS) CLASS III (LST)
ORBITAL PERIOD 99.8 MIN 97.0 MIN
REPETITION CYCLE 40 REVS 31 REVS
MAX TIME WITH NO CONTACT 71.2 MIN 73.6 MIN
AVG STATION CONTACT TIME PER DAY 365 MIN 629 MIN
MINIMUM CONTACT TIME 2.4 MIN 3.3 MIN
CONTACT IN REPETITION CYCLE 25.8% 44.2%
AVG CONTACT TIME PER ORBIT 25.6 MIN 42.1 MIN
ATS GROUND STATION CONCLUSIONS:
-d1 4-CONTACT TIME
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Appendix C
PAYLOAD ELECTRICAL INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS
C.1 PAYLOAD/ORBITER ELECTRICAL INTERFACE REOUIREILNTS
The electrical interface functions between the payloads, payload bay services
and the mission/payload specialist consoles are essentially defined by the
requirements generated in Task 2 (Appendix B), i.e., control/display require-
ments stemming from prelaunch testing/monitoring, orbital readiness testing
(ORT), safety criteria (C&W) and other miscellaneous operational activities
such as deployment preparations and deployment.
C.1.1 Class I and III Missions (EOS and LST)
The equipment interconnection (interface) required for EOS and LST is presented
in Figure C-i. The electrical functions required in each segment of the inter-
connection system are delineated in Table C-1 for EOS and C-2 for LST. The
differences in functions for the two vehicles are derived primarily from the
EOS attached ORT involving testing/calibration of the experiment sensor systemns.
FIGURE C-1
EQUIPMENT INTERCONNECTION - EOS AND LST
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TABLE C-1
EOS ELECTRICAL INTERFACE FUNCTIONS
System Characteristics Requirement Wire/Gage
Segment A & G
Power 28 VDC 450W 2 #12 (41a free air)
return 450W 2 #12 (23a in bundle)
C & W Bandwidth: 10 Hz 10 functions 10 TSP/20
2 redundant power 2 TSP/20
Narrowband digital Rate: 12.5 KBPS (max) Housekeeping data, 2 TSP/20
telemetry C & W backup
Control & related Dedicated hardwire 22 signals 44 TSP/20
bilevel monitoring system (includes redundancy
for deployment platform)
Computer up-down Rate: undefined Data 1 TSP/20
link (20 KBPS) Clock 1 TSP/20
Command Rate: 2 KBPS Data 1 TSP/20
Clock 1 TSP/20
Batteries 32-35 VDC Trickle charge 0.6a 1 TSP/20
Satellite systems Analog-bilevel 10 function allowance 10 TSP/20
bandwidth undefined
Two-way voice Bandwidth: 3 KHz Voice 1 TSP/20
Ocean scanning
spectrometer 4.6 KHz Detector amplifier outputs 20 TSP/20
Sea surface radiometer 9.2 KHz Detector amplifier outputs 5 TSP/20
Cloud physics radiometer 5.83 KHz Detector amplifier outputs 5 TSP/20
Atmosphere sounder 50 Hz Detector amplifier outputs 4 TSP/20
Pollution sensor 8 Hz Detector amplifier outputs 1 TSP/20
Microwave radiometer 400 Hz Detector amplifier outputs 5 TSP/20
Totals: 4 #12
114 TSP/20
System Characteristics Requirement Wire/Gage
Segment B
Power 28 VDC 450w 2 #12 (41a free air)
return 450W 2 #12 (23a in bundle)
C & W Bandwidth: 10 Hz 10 functions 10 TSP/20
2 redundant power 2 TSP/20
Narrowband digital Rate: 12.5 KBPS (max) Housekeeping data, 1 TSP/20
telemetry C & W backup
Control & related Dedicated hardwire 16 signals 32 TSP/20
bilevel monitoring system
Computer up-down Rate: undefined Data 1 TSP/20
link (20 KBPS) Clock 1 TSP/20
Command Rate: 2 KBPS Data 1 TSP/20
Clock 1 TSP/20
Batteries 32-35 VDC Trickle charge 0.6a 1 TSP/20
Satellite systems Analog-bilevel 10 function allowance 10 TSP/20
bandwidth undefined
Ocean scanning
spectrometer 4.6 KHz Detector amplifier outputs 20 TSP/20
Sea surface radiometer 9.2 KHz Detector amplifier outputs 5 TSP/20
Cloud physics radiometer 5.83 KHz Detector amplifier outputs 5 TSP/20
Atmosphere sounder 50 Hz Detector amplifier outputs 4 TSP/20
Pollution sensor 8 Hz Detector amplifier outputs 1 TSP/20
Microwave radiometer 400 Hz Detector amplifier outputs 5 TSP/20
Totals: 4 #12
100 TSP/20
C-2
System Characteristics Requirement Wire/Gage
Segment C
Deployment platform
Control 28 VDC, discrete 9 motorized latches 10 TSP/20
1 ring rotation motor
Monitor 28 VDC bilevel 10 monitor function 10 TSP/20
(limit switches)
Total: 20 TSP/20
Segment D & E
Ground Power 28 VDC 1500 W 4 #12 (41a free air)
return 1500 W 4 #12 (23a in bundle)
C & W Bandwidth: 10 Hz 7 functions 7 TSP/20
Narrowband digital Rate: 12.5 KBPS Housekeeping & 1 TSP/20telemetry test data
Computer up-down Rate: undefined Data 1 TSP/20link (20 KBPS) Clock 1 TSP/20
Control & related bilevel-dedicated
bilevel monitoring hardwire system 11 signals 22 TSP/20
Batteries 32-35 VDC Trickle charge 0.6a 1 TSP/20
Satellite systems Analog-bilevel 10 function allowance 10 TSP/20
bandwidth undefined
VIP VHF Housekeeping data 1 Coax
S Band Housekeeping data 1 Coax
1IRP S Band Sensor system data 1 Coax
MOMS S Band Sensor systems data 1 Coax
Totals: 8 #12
43 TSP/20
4 Coax
Segment F
Power 28 VpC 1500 W 4 #12 (41la free air)
return 1500 W 4 #12 (23a in bundle)
C & W monitor Bilevel C & W master alarm 1 TSP/20
J4arro'Tband digital Rate: 12.5 KBPS Data - real time or 2 TSP/20telemetry 
stored for downlink
to ground
Mission timing Undefined Time signal 4 TSP/20
Computer keyboard Parallel digital 16 data lines 16 TSP/20
1 mode 1 TSP/20
Two-way voice Bandwidth: 3 Hz Voice 1 TSP/20
Video aLndwidth: 5 ADz Data - composite signal 1 Coax
Totals: 8 #12
25 TSP/20
1 Coax
Segment H
Video Bandwidth: 5 MHz Composite signal 4 Coax
Deployment platform
Control 28 VDC discrete 5 control functions 5 TSP/20
hardwire
Monitor 28 VDC bilevel 6 monitor functions 6 TSP/20
(limit switches)
Control Via computer Data i TSP/20
Clock 1 TSP/20
Voice Bandwidth: 3 KHz Voice comm 2 TSP/20
(payload bay)
Totals: 15 TSP/20
4 Coax
Segment I
Power 28 VDCPower 28 VDC 1500 W 3 #12 (l1 a free air)return 1500 W 3 #12 (23 a in bundle)
Narrowband digital Rate: 12.5 KBPS Data
telemetry 2 TSP/20
C & W Bilevel-undefined C & W master alarm
(0-28 VDC) 1 TSP/20
Totals: 6 #12
3 TSP/20
C-3
TABLE C-2
EOS ELECTRICAL INTERFACE FUNCTIONS
System Characteristics Requirement Wire/Gage
Segment A & G
Power 28 VDC 500 W 2 #12 (41a free air)
return 500 W 2 #12 (23a in bundle)
C & W Bandwidth: 10 Hz 3 monitor function 5 TSP/20
2 redundant power
Narrowband digital Rate: 51.2 KBPS Housekeeping and 2 TSP/20
telemetry test data; C & W backup
Control & related Dedicated hardwire 15 signals (max) (includes 30 TSP/20
bilevel monitoring system redundancy for deployment
'latform)
Computer up-down Rate: undefined Data 1 TSP/20
link (20 KBPS) Clock' 1 TSP/20
Command Rate: 1 KBPS Data 1 TSP/20
Sub-bit detection 200 BPS Clock 1 TSP/20
Batteries 32-35 VDC Trickle charge 0.6a 1 TSP/20
Satellite systems Analog-bilevel 10 function allowance 10 TSP/20
bandwidth undefined
Totals: 4 #12
52 TSP/20
Segment B
Power 28 VDC 500 W 4 #12 (l41a free air)
return 500 W 2 #12 (23a in bundle)
C & W Bandwidth: 10 Hz 3 monitor function 5 TSP/20
2 redundant power
Narrowband digital Rate: 51.2 KBPS Housekeeping & test 1 TSP/20
telemetry data; C & W backup
Control & related Bilevel-dedicated 8 signals (max) 16 TSP/20
bilevel monitoring hardwire system (includes redundancy for
deployment platform)
Computer up-down Rate: undefined Data 1 TSP/20
link (20 KBPS) Clock 1 TSP/20
Command Rate: 1 KBPS Data 1 TSP/20
Sub-bit detection 200 BPS
Batteries 32-35 VDC Trickle charge 0.6a 1 TSP/20
Satellite systems Analog-bilevel 10 function allowance 10 TSP/20
bandwidth undefined
RF S Band Telemetry data 1 Coax
down link
Totals: 4 #12
36 TSP/20
Sengment C
Deployment platform
Control 28 VDC discrete 9 motorized latches 10 TSP/20
1 ring rotation motor
Monitor\ 28 VDC bilevel 10 monitor functions 10 TSP/20
(limit switches)
Total: 20 TSP/20
Segments D & E
Ground power 28 VDC 1500 W (max) 4 #12 (41a free air)
(23a in bundle)
Ground power Return 1500 W (max) 4 #12
C & W Bandwidth: 10 Hz 3 functions 3 TSP/20
Narrowband digital Rate: 51.2 KBPS Housekeeping & test 1 TSP/20
telemetry data; C & W backup
C-4
System Characteristics Requirements Wire/Cage
Computer up-down Rate: undefined Data 1 TSP/20
link (20 KBPS) Clock 1 TSP/20
Control & related Bilevel-dedicated 8 signals 16 TSP/20
bilevel monitoring hardwire system
Batteries 32-35 VDC Trickle charge 0.6a 1 TSP/20
Satellite systems Analog-bilevel 10 function allowance 10 TSP/20
bandwidth undefined
RF S Band Telemetry data down link 1 Coax
VHF
Totals: 8 #12
33 TSP/20
1 Coax
Segment F
Power 28 VDC 1500 W 4 #12 (41a free air)
return 1500 W 4 #12 (23a in bundle)
C & W monitor Bilevel C & W master alarm 1 TSP/20
Narrowband digital Rate: 1.6 KBPS Data - real time or 1 TSP/20
telemetry stored for downlink
to ground
Mission timing Undefined Time signal 4 TSP/20
Computer keyboard Parallel digital 16 data lines 16 TSP/20
1 mode 1 TSP/20
Two-way voice Bandwidth: 3 Hz Voice 1 TSP/20
Video Bandwidth: 5 MHz Composite signal 1 Coax
Cameras (4) 28 VDC continuous 7 control functions 7 TSP/20
Totals: 8 #12
32 TSP/20
1 Coax
Segment H
Video Bandwidth: 5 MHz Composite signal 4 Coax
Deployment platform
Control 28 VDC discrete 5 control functions 5 TPS/20
hardwire
Monitor 28 VDC bilevel 6 monitor functions 6 TSP/20
(limit switch)
Control Via computer Data 1 TSP/20
Clock 1 TSP/20
Voice Bandwidth: 3 KHz Voice comm 2 TSP/20
(payload bay)
Totals: 15 TSP/20
4 Coax
Segment I
Power 28 VDC 
. 1500 W 4 #12 (41a free air)
4 #12 (23a in bundle)
Narrowband digital Rate: 51.2 KBPS 2 TSP/20
telemetry
C & W Bilevel-undefined C & W master alarm 1 TSP/20
(0-28 VDC)
Totals: 8 #12
3 TSP/20
C-5
C.i.2 Class II Missions (ATS/SMS/DSCS - Tug)
The equipment interconnection (interface) reauired for the Class II missions
is presented in Figure C-2 based on the functional allocations established for
the MSS/PSS in Appendix B. The electrical functions required in each segment
of the interconnection system are delineated in Table C-3. The DSCS mission
with two satellites was used as the basis for determining the numbers of
functions required in order to provide design for the most demanding mission
in order to utilize the same design/hardware for the ATS and SMS.
FIGURE C-2
EQUIPMENT INTERCONNECTION - CLASS II MISSIONS
SHUTTLE CABIN PAYLOAD BAY
D
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TABLE C-3
CLASS II MISSIONS - ELECTRICAL INTERFACE FUNCTIONS
Systems Characteristics Requirement Wire/Gage
Segment A & H
Power 28 VDC 300 W max 1 #12 (41a free air)
return 1 #12 (23a in bundle)
C & W Bandwidth: 10 Hz 12 functions 12 TSP/20
dedicated hardwire redundant power 2 TSP/20
system
Narrowband digital Rate: 250-640 BPS Data and C & W backup 1 TSP/20
telemetry Clock 1 TSP/20
Satellite systems Bilevel-dedicated 16 control signals (max) 16 TSP/20
hardwire system to satellite
(0 and 28 VDC) 16 talkback signals (max) 16 TSP/20
Computer up-down Rate: undefined Data 1 TSP/20
link (- 20 KBPS) Clock 1 TSP/20
Command Rate: DSCS 1 KBPS Data 1 TSP/20
SMS undefined Clock 1 TSP/20
ATS undefined
Batteries 32-35 VDC 0.6 ampere (max) trickle 1 TSP/20
charge
Satellite systems Analog-bilevel 20 monitor functions 20 TSP/20
bandwidth undefined (allowance)
Totals: 2 #12
73 TSP/20
Segment B & G
Power 28 VDC 2'500 W 4 #12 (41la free air)
return 2500 W 4 #12 (23a in bundle)
C & W monitor Bandwidth: 10 Hz 26 signal allocation 26 TSP/20
dedicated hardwire redundant power 2 TSP/20
system
Narrowband digital Rate: 51.2 KBPS Data and C & W 1 TSP/20
telemetry backup
Tug systems Bilevel-dedicated 26 control signals 8 TSP/20
hardwire system 18 TSP/20
0 and 28 VDC 26 talkback signals 26 TSP/20
Computer up-down Rate: undefined Data 1 TSP/20
link (25 KBPS) Clock
Command Rate: undefined Data 1 TSP/20
(2KBPS) Clock 1 TSP/20
Battery 32-35 VDC Trickle charge 0.1a 1 TSP/20
Video Bandwidth: 5 MHz Data 4 coax
Tilt table
latch control Dedicated hardwire 20 functions 20 TSP/20
latch control Serial link Data 1 TSP/20
latch monitor (Assume limit Clock 1 TSP/20
switches 1 function 1 TSP/20
raise control Hardwired 1 function 1 TSP/20
position monitor Bilevel 2 function 2 TSP/20
Totals: 8 #12
111 TSP/20
1 Coax
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System Characteristics Requirement Wire/Gage
(Tug) Segment C
Power 28 VDC 2500 w 4 #12 (41a free air)
return 2500 W 4 #12 (23a in bundle)
C & W Bandwidth: 10 Hz 26 functions 26 TSP/20
redundant power 2 TSP/20
Narrowband digital Rate: 51.2 KBPS Housekeeping & test 2 TSP/20
telemetry data; C & W backup
Control & related Dedicated hardwire 26 functions 52 TSP/20
bilevel monitoring system 16 functions 32 TSP/20
Computer up-down Rate: undefined Data 2 TSP/20
link (20 KBPS) Clock 2 TSP/20
Command Rate: undefined Data 2 TSP/20
(2 KBPS) Clock 2 TSP/20
Battery 32-35 VDC Trickle charge O.la 1 TSP/20
0.3a 1 TSP/20
Tug systems Analog-bilevel 15 functions (allowance) 30 TSP/20
bandwidth undefined 20 functions (allowance) 40 TSP/20
Totals: 8 #12
117 TSP/20
(Satellite)
Power 28 VDC 300 W max 2 #14 (32a free air)
return 2 #14 (17a in bundle)
C & W Bandwidth: 10 Hz 12 functions 12 TSP/20
dedicated hardwire redundant power 2 TSP/20
system
Narrowband digital Rate: 250-640 BPS Housekeeping & test 1 TSP/20
telemetry data; C & W backup
Clock 1 TSP/20
Satellite systems Bilevel-dedicated 16 control signals 16 TSP/20
hardwire system (max) to satellite
(0 and 28 VDC) 16 talkback signals (max) 16 TSP/20
Computer up-down Rate: undefined Data 1 TSP/20
link (e 20 KBPS) Clock 1 TSP/20
Command Rate: DSCS 1 KBPS Data 1 TSP/20
SIS undefined Clock 1 TSP/20
ATS undefined
Batteries 32-35 VDC 0.6 ampere (max) trickle 1 TSP/20
charge
Satellite systems Analog-bilevel 20 monitor functions 20 TSP/20
bandwidth undefined (allowance)
Totals: 4 #14
73 TSP/20
Segment D
Tilt table
latch control Dedicated hardwire 20 functions 20 TSP/20
latch control Serial link Data 1 TSP/20
Clock 1 TSP/20
latch monitor Bilevel- 1 function 1 TSP/20
limit switches
raise control Hardwired 1 function 1 TSP/20
position monitor Bilevel 2 functions 2 TSP/20
Total: 26 TSP/20
Segment E & N
Power 28 VDC 300 W 2 #12 (41a free air)
return 300 W 2 #12 (23a in bundle)
sense Voltage regulator 1 TSP/20
C &'W Bandwidth: 10 Hz 12 functions 12 TSP/20
Dedicated hardwire
system
Narrowband digital Rate: 250-640 BPS Housekeeping & test 2 TSP/20
telemetry data; C & W backup
Control & related Dedicated hardwire 22 functions (max) 22 TSP/20
bilevel monitoring system
Computer up-down Rate: undefined Data 2 TSP/20
link (20 KBPS) Clock
Command Rate: DSCS 1 KBPS Data 2 TSP/20
SMS undefined Clock
ATS undefined
Battery 32-35 VDC Trickle charge 0.3a 1 TSP/20
Totals: 4 #12
42 TSP/20
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System Characteristics Requirement Wire/Gage
Segment F & M
Power 28 VDC 2000 W 6 #12 (41a free air)
return 2000 W 6 #12 (23a in bundle)
sense Voltage regulation 1 TSP/20
C & W Bandwidth: 10 Hz 24 functions 24 TSP/20
dedicated hardwire
system
Computer up-down Rate: undefined Data 1 TSP/20
link (20 KBPS) Clock 1 TSP/20
Command Rate: undefined Data 1 TSP/20
(2 KBPS) Clock 1 TSP/20
Battery 32-25 VDC Trickle charge 0.la 1 TSP/20
Video Bandwidth: 5 MHz Data 1 Coax
Total: 12 #12
30 TSP/20
1 Coax
Segment I
Power 28 VDC (from MSS) 2 KW peak 6 #12 (41a free air)
return 2 KW 6 #12 (23a in bundle)
C & W Monitor Bilevel-undefined C & W master alarm 1 TSP/20
(from PSS)
Digital data Rate: 250 BPS low to Data-real time or stored 1 TSP/20
51.2 KBPS high for downlink to ground
(from PSS)
Mission timing Undefined (from MSS) Time signal 4 TSP/20
Computer keyboard Parallel digital 16 data lines 16 TSP/20
1 mode line 1 TSP/20
Two-way voice Bandwidth: 3 KHz Voice 1 TSP/20
Video Bandwidth: 5 MHz Data 1 Coax
Totals: 12 #12
24 TSP/20
1 Coax
Segment J
Power 28 VDC 2 KW max 2 #2 (181a free air)
return 2 #2 (100 a in bundle)
Digital data Rate: 250 to 640 BPS Data Relay 2 TSP/20
(Satellites)
Digital data (Tug) Rate: 51.2 KBPS Data Relay 2 TSP/20
Video Bandwidth: 5 MHz Data Relay 1 Coax
C & W Bilevel-undefined C & W master alarm 1 TSP/20
(To commander station) (Derived from PSS)
Mission timing Undefined Time signals 4 TSP/20
Shuttle navigation Digital-(serial) Data 1 TSP/20
Clock 1 TSP/20
Voice Bandwidth: 3 KHz 3 TSP/20
To commander & pilot
To data system Totals: 4 #2
14 TSP/20
1 Coax
Segment K & L
Narrowband digital
telemetry
Tug Rate: 51.2 KBPS Housekeeping data 2 TSP/20
Pronellant System Discrete hardwire 20 functions 20 TSP/20
(Tug)
Tug Systems Control Discrete hardwire
Control 12 functions 12 TSP/20
Monitor 12 functions 12 TSP/20
Total: 46 TSP/20
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C.1.3 Sortie Laboratory
The equipment interconnection (interface) required for the Sortie Laboratory
is presented in Figure C-3. The electrical functions required in each segment
of the system are summarized in Table C-4. As noted in Figure C-3 an option
is presented wherein the MSS and/or the PSS may be utilized for Sortie Laboratory
missions. It is postulated that the configuration selection would be oasea on
the type(s) of experiments in the Sortie Laboratory and an attendant assessment
of the value of supplementing the Sortie Lab/Shuttle equipment with equipment
(or volume) available in the PSS. In the event that for a particular Sortie
Lab mission no requirement is identified for the PSS, it is assumed the complete
Sortie Lab interface with Shuttle would be via the MSS with the possibility of
PSS removal during Shuttle turn around operations.
FIGURE C-3
EQUIPMENT INTERCONNECTION - SORTIE LABORATORY
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TABLE C-4
SORTIE LAB ELECTRICAL INTERFACE FUNCTIONS
System Characteristics Requirement Wire/Gage
Segments A, B. C. & D
Power 28 VDC 3 KW (Shuttle allowance) 6 #12 (41la free air)
return 3 10 (Shuttle allowvance) 6 #12 (23a in bundle)
C & W Bandwidth: 10 Hz 20 signal allocation to 40 TSP/20
and from orbiter,
redundant power 2 TSP/20
Narrowband digital Rate: 25 KBPS Data 1 TSP/20
telemetry Clock 1 TSP/20
Comuter link Rate: 30 IKPS Data 1 TSP/20
Clock 1 TSP/20
Command Rate: 2 KBPS Data 1 TSP/20
Clock 1 TSP/20
Stabilization/ Undefined (30 KBPS) Data 1 TSP/20
Pointing Attitude Clock 1 TSP/20
Rate
Wideband data Rate: 256 KBPS Data 1 TSP/20
Clock 1 TSP/20
Control & related Dedicated hardwire 20 functions 40 TSP/20
bilevel monitoring system
Two-way voice Bandwidth: 3 KHz Channel select 1 TSP/20
Lab to orbiter Channels: 2 Station select 1 TSP/20
Lab to orbiter to Voice 1 TSP/20
mission control
Video Bandwidth: 5 MHz Data 1 Coax
Totals: 12 #12
95 TSP/20
1 Coax
Segment E
Power 28 VDC Undefined (10 KW) 3 #0 (245a free air)
return Undefined (10 KW) 3 #0 (150a in bundle)
Computer up-down Rate: 30 KBPS Data 1 TSP/20
link Clock 1 TSP/20
Narrowband data Rate: 25 KBPS Data 1 TSP/20
Clock 1 TSP/20
Wideband data Rate: 256 KBPS Data 1 TSP/20
Clock 1 TSP/20
C & W Bandwidth: 10 Hz 15 functions 15 TSP/20
redundant power 2 TSP/20
Control & related Dedicated hardwire 20 functions 40 TSP/20
bilevel monitoring system
Two-way voice Bandwidth: 3 KHz Voice comm 2 TSP/20
Totals: 6 #0
65 TSP/20
Segment P-
Power 28 VDC 3 KW (allowance) 6 #12 (41a free air)
550 w (Pss) (23a in bundle)
Return 3 KW (allowance) 6 #12
550 W (PSS)
C & W monitor Bilevel C & W master alarm 1 TSP/20
20 function exchange 20 TSP/20
Narrowband data Rate: 25 KBPS Data 1 TSP/20
Clock 1 TSP/20
Wideband data Rate: 256 KBPS Data 1 TSP/20
Bandwidth 1 MHz Clock 1 TSP/20
Computer keyboard Parallel digital 16 data lines 16 TSP/20
1 mode 1 TSP/20
Two-way voice Bandwidth: 3 KHz Voice comm 1 TSP/20
Video Bandwidth: 5 lMIz Data 1 Coax
Totals: 12 #12
42 TSP/20
1 Coax
*N/R if PSS not used for Sortie Lab.
Segment 0
Power 28 VDC 3 KW (allowance) 6 #12 (41a free air)
return 550 w (PSS) 6 #12 (23a in bundle)
C & W Bilevel-undefined C & W master alarm 1 TSP/20
(0-28 VDC)
Narrowband data Rate: 25 KBPS Data relay 2 TSP/20
Wideband experiment Rate: 256 KBPS Data relay 2 TSP/20
data
Totals: 12 #12
5 TSP/20
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C.i.4 Summary
The electrical interface required between the various elements that comprise the
payload-payload support system is driven by the control-display functions needed
to accomplish in-flight and prelaunch Shuttle-integrated processing (testing,
monitoring, preparation) of the payload. The interface wiring requirements
generated for each mission class and shown in the preceding tables are classified
as worst case estimates with regard to numbers of wires required for the
following reasons:
A. Wiring allowances were provided for each mission class to permit
redundant hardwire monitoring of parameters at the PSS and MSS
that are available for display via processing of the serial digital
telemetry stream.
B. Redundant hardwire control is provided as a back-up to the hard-
wired serial digital command link for both the payload and tilt
table-deployment platform systems.
C. A twisted shielded wire pair (TSP) was allocated to each electrical
function. In some cases where it is determined to be acceptable to
use a common return line, the numbers of required wires will be
reduced.
C.2 DATA TRANSFER TECHNIQUES
Digital data exists in the following common forms:
A. Discretes which are single bits indicative of an event state.
B. Serial digital data either self-clocking or transferred with
separate clock lines.
C. Parallel digital data where distances are short accompanied
by clock lines and "handshakes" or transfer initiating pulses.
Transfer of data in parallel form is not a serious contender for use in the
payload bay for two reasons: 1) the bay is 60 ft long; 2) the signal interfaces
between the payload and the Tug are already in a serial format. The transfor-
mation of data from one form to the other would simply add unnecessary complexity
and increase the cost of equipment.
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C.2.1 Serial Data Transfer Technique Selection
The selection of a transfer technique for serial data is usually based upon the
following criteria:
A. Numbers of interfaces to be considered
B. Data transfer rate
C. Distance between sources and sinks
D. Allowable error rate
E. Type of multiplexing to employ
F. Transmission medium
G. Synchronization
H. Method of control
I. Degree of redundancy
J. Error detection and correction
K. Interface coupling and isolation
Although all are pertinent to design of the data bus systems within the Tug and
the Orbiter only Items B, C, E, F,.G, I and K are of particular importance when
considering the interfaces between the spacecraft and Tug, Orbiter, payload
service panel and integration equipment. One additional consideration which is
important is to achieve design consistency with Tug and Orbiter data systems in
order to increase equipment commonality and reduce the level of training
necessary to understand and repair the systems.
The types of digital data to be transferred are summarized in Table C-5 together
with their individual data rates (Item B) which will be used in considering the
transfer medium. Satellite narrowband data is baselined for interleaving with
Tug data on Tug studies. Digital data transfer to the PSS from the Class II
mission satellites will be hardwired from the satellite PCM encoder output,
through the Tug using Tug wiring, to the PSS. This approach essentially bypasses
the Tug data bus which eliminates any requirement for data searching of Tug-
satellite interleaved data by the flight support equipment (PSS) and provides the
capability for performance of satellite checkout activities when the Tug is
inactive. It is also carried directly to the T-26 service panel to allow pre-
launch checkout of the satellite when the Tug is not active. Wideband data will
always interface directly with the Orbiter systems although routed through the
Tug for Class II spacecraft. Computer uplink and serial commands will interface
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with the Tug and spacecraft signal conditioners and decoders. however,
whether the command emanates from the Orbiter or the Tug the originator
should be indistinguishable to the spacecraft.
To ensure that consistent interface designs would be provided for spacecraft
independent of their class and interfacing systems, design personnel were
contacted at MDC and the Space Division of Rockwell International to ascertain
the status of Tug and Orbiter data bus designs. This status is shown in Table
C-6. It is seen that designs are virtually identical with the exception of the
future possibility of the Orbiter's mission-critical bus going to full duplex
operation. The change is contemplated due to forecasts of high bus loading
(high data rates in respect to bus rate).
TABLE C-5
DIGITAL DATA TO BE TRANSFERRED
Computer Serial
N.B. Data W.B. Data Uplink Command
Payload (KBPS) (KBPS) (KBPS) (KBPS) Discretes
EOS 12.5 None 2 N.A.
ATS, SMS, DSCS-II 0.25 to 0.64 None 20 1 N.A.
LST 1.6 51.2 30 0.20 N.A.
Space Lab 25 256 30 2 N.A.
Tug 51.2 None 25 2 N.A.
TABLE C-6
DATA BUS CURRENT DESIGN STATUS
Specification Orbiter (mission critical bus) Tug
Bus Rate (MBPS) 1 1
Bus Type
(Current) Half-duplex Half-duplex
(Future) Full-duplex (?)
Modulation Type Bi-phase Bi-phase
Synchronization User Generated User Generated
Word Length
(Data) 16 bits 16 bits
(Overhead) 8 bits 8 bits
(Total) 24 bits 24 bits
Redundancy Dual Redundancy Dual Redundancy
Error Detection Included in Overhead Included in Overhead
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It has been indicated that the T ug bus design will follow the Orbiter's lead
to ensure commonality.
Since subsystems within the two STS elements will interface via redundant
(Item I) two wire lines (Item F) using biphase modulation (Item E) which
implies transformer coupling (Item K) it would appear that these are
desirable criteria for payload bay wiring. However, it also seemed reasonable
to review some of the tradeoffs pertinent to the bay wiring.
The selection of a PCM modulation technique was first investigated as
illustrated by Figure C-h because so many possibilities exist. The three
waveforms illustrated are those which are commonly selected after a review
of all characteristics. Due to its self-clocking characteristics (Item G)
eliminating clock lines, lack of a DC frequency component allowing transformer
coupling and circuit isolation (Item K) and general lack of negative aspects
it is seen that biphase or Manchester coding is a reasonable choice.
Table C-7 summarizes the rationale for this selection and also indicates the
superiority of Twisted Shielded Pair (TSP) over Coax for data rates requiring
bandwidth below 10 MHz on the basis of external noise attenuation as well as
cost and weight.
Is TABLE C-7
DATA TRANSFER TECHNIQUE SELECTION
CABLE TYPEI
ALTERNATIVE BANDWIDTH WEIGHT COST NOISE ATTENUATION
TSP TO 10 MHz I TO 2 LB/100 FT $18/500 FT 56 DB AT 1 MHz, 53 D3 AT 10 MHz
COAX TO 500 MHz 15 TO 20 LB/100 FT $100/500 FT 38 DB AT 1 MHz, 51 D3 AT 10 MHz
SELECTIOr: TSP FOR DIGITAL DATA
MODULATION TYPE
NO. OF ALTERNATIVES COMMONLY USED AC COUPLED SELF CLOCKING
23 HRZ-LEVEL NO NO
BI10 LEVEL YES YES
BI-POLAR* YES YES
ISELECTION: BIO - LEVEL
*LEAST COMMON
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FIGURE C4
PCM WAVE FORMS
WAVE FORMS ASPECTS
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 Positive Negative
Available Circuit Requires Clock
Output Line
NRZ - Level
One represented by plus level Simple Detection DC Component
Zero represented by minus level High Signal to Susceptible to
Noise Ratio Impulse Noise
BiO - Level Clock Information Clock must be
Available Reconstructed
One Represented by Plus Minus No DC Frequency Signal Inversion
Component Potential
Zero Represented by Minus Plus
o--
Bi-Polar NRZ No DC Frequency Lower Signal
Component to Noise
One represented by equal magni- Error Detecting Requires Forced
tude opposite polarity pulses Capability Transitions
Zero represented by zero level Sophisticated Bit
Synchronized
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C.2.2 Multiplexing Vs hardwire
The question of whether to hardwire or multiplex data channels was first
addressed in a general manner by estimating the equipment required for each
case and the cost, weight and power demands. These parameters were traded
and the expected weight savings of multiplexing resulted along with the
expected higher costs. Consideration of other factors led to the selection
of multiplexing as the recommended approach.
C.2.2.1 Assumptions and Procedure
The basic assumptions which were made are shown in Table C-b. Multiplexing
required a master unit for program control irrespective of the number of
channels multiplexed. A converter and remote multiplexer were then added to
the system for each 32 channels of analog data to be acquired. Finally two
twisted-shielded-pairs (TSP) were provided to carry a clocir, synchronization
and control bits to the multiplexers and data back to the controller. For
the case of hardwire, a 30-foot average length of cable was assumea.
TABLE C-8
MULTIPLEXING VS HARDWIRE
Unit Wt. Unit Cost Unit Pwr. No. A. No. B No. C Wt. Cost PYr.(lb.) ($ X 103) (W) (1000 Mea.) (100 Mea.) (10 Mea.) A B C A B C A B C
Master Unit 14 59.1 12 1 1 1 14 1414 4 60 60 60 12 12 12
Converter Unit 2 4.4 2 32 3 1 64 6 2 140 13 4 64 6 2
Multiplex Unit 1.2 5.9 0.06 32 3 1 38 4 1 192 18 6 2 0.2 0.06
2 TSP at 100' 2 4.0 -- 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 -- -- --
Total 118 26 19 396 99 74 78 18 14
TSP at 30' Avg. .66 1.33 -- 1000 100 10 660 666 1.33 .13 13 3 -- -- --
C.2.2.2 General Results
The results of the trade are shown in Figure C-5. It is seen that the cost
of the multiplexed system is always much higher than for hardwire and there
is a power penalty not paid by the latter system. The advantages of the
multiplexed system appear in the weight tradeoff where the crossover point
occurs at about 28 channels. A similar curve would result if volume were
the parameter being traded.
C-i7
C.2.2.3 Applicability of Results
Since the mission and payload stations contain computers, these devices will
undoubtedly be used as the controlling elements. Their higher cost in relation
to the master unit used in the trade is offset by their being shared for other
functions such as display generation so that differences in approach tend to
balance out. The multiplexed system will obviously require short cable lengths
to connect from multiplexers to transducers or signal conditioners which have
not been included. This is offset by the additional capacity of such a system
when a number of discrete or event functions must be monitored. On the whole,
the trends portrayed would seem to be valid.
FIGURE C-5
MULTIPLEX VS HARDWIRE TRADE
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C.2.2.4 Other Considerations
Other factors which must be taken into account are (1) the panel area
required to treat individual controls and displays which is synonymous
with the use of hardwire, and (2) the time required for installation of
equipment during Shuttle turnaround. Panel space is at a premium requiring
a limitation on the quantity of switches and discrete readouts. Remote
multiplexers and command units could be left in the bay from flight to
flight since they are remotely programmable while payload peculiar cables
would require changeout for every flight.
Finally, the majority of uplink and downlink measurements and command
functions are already in multiplexed format and are simply not available
in hardwire format.
C.2.2.5 Conclusion
In conclusion, the use of multiplexing appears to be the proper approach
except for the disparity in cost. The advantages of time sharing appear
to override this penalty.
C.3 CABLE DEFINITION
The required electrical signals and wire sizes for the study mission classes
were established as presented in Figures C-1 through C-4 in Section C.l.
Specific considerations related to the determination of cabling systems for
the mission classes are as follows:
A. Type of cabling; flat, belted, round
B. Types of connectors; standard, special purpose
C. Type of wiring insulation; teflon, kapton
Use of flat cabling is discarded basically because of the higher degree
of confidence level associated with the connectors required for usage of
round or belted cabling, viz., the state of the art.
Where geometric considerations are not germane, standard construction
round cables are recommended. In applications where cables are routed
through a narrow restricted passage, the recommended approach is usage
of belted cables which are a flat braided configuration of the standard
round version. This type of construction was utilized on the Lunar
Excursion Module.
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Recommendations with regard to type of connectors to be utilized are for
usage of standard connectors which have already been flight qualified to
avoid the cost and uncertainties related to development of special purpose
connectors. Standard connectors in this case are defined as the iAS 1599
type (NASA 4OMxxx series) such as ST234, ST232 and ST278 as specified by
MDAC drawing STC0010. Connectors involved in remote demate/mate operations
(umbilicals) are specified as a rack and panel type such as the Deutsch U79.
The characteristics comparison of teflon and kapton wire insulations are
shown in Table C-9.
TABLE C-9
TEFLON AND KAPTON INSULATION
Teflon (TFE) Kapton
burns with less vigor type 3 flammable characteristic
cold flow if pinched no cold flow
-2520C low temperature -1950C low temperature
+26000 high temperature -200oC high temperature
has notch sensitivity
rugged - high scrape/abrasion
resistance
carbon-oxygen reaction in pure 02
One of the significant advantages of kapton insulated wiring is the 30-40
percent reduction in weight and volume when compared with teflon insulation.
Consideration of installations, environment, predicted traffic and handling
lead to the general conclusion for usage of teflon insulated wiring in the
Shuttle cabin and kapton in the payload bay.
Cabling schematics developed for the mission classes are shown in Figures C-6
through C-8. Details of the cabling with regard to functional allocation,
connector pins/gages and size estimates are presented in Tables C-10 through
C-12.
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FIGURE C-6
EOS/LST EQUIPMENT CABLING
SCA3,4 DEPLOYMENT PLATFORM
POWER j POWER 3 L POWERAE
IGNALS SIGNALS SIGNALS
PSS ( SIGNALS J X SIGNALS
SC PLA RM UMBILICAL CARRIER
CONTROL PLATE
PLATFORM POR 41 -1/2 I
MSS CONTROL
SCOAX IL . T-26SERVICEPANEL
CABIN-BAY INTERFACE *EXPERIMENT DATA CABLES N/R FOR LST
SHUTTLE SYSTEMS PANEL
iTABLE C-10
EOS/LST CABLING DEFINITION
CA1LE J.D. FUNCTION PINS-GAGE CONN. DIAMETER
1, 2. 3 POWER 4-12 1-1/2 IN.
4, 5, 6 SIGNALS 61-20 1-1/2 IN.
4A, 5A, 6A SIGNALS 61-20 1-1/2 IN.
-7, 3, 9 EXPERIMENT DATA 61-20 1-1/2 IN.
'7A, 3A. 9A EXPERIMENT DATA 26-20 1 IN.
10, 15 RF (GROUND MULTIPLE COAX 1-1/2 IN.
11 POWER 8-12 1-1/8 IN.
12 SIGNALS 55-20 1-3/8 IN.
13 POWER (GROUND) 8-12 2 IN (2)
14 SIGNALS (GROUND) 61-20 1-1/2 IN.
14A SIANGLS (GROUND) 32-20 
- 1-1/8 IN.
15 RF (GROUND) MULTIPLE COAX 1-1/2 IN.
16, 16A PLATFORM CONTROL 32-20 1-1/8 IN.
163 PLATFORM CONTROL 55-20 1-3/8 IN.
17, 18 VIDEO MULTIPLE COAX 1-1/2 IN.
19 POWER 6-12 1-1/2 IN.
20 SIGNALS 620 5/8 IN. *N/R FOR LST
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FIGURE C-7
CLASS II MISSION EQUIPMENT CABLING
TABLE C-11
CLASS II MISSION CABLING DEFINITIONS
CABLE I.D. FUNCTION PINS-GAGE CONN. DIAMETER
1, 2, 25 Power 4-12 7/8 in.
3, 4 Signals 61-20 1-1/2 in.
3A, 3B Signals 61-20 1-1/2 in.
4A, 4B, 26 Signals 26-20 1 in.
5, 5A, 5B, 5C, Signals 61-20 1-1/2 in.
5D, 5E, 5F
6 Power 8-12 1-3/8 in.
7 Tilt Table Control 55-20 1-3/8 in.
8 Power 12-12 1-3/8 in.
9 Signals 55-20 1-3/8 in.
10 Video Multiple Coax 1-1/2 in.
11, 13 Power 8-12 1-3/8 in.
12, 14 Signals 61-20 1-1/2 in.
12A, 12B, 12C Signals 61-20 1-1/2 in.
14A, 14B, 14C Signals 61-20 1-1/2 in.
15, 16, 27 Video Multiple Coax 1-1/2 in.
17 Power 8-12 1-3/8 in.
18 Signals 32-20 1-1/8 in.
19 Signals 61-20 1-1/2 in.
19A Signals 55-20 1-3/8 in.
20 Power 12-12 2 in (2)
21, 21A Signals 61-20 1-1/2 in.
22 Signals 61-20 1-1/2 in.
22A Signals 26-20 1 in.
23, 24 RF Coax Multiple Coax 1-1/2 in.
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FIGURE C-8
SORTIE LABORATORY EQUIPMENT CABLING
L -,/S
TABLE C-12
SORTIE LABORATORY CABLING DEFINITION
CABLE I.D. FUNCTION PINS-GAGE CONN. DIAMETER
1,2 Power 12-12 1-3/8 in.
3 Power 4-00 3 in.
4, 5, 6 Signals 61-20 1-1/2 in.
4A, 4B, hC Signals 61-20 1-1/2 in.
5A, 5B, 5V Signals 61-20 1-1/2 in.
6A, 6B, 6C Signals 61-20 1-1/2 in.
7 Pallet Stabilization 6-20 5/8 in.
(Serial Digital)
*8 Power 12-12 2 in. (2)
*9, 9A, 9B Signals 61-20 1-1/2 in.
10, 11, 12 Video Multiple Coax 1-1/2 in.
13 Power 4-00 3 in.
13A, 13B Signals 61-20 1-1/2 in.
13C Signals 10-20 3/4 in.
14 Power 12-12 1-1/2 in.
15 Signals 6-20 5/8 in.
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Each system shown in Figures C-6 through C-8 includes a J-box (distribution
box) that is mounted on the deployment platform and/or tilt table (as appropri-
ate) which provides signal/power distribution and houses various items of
support equipment such as isolation/buffering systems, power regulators 
ana
command decoders.
The isolation/buffering systems are required to provide isolation of various
grounds/returns throughout the Shuttle/payload/FSl systems and to facilitate
effective control and monitoring of payloads by interconnected G3L. Isolation
systems typically use diodes, resistors, buffer amplifiers and transformer
counling to achieve the desired isolation of interconnected systems.
Power regulators are requirea to condition the Shuttle supplied power to
regulation values within satellite system requirements.
Figure C-9 provides a representative J-box layout for the EOS and LST. 
The
isolation system is required to handle 115-120 functions between the bay and
cabin, and 45-50 functions between the bay and payload related GSh. The noted
number of bay-cabin functions are driven by acquisition of EOS experimental
data during Shuttle attached ORT at LEO and is therefore reduced by 40 functions
for the LST mission.
The deployment platform driver and decoder assembly provides a redundant system
for platform control via hardware control from the PSS and MSS to switching amp
drivers within the assembly and through utilization of a serial digital command
line to the command decoder.
Estimate of the J-box characteristics follows:
Dimensions 12 x 14 x 18 in
Weight 60 - 60 lbs
Power 40 - 50 watts
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FIGURE C-9
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Figure C-10 presents a representative J-box for the Class II missions
(ATS/SMS/DSCS - Tug). The system is conceptually identical to the EOS and
LST (Figure C-10). The driver assembly and decoder in this case provides
redundant hardwire/digital control of the tilt table. Power regulation
equipment is provided for regulation of both tug and satellite power. The
isolator buffer assembly for Class II missions is required to handle 11l
tug functions (bay-cabin) 74 satellite functions (bay-cabin) 43 T-26
satellite functions, 59 T-26 tug functions and 46 T-0 tug functions.
An estimate of J-box characteristics follow:
Dimensions 12 x 16 x 18 in.
Weight 90 - 100 lbs.
Power 50 - 60 watts
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FIGURE C-10
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Figure C-ll presents a J-box layout for the Sortie Lab. Power conditioning
equipment for this mission is omitted based on the assumption that the lab
has the internal capability for power conditioning. Pallet type missions may
require the use of power regulation equipment depending on specific configu-
rations and requirements. A stabilization (attitude control) encoder-decoder
is included for this mission (pallet) to provide Shuttle computer control of
the stabilization platform. This approach was selected as compared to a
hardwired approach per the rational developed in Section C.2
An estimate of J-box characteristics follows:
Dimensions 12 x 14 x 18 in.
Weight 30 - 40 lbs.
Power 30 - 40 watts
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FIGURE C-11
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C.4 PAYLOAD/GSE INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS
C.4.1 Electrical Interfaces
The following describes the required payload electrical interfaces with the
GSE by mission class.
C.4.1.1 Class I and III (EOS and LST)
From Figure C-1, the GSE electrical interfaces for the EOS and LST are through
the Shuttle T-26 service panel, through interface segments D and E which
correspond to cables 13, 14, 14A and 15 in Figure C-6.
The functions provided for each satellite are presented in Table C-13. The
approach for the EOS and LST provides no functions through the T-0 service
panel based on the premise that caution and warning and health data are avail-
able to the launch control center via the Shuttle-satellite interleaved RF data
and that satellite system control is achieved from the PSS commencing no later
than T-26 minutes.
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C.h.1.2 Class II Missions (ATS/SMS/DSCS-Tug)
From Figure C-2, the electrical interface functions to the T-0 and T-26
service panels are through segments K, F and E respectively. These segments
correspond to cables 19 and 19A to the T-0 panel and cables 20, 21, 21A, 22
and 22A to the T-26 panel (Figure C-7).
At the T-26 panel cables 21 and 21A are allocated to Tug functions; cables 22
and 22A are allocated to satellite functions. Ground power is supplied through
cable 20; RF signals to ground are routed through multiple coaxial cable No. 23.
At the T-0 service panel, cables 19 and 19A are allocated to carry Tug pro-
pellant systems control and display functions to maintain continuous propellant
systems control and off loading capability, and to provide control of the
remaining Tug systems since operation of the MSS is impractical until reaching
low Earth orbit. No satellite functions are provided through tne T-O service
panel based on the rational developed for the LOS and LST.
The T-O functions for Tug and the T-26 functions for the Tug and the satellites
are presented in Tables C-15, C-16 and C-17 respectively.
TABLE C-13
EOS ELECTRICAL FUNCTIONS T-26 PANEL
SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS REQUIREMENT WIRES/GAGE
Ground Power 28 VDC 1500 W 4 #12 (4 1a free air)Return 1500 W 4 #12 (23a in bundle)
Caution & Warning Bandwidth: 10 Hz 7 Functions 7 TSP/20
Narrowband Digital Rate: 12.5 KBPS Housekeeping and 1 TSP/20Telemetry Test Data
Computer Up-Down Rate: Undefined Data 1 TSP/20Link (20 KBPS) Clock 1 TSP/20
Control and Related Bilevel-Dedicated 11 Signals 22 TSP/20Bilevel Monitoring Hardwired System
Batteries 32-35 VDC Trickle Charge 0.6a 1 TSP/20
Satellite Systems Analog-Bilevel 10 Functions 10 TSP/20
Bandwidth Undefined (Allowance)
VIP VHF Housekeeping Data 1 Coax
S-Band Housekeeping Data 1 Coax
MIRP S-Band Sensor Systems Data 1 Coax
MOMS S-Band Sensor Systems Data 1 Coax
Totals 8 #12
43 TSP/20
4 Coax
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TABLE C-14
LST ELECTRICAL FUNCTIONS T-26 PANEL
SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS REQUIREMENT WIRES/GAGE
Ground Power 28 VDC 1500 W (max) 4 #12 (41a free air)
(23a in bundle)
Ground Power Return 1500 W (max) 4 #12
Caution & Warning Bandwidth: 10 Hz 3 Functions 3 TSP/20
Narrowband Digital Rate: 51.2 KBPS Housekeeping & Test 1 TSP/20
Telemetry Data, C&W Backup
Computer Up-Down Rate: Undefined Data 1 TSP/20
Link (20 KBPS) Clock 1 TSP/20
Control and Related Bilevel-Dedicated 8 Signals 16 TSP/20
Bilevel Monitoring Hardwired System
Batteries 32-35 VDC Trickle Charge 1 TSP/20
0.
6
a
Satellite System Analog-Bilevel 10 Functions 10 TSP/20
Bandwidth Undefined (allowance)
S-Band Telemetry Data 1 Coax
Down Link
Total 8 #12
33 TSP/20
1 Coax
TABLE C-15
TUG ELECTRICAL INTERFACE FUNCTIONS T-0 PANEL
SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS REQUIREMENT WIRES/GAGE
Narrowband Digital Rate: 51.2 KBPS Housekeeping Data 2 TSP/20
Telemetry
Propellant System Discrete Hardwire 20 Functions 20 TSP/20
(Tug)
Tug Systems Control Discrete Hardwire 12 Functions 12 TSP/20
Monitor Discrete Hardwire 12 Functions 12 TSP/20
Total 36 TSP/20
TABLE C-16
TUG ELECTRICAL INTERFACE FUNCTIONS T-26 PANEL
SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS REQUIREMET WIRES/GAGE
Power 28 VDC 1800 W 6 #12 (l1a free air)
Return 1800 W 6 #12 (23a in bundle)
Sense Voltage Regulation 1 TSP/20
Caution & Warning Bandwidth: 10 Hz 24 Functions 24 TSP/20
Dedicated Hardwire
System
Computer Up-Down Rate: Undefined Data 1 TSP/20
Link (20 KBPS) Clock 1 TSP/20
Command Rate: Undefined Data 1 TSP/20
(2 KBPS) Clock 1 TSP/20
Battery 32-35 VDC Trickle Charge 1 TSP/20
0.1 Ampere
Video Bandwidth: 5 MHz Data 1 Coax
Total 12 #12
30 TSP/20
1 Coax
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TABLE C-17
CLASS II SATELLITE ELECTRICAL INTERFACE FUNCTIONS T-26 PANEL
SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS REQUIREMENT WIRES/GAGE
Power 28 VDC 300 W 2 #12 (41a free air)
Return 300 W 2 #12 (23a in bundle)
Sense Voltage Regulation 1 TSP/2O
Caution & Warning Bandwidth: 10 Hz 12 Functions 12 TSP/20
Dedicated Hardwvire
System
Narrowband Digital Rate: 250-640 BPS Housekeeping and Test 2 TSP/20
Telemetry Data, C&W Backup
Control and Related Dedicated Hardvire 22 Functions (max) 22 TSP/20
Bilevel Monitoring Systems
Computer Up-Down Rate: Undefined Data 2 TSP/20
Link (20 KBPS) Clock
Command Rate: DSCS 1 KBPS Data 2 TSP/20
SMS Undefined Clock
ATS Undefined
Battery 32-35 VDC Trickle Charge 1 TSP/20
0.3a
Total 4 #12
32 TSP/20
C.4.1.3 Sortie Laboratory Missions
From Figure C-3, the GSE electrical interface for the Sortie Lab is through
interface segment E which corresponds to cables 13, 13A, 13B and 13C in
Figure C-8. The electrical functions provided through the T-26 panel are
shown in Table C-18. It should be noted that approximately 60 percent of the
T-26 functions are allocated to an allowance for control and related bilevel
monitoring which creates the need for 40 twisted shielded wire pairs. This
allowance was made due to the lack of definition of systems contained within
the Sortie Lab and is purely an assessment of Sortie Lab needs.
TABLE C-18
SORTIE LABORATORY T-26 FUNCTIONS
SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS REQUIREMENT WIRES/GAGE
Power 28 VDC Undefined (10 KW) 2 #00 (2830 free air)
Return Undefined (10 KW) 2 #00 (1756 in bundle)
Computer Up-Down
Link Rate: 30 KBPS Data '1 TSP/20
Clock 1 TSP/20
Narrowband Data Rate: 25 KBPS Data 1 TSP/20
Clock 1 TSP/20
Wideband Data Rate: 256 KBPS Data 1 TSP/20
Clock 1 TSP/20
Caution & Warning Bandwidth 10 Hz 15 Functions 15 TSP/20
Redundant Power 2 TSP/20
Control & Related Dedicated Hardvire 20 Functions 40 TSP/20
System (allowance)
Two-Way Voice Bandwidth: 3 KHz Voice Comm. 2 TSP/20
Totals 4 #OO
65 TSP/20
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C.4.2 Fluid Interfaces
All four classes of SOAR-IIS payloads use fluids, and as such will require
ground fluid interfaces. In addition, one (Sortie Lab) may have flight
interfaces with Orbiter subsystems. Tables C-19 and C-20 summarize the gas
and fluid interfaces for each payload class. The spacecraft interfaces are
straightforward, with both GN2 and N2H4 preloaded (at the PSA) before mating
with the Orbiter. However, propellant drain capability is required on the
pad for emergency dump. Drain procedures require access to the cargo bay
for manual attachment of the drain line, which safely removes the propellant
to an approved container or area.
The Tug propulsion system interfaces are similar to existing vehicles, and will
require the following 8 to 10 umbilical connections in the T-O panel:
2 propellant fill
2 tank vent
2 accumulator fill
2 helium fill
2 dump (LO2 may be inflight dump only; Lh2 may not have a dump line.)
Tug ground purge uses the Orbiter bay purge system. The Tug and Orbiter will
share common ground equipment.
Final decision on the Tug dump requirements for abort have not been specified,
but inflight dump capability for the LO2 tank is likely. A 2-3 in. line
through the Tug/Orbiter interface panel will be sufficient since there is no
abort mode prior to solid motor rocket shutdown. This line dumps LO2 out the
bottom of the Orbiter, and will not go through the T-O launch umbilical panel.
The current baseline includes abort landing with the LH tanks full, so no LH,
dump line is required. If one is eventually required, it will be similar to
the LO2 dump line.
The LST is a payload extremely sensitive to particulate contamination. If the
100,000 class cleanliness of the cargo bay is not sufficient, and/or local
covering of sensitive areas inadequate, the entire LST will be enshrouded with
a class 10,000 air purge. This purge would require two 4 in. lines (inlet and
return) for this specially cleaned air through the T-26 umbilical panel.
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TABLE C-19 40384
PAYLOAD GAS INTERFACES
MISS ION CLASS
I II II III IV
ATSISMS
EOS DSCS-I I TUG CST SORTIE LAB SPECIAL
N2  PRELOADED- PRELOADED- -
PRELOADED - USES SHUTTLE
NO PAD NO PAD NO PAD N2 -NO PAD
REQ MN'T REQMN'T REQMN'T REQMN'T
HE 1-112" COLD HE
1-1/2" AMB HE
GO2  1-112" VENT -
USES SHUTTLE
1-2" FILL GO2-NO PAD
REQMN'T
GH2  1-112" VENT
1-2" FILL
AIR 10,000 CLASS 10, 000 CLASS PURGE MAY
CLEANLINESS CLEANLINESS BE RQD
IF LST (POS P)
SHROUDED
TABLE C-20 40384-1
PAYLOAD LIQUID INTERFACES
MISSION CLASS
II II III IV
ATSISMS
EOS DSCS-II TUG CST SORTIE LAB SPECIAL
N2H4 PRELOADED- PRELOADED-
DRAIN RQD DRAIN RQD
(NOT THRU (NOT THRU
PANEL) PANEL)
LH2 - 1-2" FILLIDRAIN TBD
1 - TBD DUMP
(MAY NOT BE
RQD)
LO2  1-2" FILLIDRAIN TBD
1 - TBD" DUMP
(MAY BE IN
INFLIGHT ONLY)
ECS - USES SHUTTLE MJS REQUIRES
ECS - NO PAD RTG THERMAL
REQMN'T CONTROL
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The Sortie Lab fluid interfaces cannot be finalized until the autonomous vs
Shuttle provided ECS trade is completed. The current baseline supplies fluids
to the Sortie Lab from the Shuttle subsystems. however, MSFC trades indicate
an autonomous ECS is preferable, since the Shuttle provided thermal control
system may not be adequate for Sortie Lab requirements. For the baseline
configuration, the following Shuttle/Sortie Lab interfaces are received.
Freon inlet and return (1" O.D.)
Water inlet and return (1" O.D.)
LO2 Fuel Cell Feed (1/2" O.D.)
LH2 Fuel Cell Feed (1/2" O.D.)
ECS Air (4" O.D.)
it is assumed that fuel cell water will be stored in the Sortie Lab. The only
possible ground interface could be a GN 2 purge (supply and return) through the
T-26 panel. This requirement has not been firmly established, but if it is
required, two 4 in. O.D. lines will be required.
If, however, the Sortie Lab requires an autonomous ECS system, there will be
no Freon, water, GN2 or cryogenic fluid interfaces with the Shuttle. GN2,
freon and water will probably be preloaded prior to mating. Cryogenics (L 2
and L02) can be loaded through the T-26 panel (i in. O.D. Line). Vent
provisions for the LO2 and Li2 tanks will also be required and the simplest
implementation is to use 2 in. lines and use the GH,, and GO vent umbilicals
used for the Tug. Air circulation and conditioning will be entirely within
the Sortie Lab, with no interface with the Orbiter except that which occurs
through an open airlock. Atmosphere makeup will come from GN2 bottles and
LO2 tanks within the Sortie Lab.
All payload using fluids of any kind are required to pass acceptance tests to
verify system integrity. Such tests usually consist of proof, leakage and
functional operation. Shuttle launched payloads are no different; however,
all such tests are planned to occur prior to mating with the Orbiter. Therefore,
no on-pad GSE or connections are required for fluid system testing.
The summary of payload required fluid/gas interfaces is presented in Figure C-12.
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FIGURE C-12
PAYLOAD UMBILICAL REQUIREMENT
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FIGURE C-13
SERVICE PANEL OPTIONS - ELECTRICAL
OPTION 1 OPTION 3
SPECIAL PURPOSE 000 FLIGHT QUALIFIED
CONNECTOR 000 CONNECTORS
ELECTRICAL * MIXED FUNCTIONS 0 FUNCTION SEPARATION
FUNCTIONS 0 MULTI PLE VEHICLES F MULTI PLE VEHICLES
GAFLUD (GF)
FUNCTIONS(GIF
OPTION 2 SPECIAL PURPOSE OPTION4
CONNECTORS 000 FL IGHT QUALIFIED
IQ9Q) * MIXED FUNCTIONS 000 1 CONNECTORSST*UG ONLY - FUNCTION SEPARATION
SPECIAL PURPOSE 0 VEHICLE SEPARATION(GIF) CONNECTOR (G/F)
0 MIXED FUNCTIONS
* SATELLITE ONLY
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c.5 INTERFACE CONCEPTS
Selection of a GSE-Shuttle service panel interface concept is essentially
governed by the following criteria.
A. Basis of connector separation
B. Available hardware
C. Operations
Connector functional allocations (Item A) may be based on maintaining separation
of the various types of systems such as power, RF, control and talkbacKs, and
data. Using this approach, separate connectors and associated separate cabling
are provided for each system and establishes the requirement to maintain the
separation through system distribution points such as i-boxes. Connector
assignments may also consider separation by vehichle wherein for example the
interface to tug and satellite systems is provided through separate service
panel connectors.
The primary consideration related to available hardware (Item B) is selection
of existing flight qualification components versus the development of special
purpose hardware. Use of existing flight qualified hardware provides a slight
degree of restriction in system definition but eliminates the need for develop-
ment of special purpose hardware with its attendant costs and introduction of
the element of uncertainty.
Operational aspects are directed to consideration of requirements to provide
independent checkout capability for multiple vehicle missions which again
encompasses the area of connector functional assignments.
It is clear the three previous items comprising the previous criteria are
closely aligned and interacting. The prime point is that their consideration
results directly in specification of service panel characteristics.
Figure C-13 is presented to demonstrate conceptual service panel configuration
options for the Class II missions with tug since this mission provides the
widest latitude of configuration wherein option 1 provides all electrical
functions for payloads through a single special purpose connector; option 2
provides a single special purpose connector for each vehicle, i.e., one for
tug and one for satellites; option 3 provides flight qualified connectors
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with function separation but no vehicle separation; option 4 provides flight
qualified connectors with both function and vehicle separation.
Option 4 is selected/recommended on the basis of the following merits:
A. Usage of existing flight qualified hardware eliminates the
development costs related to special purpose equipment and
the attendant operational risks.
B. Separation of electrical signals by function is desirable
in order to minimize cross talk and its ultimate effects
on separate systems and data.
C. Separation of electrical signals by vehicle is desirable
in order to provide the versatility to accomplish prelaunch
certification of one payload element when the other element
is perhaps inactive.
C.6 ACCESS REQUIREMENTS
The locations requiring spacecraft and upper stage electrical access via the
payload service panel, shown in Figure C-14 are seen to encompass a majority
of the launch area facilities; the operations performed by the facilities are
indicated in Table C-21. The functions required on the panel following loading
of the spacecraft/Tug into the payload bay in the Integration and Mating
Facility (CAB), during transport to the pad on the mobile launch platform and
after Orbiter connection to the Launch Umbilical Tower are as follows:
A. Power, battery charge and monitoring lines required for Low-
Earth-Orbit (LEO) spacecraft and, perhaps, for all spacecraft
if the upper stage will be unpowered (and, therefore, incapable
of supporting the spacecraft) at any time during prelaunch
operations.
B. Serial PCM telemetry and command lines for status monitoring
and final system checkout.
C. Caution and warning signals. Spacecraft now contain live
ordnance and are fueled.
D. Discrete controls and talkback for function such as Tug fill
and drain and system control.
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E. A computer link for software update.
F. A voice link for Sortie Lab during any final on-pad equipment
changeouts.
G. A video link for checkout of the Tug TV acquisition system.
As previously indicated, functions are split between the T-26 minute and T-O
panels. Tug hardwire and telemetry signals are available on the latter in
case the Orbiter should pre-empt (the total data link) prior to liftoff.
After arrival at the pad, checkout and test of the payloads will be performed
using equipment within the Payload Support Facility (NASA payloads), Payload
Processing Facility (DOD payloads) and the Tug Maintenance and Refurbishment
Facility. Integrated stage checkout also requires that controls and telemetry
functions interface with the launch control firing room. This interface will
be implemented via the Launch Processing System which accepts the Orbiter data
stream with interleaved Tug and spacecraft data and distributes it to the
various facilities.
FIGURE C-14
LOCATIONS WITH PAYLOAD SERVICE PANEL/TEST 41412
CONNECTOR ACCESS REQUIREMENTS
TUG MAINTENANCE ORBITER MAINTENANCE
AND REPAIR FACILITY AND REPAIR FACILITY
PAYLOAD INTEGRATION
SERVICING AND MATING
AREAS (VAB)
SAFING AND
DESERVICING
FACILITY MOBILE
LAUNCH
CONTROL TOWER PLATFORM
AND FAA
REMOTE LAUNCHTRET UMBILICALTRACKING TOWER/PAD
STATIONS TOWER/PAD
MISSION OPERATIONS
CONTROL AND LAUNCH ETR TRACKING
(STC, MCC) CONTROL CENTER STATIONS
0 ACCESS REQUIRED CENTRAL DATA
O ACCESS NOT REQUIRED FACILITY OR CIF
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TABLE C-21
FACILITIES
SAFING AND DESERVICING FACILITY ORBITER MAINTENANCE AND REFURBISH-
o GROUND POWER MENT CHECKOUT FACILITY
o ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL o PAYLOAD REMOVAL
o DRAIN FUEL CELLS, TANKS o PAYLOAD INSTALLATION
o PURGE TANKS AND LINES
o REMOVE HAZARDOUS PAYLOADS INTEGRATION AND MATING (VAB)
TUG MAINTENANCE AND REFURBISHMENT o SRB MATING
o ET MATING
o RECEIVING AND READINESS TESTS o SHUTTLE TEST AND CHECKOUT
o SIMULATION AND CHECKOUT o VEHICLE MOBILE LAUNCH PLAT-
FORM MATING
PAYLOAD PROCESSING FACILITY o INTERFACE VERIFICATION
o RECEIVING AND CHECKOUT LAUNCH PAD/LUT
o PRE-INSTALLATION MATING TESTS
o SIMULATION AND CHECKOUT o ABBREVIATED AVIONICS TEST
AND INTEGRATED CHECKOUT
PAYLOAD SERVICING FACILITY o TUG FUELING
o RECEIVING AND CHECKOUT
LAUNCH CONTROL FACILITY
o PRE-INSTALLATION MATING TESTS
o CONTROL ROOM - SUPPORT M&R
o CONTROL ROOM - SUPPORT PAD
Figure C-15 illustrates the distribution process. An antenna is provided on the
Launch Umbilical Tower for the reception of the Orbiter's interleaved data. The
signal is routed to an amplifier room and then transferred via hardline to the
data processing system within the Central Instrumentation Facility. The data
streams are demultiplexed at this point and input to the computer complex for
processing prior to dissemination to remote terminals in the various facilities.
A hardwire Orbiter umbilical is also routed to the LUT electrical equipment room
to allow checkout to proceed during periods of RF silence.
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FIGURE C-15 41413
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C.6.1 Pad Electrical Aerospace Ground Equipment (LAGE)
The EAGE required at the LUT which interfaces with the payload service panel
is seen to be the following:
A. RF Amplifiers
B. Video Amplifiers
C. Line Amplifiers for Serial PCM and Serial Commands
D. Voice Communications Relay Equipment
E. Battery Chargers
F. Payload Power Supplies
G. Command Decoders and Relay Drivers
H. Remote Multiplexers
I. Patch Panel and Distribution Equipment
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C.6.2 Mobile Launcher Equipment
The only interfaces with the Orbiter and payload service panels appear to be
the following:
A. Battery Charge and Monitor
B. Caution/Warning Monitor
C.6.3 Orbiter Maintenance and Repair Facility
No requirements for service panel access have been found in the Orbiter
Maintenance and Repair Facility with the exception of battery chargers and
caution/warning monitoring. As indicated in Table C-22, all tests are
concerned solely with Orbiter, external tank and solid rocket checkout with
two exceptions. One, a combined booster/spacecraft system test conducted with
the payload in the bay (performed via MSS and PSS consoles) is primarily for
verification of connector mating. The second is a communications check veri-
fying the Orbiter, Tug or spacecraft RF link and takes place prior to tneir
installation within the bay.
C.6.4 Spacecraft Service/Payload Processing Facilities
Although the spacecraft has not been installed in the Orbiter at this point,
it is, perhaps of interest to define how the lines, required at the S/C inter-
face for the service panel, are integrated with spacecraft test connectors in
order to provide the spacecraft/GSE interface. It also allows an initial
assessment and identification of the GSE.
TABLE C-22
ORBITER MAINTENANCE/REPAI R/CHECKOUT FACILITY
TEST/0PEPATION mCN.OR EmrIPl.
PRELIMINARY ELECTRICAL AND R.F, TESTS ORBITER NOT APPLICABLE
LOAD FLIGHT SFTWARE ORBITER NOT APPLICABLE
SCF COPATIBILITY TEST R. F. BONNE R.F. APLIFIER ANTENNA
ORBITER/PAYLOAD COIPATIBILITY TESTS R.F. BONET R.F. CABLES
INTEGRATED SYSiTM TESTS 1I1BILICAL ORBITER GSE
(ORBITER/EXTENAL TANK/BOOSTER MTTE)
ECHANICAL CHECKS NfOE NOE
COWBINED BOOSTER/SPACECRAFT SYSTEM TEST UMBILICAL M.S.S., P.S.S. CONSOES
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Figure C-16 illustrates the test sequence normally followed in the Satellite
Assembly Building and Propellant Laboratory Facility which are to be replaced
by the Payload Processing Facility. After receiving inspection, the spacecraft
undergo a reaction control system leak test, which only required valve controls,
followed by a Satellite Control Facility compatibility check of transponders.
This is followed by a check of the solar panels to detect any faulty cell
strings. The spacecraft then loads propellant in a safe area after which the
thrusters are fired. The last major operation is the checkout of ordnance
circuits and the installation of pyrotechnics.
Table C-23 delineates the tests or operations which are performed and the type
of test connection to be made. It also indicates the GSE required to support
the tests. The designation test connector, under the "Connection" column,
indicates a connector usef for test only which is either capped off prior to
payload bay installation or provides circuit continuity when mated with an
in-flight jumper (IFJ). For example, the solar array illumination test requires
that the individual cell strings be available to GSE. Upon test completion, the
cell strings are joined by means of IFJ(s) to control circuits within the
spacecraft's Power Control Unit. All connections labeled interface connector
are brought out to the service panel via the Tug and J-Box within the bay.
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TABLE C-23
SPACECRAFT PROCESSING FACILITY TESTS/EQUIPMENT
TEST/OPERATION CONNECTION EUIPMENT
REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM LEAK TEST TEST CONNECTOR 1 RCS TEST SET
BATTERY INSTALLATION, CHARGE, INTERFACE CONNECTOR 2 BATTERY CHARGER AND PANEL
MONITOR
INTERNAL/EXTERNAL POWER TEST INTERFACE CONNECTOR AND TEST 3 POWER SUPPLY AND CONTROL
CONNECTOR UNIT
INTEGRATED SYSTEMS TEST INTERFACE CONNECTOR AND TEST 4 DATA ACQUISITION, DISPLAY/
CONNECTOR CONTROL PANEL COMPUTER
SCF COMPATIBILITY TEST INTERFACE CONNECTOR 5 COMMAND PROCESSOR, ENCRYPTION/
DECRYPTION EQUIPMENT
COMMUNICATIONS PERFORMANCE TEST NONE 6 GROUND STATION
SOLAR ARRAY ILLUMINATION TEST TEST CONNECTOR 7 CHECKOUT DRAWER, DISCRETE
CONTROIS AND DISPLAYS
COUNTDOWN TIME TEST INTERFACE CONNECTOR 4
PROPELLANT LOADING AND FIRING TEST CONNECTOR 1 2ND SET
TEST
PREINSTALLATION MATING INTERFACE CONNECTOR 8 TUG/ORBITER SIMULATORS
SIMULATION
SAFE AND ARM DEVICE TEST INTERFACE CONNECTOR 9 ORIWANCE TEST DRAWER
ORDNANCE INSTALLATION FLIGHT SYSTEMS 10 NONE
LRU TESTS NONE 11 LRU TEST CONSOLES
C.6.5 Tug Maintenance and Refurbishment Test Facility
The process of reviewing the tests to be performed, the availability of existing
connectors required for the service panel at the launch pad, the identification
of new test connectors and the EAGE required to perform the tests was also
performed for the Tug M&R facility as shown in Table C-24. Test equipment for
conducting propulsion system tests is illustrated in Figure C-17. Items of
equipment include a test operator's station which defines the progress of the
test and individual control consoles for establishing test conditions. The tests
themselves would be under computer control. Figure C-18 illustrates the types
of equipment which would be required for the Avionics Verification Testing and
also depicts various types of Line Replaceable Unit (LRU) or component test sets
which would be reouired.
C.6.6 DOD/NASA Launch Area Operations
In reviewing the checkout and build-up of the spacecraft and stages, the differ-
ences in the handling of DOD and NASA payloads became apparent. The flow
diagram, Figure C-19, illustrates the present plans for integrating vehicles
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and stages. It is seen that spacecraft Tug/payload operations are reversed
for the two agencies as a result of the sensitive nature of DOD sracecraft
sensors and the requirement to provide Comsec equipment and transponders
compatible with the SCF. It is suggested that the present approach of
transporting the Tug to the PPF requires additional Tug GSE and that a more
efficient approach is to provide secure areas at the Tug facility for equin-
ment changeout.
TABLE C-24
MAINTENANCE AND REFURBISHMENT TUG FACILITY TEST EQUIPMENT
TEST CONNECTION EQUIPMENT
LOAD C/O SOFIWARE TEST CONNECTOR DMS TEST SET, POWER SYSTEM TEST SET
VEHICLE CALIBRATION UMBILICAL TELEMETRY GROUND STATION, COMMAND
CONSOLE, BATTERY CHARGER
RUN ONBOARD CHECKOUT TEST CONNECTOR DMS TEST SET, POWER SYSTEM TEST SET,
PNEUMATIC CONSOLE
INTERFACE C/0 INTERFACE CONNECTOR SPACECRAFT/ORBITER SIMULATORS AND
CHECKOUT EQUIPMENT
OPTICS C/O TEST CONNECTOR STAR TRACKER SIMULATOR, HORIZON
SENSOR TEST SET, TV TEST KIT
MAIN PROP PRESSURE LEAK ON FILL, TEST CONNECTOR CHECKOUT EQUIPMENT
DRAIN, VENT FEED, CONDITIONING
MAIN PROP FUNCTIONAL TEST ON FILL, TEST CONNECTOR CHECKOUT EQUIPMENT
DRAIN, VENT, FEED, CONDITIONING
PRESSURE LEAK ON PRESSURE AND TEST CONNECTOR CHECKOUT EQUIPMENT
PNEUMATIC SYSTEMS
FUNCTIONAL TEST ON PRESSURE AND TEST CONNECTOR CHECKOUT EQUIPMENT
PNEUMATIC SYSTEMS
GIMBAL TEST TEST CONNECTOR CHECKOUT EQUIPMENT
ACPS PRESS LEAK TEST ON PROPELLANT TANKS TEST CONNECTOR ACPS PRESSURE KIT, ACPS BREAKOUT BOS,
AND PRESS. AND PRESSURANT CHECKOUT EQUIPMENT
ACPS FUNCTIONAL TEST ON PROPELLANT TANKS TEST CONNECTOR
AND PRESSURANT
TRANSFER SCF TUG TO SECURE AREA
INSTALL COMSEC EQUIPMENT
ADD SCF TRANSPONDER
COMMUNICATIONS C/O R.F. BONNET TELEMETRY GROUND STATION, COMMAND
UMBILICAL CONSOLE, BATTERY CHARGER & MONITOR
S/C CONTROL SOFTWARE LOAD UMBILICAL
MECHANICAL MATING & CHECKS UMBILICAL
VALIDATE ELECTRICAL INTERFACES UMBILICAL
VALIDATE SPACECRAFT CONTROL UMBILICAL TELEMETRY GROUND STATION, COMMAND
CONSOLE, POWER BATTER CHARGER AND
MONITOR
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C.7 CABLE IN STALLATIONS
Figures C-20 through C-22 provide descriptions of representative cable
installations in the Shuttle payload bay wherein installations for the
following interfaces are shown:
A. Cabin-bay interface panel to payload J-box (cradle or tilt
table mounted).
B. Payload J-box to Shuttle service panels (T-O and T-26).
C. Payload J-box to payload umbilical
Schematics of these systems are shown for each mission class in Figures C-7 - C-9.
It should be noted that the depicted installations are arbitrary inasmuch as
teh Shuttle system payload lateral c.g. envelope (which is presently undefinea)
may preclude cable installation along one side of the Orbiter wall as shown.
Alternatives available are splitting of cable runs to provide balanced runs on
each side of the Orbiter and/or the addition of ballast to provide an acceptable
lateral c.g. location. Division of cable runs requires the installation of
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additional mounting hardware which results in additional perturbation to the
payload bay interior skin with attendant effects on the Shuttle insulation
system.
Representative weights of the cabling system are presented in Table C-25 which
provide an estimate for the EOS required system.
TABLE C-25
EOS CABLING SYSTEMS WEIGHT ESTIMATE
Cabin-bay interface panel to cradle J-box (36 feet)
Weight (lbs)
Power Cables 10
Signal Cables 60
Experiment data cables 60
J-box to T-26 service panel (28 feet)
Power cables 16
Signal cables 60
Coaxial cable
Connectors 20
J-box 80
Total 308 lbs
Weight for the LST system is estimated at 125 percent of the EOS system;
Class II missions at 200 percent of EOS; Sortie Lab at 50 percent of EOS.
Conceptual service panel configurations required for each mission class are
also shown in the noted figures as derived from the Shuttle baseline allo-
cation of one-half of the area in the 34 x 34 in. T-26 panel.
Additional available options for the installation include location of the
payload distribution box at the Shuttle forward cabin wall as opposed to
location on the mounting/deployment mechanisms. The former approach provides
a reduction of interface cabling length/weight which may be significant with
regard to Class II mission delivery altitudes since the greatest cabling
weight exists for these missions but presents a disadvantage in tne area of
testing wherein it is desirable to include the distribution box as part of
the payload mounting structure in order to accomplish certification of the
box prior to payload integration with Shuttle.
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Appendix D
PAYLOAD DESIGN/OPERATING IMPACT ANALYSIS - DOCKING MODULE
D.1 GROUND OPERATIONS
D.1.1 Docking Module/Orbiter Integration
Introduction of a docking module in the Orbiter payload bay has an impact on
both the Shuttle and Payload ground operations.
The Shuttle baseline prelaunch ground processing schedule (Figure D-l), cur-
rently requires 232 hours to complete. Integration of a docking module with
the Orbiter must occur prior to integration of the payload due to the "soft"
interface between the docking module and the payload.
Orbiter maintenance is scheduled for completion at launch minus 163 hours and
payload installation occurs 14 hours later at launch minus 150 hours. Docking
module installation should occur during this 14 hour period of Orbiter turn-
around operations. Two factors however suggest that module installation
operations may conflict with Orbiter operations.
The first factor is that 12 of the 14 hours are involved with the performance
of systems verification tests and subsequent removal of electrical and
mechanical test GSE. The Shuttle baseline does not indicate whether these
tests occur in the payload bay or not. If the bay is occupied with GSE and
personnel for the performance of these tests, docking module installation
operations must be delayed until test completion and the Orbiter turnaround
schedule must be increased by the amount of time required to install the
module.
Docking module/Orbiter integration operations were estimated as follows:
Function Time
Transfer docking module to integration area 0.50
Install portable contamination shelter 0.50
Condition shelter environment 1.00
Remove module protective cover 0.75
Attach hoisting GSE 0.25
Hoist docking module 0.50
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Function Time
Lower module into payload bay 0.50
Attach module to payload bay fwd. bulkhead 3.75
Remove hoisting GSE 0.25
Connect Orbiter/module electrical interfaces 2.00
Pressurize module & leak check interfaces 4.00
Perform module systems verification test 4.00
TOTAL 18.00 hours
If docking module integration operations (Figure D-2) must be performed
serially with Shuttle ground processing operations, Shuttle turnaround time
is increased from the baseline of 232 hours to 250 hours.
In order to assess the impact which this 18 hour increase to Shuttle turn-
around time has on the overall Shuttle Program, the Shuttle Traffic Model
(NAS TM X-64731) was reviewed (Figure D-3) to determine the potential number
of flights which would utilize a docking module. Of the 366 flights on which
NASA payloads are scheduled to be launched, 109 flights potentially require a
docking module. This represents about 30 percent of the NASA payload traffic
model. It should be noted that the traffic model utilized for the analysis
contains no Sortie Module flights. Additionally, although DoD payloads are
included in the model, there is insufficient data available in the model re-
garding their individual characteristics to include them in the assessment.
Since about one of every three Shuttle flights potentially requires a docking
module, and since module/Orbiter integration will occur in the Shuttle Main-
tenance & Checkout Facility, the MCF will be required to provide both facility
space and equipment as well as integration GSE. Per the Shuttle baseline, pay-
loads are integrated in the MCF. Docking module/Orbiter integration equipment
can be reduced if module handling points are designed to be compatible with
payload integration GSE.
It is concluded that:
A. docking module/Orbiter integration impacts Orbiter turnaround time
by an additional 18 hours.
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B. about one third of the Shuttle traffic model (NAS TM X64731) re-
quires the use of a docking module. It is expected that traffic
models which include Sortie Lab missions will require docking
modules for at least 50 percent of the Shuttle flights.
C. the Maintenance and Checkout Facility must provide facility space
and associated equipment for docking module integration operations.
D. the docking module handling points should be compatible with pay-
load/Orbiter integration equipment.
D.1.2 On-Pad Payload Access
A review of the NASA TM X-64731 Shuttle Traffic Model revealed that 226 (60%)
of the Shuttle missions carry payloads of current design which may require
on-pad access for in-flight-jumper connection, protective cover removal, etc.
When a docking module is installed in the Orbiter, manned access to the pay-
load through the crew compartment/payload bay hatch is not possible except
under extremely questionable operational conditions. This is in conflict
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with the capability stated in the Space Shuttle System Payload Accommodations
Document JSC 07700.
"--- The capability for payload checkout and component replacement
in the vertical position will be possible through the Orbiter crew
compartment/payload bay hatch. Access to, removal of, and loading
of payload items on the pad must be accomplished no later than TBD
hours prior to launch."
The SOAR II study briefly assessed the payload bay manned access requirements
for the Bio-Research Module spacecraft whose launch configuration included a
docking module and concluded that access was only possible through the pay-
load bay doors.
In addition to access requirements potentially imposed by payloads of current
design, it is anticipated that problems with three out of every one hundred
cryogenic TUGs will be discovered at the launch pad and will require in-bay
access in order to rectify them.
Figure D-4 illustrates the module in the payload bay with the docking tunnel
in the retracted position. In this configuration, the crew compartment/pay-
load bay hatch can only be opened 38 degrees at which point it is physically
prevented from further opening due to interference with the docking tunnel.
In addition, about 80 percent of the docking module exit hatch is covered by
the retracted docking tunnel (Figure D-5). These two factors preclude access
to the payload bay from the Orbiter crew compartment.
An extremely questionable method of accessing the payload bay from the crew
compartment would be to open the payload bay doors and extend the docking
tunnel to its operational position. This mode of operation is either not
feasible or undesirable for the following reasons:
A. Extending the docking tunnel to its operational position in a 1-G
environment for vertical access at the launch pad requires that the
module structure and Orbiter/module and module/payload structural
interfaces be capable of sustaining 1-G static loading during exten-
sion operations and while in an operational configuration. Provisions
for this capability potentially increase module and Orbiter structural
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weight at the expense of the payload.
B. Special and docking module peculiar GSE which is compatible with the
docking module and its payload access tunnel is required.
C. Introduction of this GSE for manned access would significantly con-
strain the size and volume of payload equipment which could be moved
to and from the payload through the docking module. This constraint
impacts payload prelaunch access and checkout requirements planning
and philosophy and must be accounted for.
The payload bay hatch is presently sized to allow a 27 x 27 x TBD
inch object (per JSC 07700) to be moved to or from a payload through
the docking module. Instruction of any required on-pad access GSE
within the docking module volume would reduce this capability.
D. Entrance into the payload from above while it is in a vertical position
and in a 1-G environment has significant implications on payload
cleanliness maintenance capability as well as introducing the potential
for physical damage to payload mounted equipment due to accidental
dropping of checkout equipment (and equipment being changed out) by
the checkout/maintenance crew.
E. Adopting this mode of payload access increases payload access time
requirements at the launch pad and potentially impacts the Orbiter
ground processing turnaround schedule. Schedule on-pad operations are
presently allotted 38 working hours.
From the above considerations it is concluded that if on-pad manned access to
the payload is required, utilization of the docking module is not recommended.
Access to the payload at the launch pad can only be accomplished through the
Orbiter payload bay doors. Additionally, access to the internal volume of a
payload is best facilitated by the incorporation of an access hatch (re-
usable or non-reusable) in the side wall or bottom of the payload structural
shell.
D.2 FLIGHT OPERATIONS
1.2.1 EVA Operations
In order to determine the interactions of EVA operations with the docking
module, it was necessary to determine the equipment and equipment peculiar
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operations associated with EVA preparations and vehicle egress. The basis
for making this determination was data extracted from "Apollo Space Suit and
Extra Vehicular Mobility Unit", LM&SC 5-02-66-1, dated 3-1-66.
The EMU is a self contained anthropomorphic protective enclosure consisting
of the following major subassemblies:
SUBASSEMBLY WEIGHT VOLUME
(lbs) (cu.ft.)
Constant Wear Garment (CWG) 0.83 0.07
Liquid Cooled Garment (LCG) 4.3 0.7
Pressure Garment Assembly (PGA) 32.0 4.88
Helmet Assembly 5.5 1.2
Gloves 1.65 0.42
Portable Life Support System (PLSS) 46.0 2.8
TOTAL 90.28 10.07
The anticipated operational EMU compliments usage are presented below.
Operational Major EMU Subassembly Operating
Phase CWG LCG PGA PLSS Condition
Normal Earth Orbital x Shirtsleeve
Operations
Earth Orbital EVA - x x x Pressurized,
Liquid Cooled
Emergency Earth x - x Pressurized,
Orbital Operations PLSS if ECS
fails
EVA equipment donning timelines were developed to establish the relative
times which would have to be allotted to equipment peculiar operations.
These timelines are presented in Figures D-6 and D-7.
For nominal "equipment-only" donning operations, about 38 minutes are required.
For emergency "equipment only" donning about 7 minutes are required. It
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should be noted that these times do not take into account any necessary pre-
breathing requirements which are necessary to eliminate the risk of decom-
pression sickness. For a 14.7 psia Orbiter cabin pressure, 
the required
suit pressure necessary to avoid pre-breathing is in the range of 7-8 psia.
If, however, state-of-the-art pressure suits having an operational 
pressure
of 3.5-5 psia are utilized, at least 1.5 hours would have to be allotted to
pre-breathing.
For purposes of EVA analysis, pre-breathing will be assumed as a pre-requisite.
In developing the crew EVA preparations and vehicle egress timelines, two
additional assumptions were made.
The first assumption deals with the capability of two fully suited crewmen
to occupy the Orbiter airlock. The results of the SOAR II study indicated
that simultaneous occupancy might be marginal. During pre-PGA donning
operations, the crewmen (prime and backup) will either suit up simultaneously
or sequentially in the airlock. Simultaneous pre-suit-up operations require
about 20 minutes. If pre-suit-up operations are performed sequentially by
each crewman, the total pre-suit-up time required is about 40 minutes. Addi-
tionally, if final suit-up operations are performed sequentially, about 4
minutes are required.
The second assumption was that the back-up crewman remains in the airlock
during EVA operations (Figure D-8), ready to provide rescue support if
required. In this condition, vehicle egress can be accomplished by the back-
up crewman within six minutes in the event that the EVA crewman encounters an
emergency. If the back-up crewman were only partially suited and pre-breathing
in the lower deck during EVA operations, about 36 minutes would be required
to egress the vehicle and assist the disabled EVA astronaut. Due to the sub-
stantial amount of time involved, this mode of operation was rejected.
The EVA preparations and vehicle egress timelines developed in Figures D-9 and
D-10 were based on simultaneous suit-up and a fully suited back-up crewman
in the airlock. The total time involved in preparing for EVA operations is
about two hours.
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In addition to the necessary 90 pounds of EMU subassemblies required for
each EVA crewman, depending on the types of EVA operations required, the
following general equipment may also be required:
A. Low pressure umbilical
Length: 119 inches
Weight: 20 - 25 lb.
B. High pressure umbilical
Length: 60 ft.
Weight: 120 lb. (estimated)
C. Hand-held Maneuvering Unit
Weight: 7.5 lb.
D. Astronaut Maneuvering Unit
Volume: 3 ft3
Weight: 245-1b unit including life support, 23 to 234 lb.
fuel and tankage
E. Restraints, Tethers and Work Platforms
1. Foot Restraints
Dimensions: 21 x 13 x 4 in. per pair
Weight: 25 lb.
2. Worksite Variable Waist Restraints
Weight: 2 lb. (estimated)
F. Equipment Transporters and Restraints
1. Clothesline
2. Track
3. Velcro-Type Patches
4. Equipment Safety Tether
5. Equipment Restraints
6. Flexible Dual Waist Restraint
7. 10 ft. safety tether
8. 60 to 200 ft. safety tether
G. Mobility Aids
1. Portable Handrails
2. Portable Handholds
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D.2.2 Concurrent EVA/IVA and Shirtsleeve Operational Interferences
There are four operational conditions involving the docking module during
which concurrent EVA/IVA and shirtsleeve operations can interfere with one
another. These conditions are summarized in Figure D-ll.
Each of these conditions is examined in the following paragraphs. It should
be noted that crew activity times which deal with extra vehicular mobility
unit equipment donning and doffing were derived from "Apollo Space Suit and
Extra Vehicular Mobility Unit", LM&SC 5-02-66-1, dated 3-1-66.
D.2.2.1 Case 1: Orbital Element Servicing Mission
This configuration involves a pressurizable module or orbital element which
is attached to the extended docking tunnel of the docking module and both
the docking module and pressurizable module are pressurized and shirtsleeve
operations are occurring.
Under these conditions
A. EVA operations cannot be initiated unless shirtsleeve activities
are terminated (Figure D-12) and the pressurized volume is evacu-
ated of unsuited personnel. Personnel evacuation requires about
30 minutes and shirtsleeve operations are interrupted for the
amount of time required for
1. Evacuation of shirtsleeve personnel (26 min.)
2. Final suit donning by EVA crew (20 min.)
3. Airlock decompression (8 min.)
4. Vehicle egress by EVA crew (6 min.)
5. EVA operations (4 hours)
6. Vehicle ingress (6 min.)
7. Airlock repressurization (8 min.)
8. Suit doffing (20 min.)
9. Ingress of service crew (26 min.)
Shirtsleeve servicing operations are interrupted for a total of six nours.
Based on this 6-hour interruption time, it is recommended that, during
orbital element maintenance and servicing operations which employ a docking
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module, EVA operations should not be performed concurrently.
B. Concurrent EVA/Shirtsleeve operations are strongly not recommended
since in the event that the EVA crewman becomes disabled or re-
quires assistance from the back-up EVA crewman an excessively
critical amount of time is required to reach the disabled crewman.
Assuming that the disabled crewman is in the immediate vicinity of
the docking module/payload bay hatch, the back-up crewman would
require at least 49 minutes to reach him. Activity times developed
for these operations are as follows:
1. Evaluation of shirtsleeve personnel (26 minutes)
2. Airlock and docking module decompression (17 minutes)
3. Vehicle egress by back-up crewman (6 minutes)
In the event that the disabled crewman is not in the immediate vicinity of
the docking module/payload bay hatch, and is (as is most probable) located
near the external structure of the docked orbital element, it is likely
that it will require significantly longer than one hour for the back-up crew-
man to reach him.
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If a disabling contingency occurs at some time in the fourth hour of the EVA,
the excessive amount of time required to offset rescue could result in crew
casualty.
Based on the above considerations, it is concluded that concurrent EVA/shirt-
sleeve operations during orbital maintenance and servicing missions is not
recommended.
D.2.2.2 Case 2: Sortie Lab Type Mission (Docking Module Pressurized)
This configuration involves a pressurizable module in the Orbiter payload bay
which is attached to the docking module. Both the pressurizable module and
the docking module are pressurized during shirtsleeve operations in the
pressurizable module.
This case is essentially the same as Case 1 with regard to EVA operations.
EVA cannot be initiated unless shirtsleeve operations in the pressurizable
module are terminated or unless the shirtsleeve crew is isolated from the
Orbiter crew cabin. If operations in the pressurizable module are ter-
minated to allow EVA, a six-hour interruption is required. Similar to the
recommendation of Case 1, concurrent EVA/shirtsleeve operations are not
recommended.
If crew operations in the pressurizable module are allowed to continue during
EVA operations, two serious impacts to the operations crew arise.
The first impact is on the crew in the pressurizable module. During the
initiation (Figure D-13) and termination of EVA operations, the docking module
is depressurized for a period of about 38 minutes for each operation and
during this time should an emergency in the pressurizable module occur, which
requires rapid egress to the safety of the docking module or the Orbiter
crew compartment, crew safety is endangered. For this condition, the pressuri-
zable module must provide pressure suits for each of its crewmen. Since
emergency egress is precluded, crew safety is endangered for at least five
minutes until each crewman can perform an emergency suit-up. If the emergency
also involves the environmental control systems of the pressurizable module,
this time is increased to nearly eight minutes because of PLSS donning require-
ments.
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Should the EVA astronaut become disabled and require assistance or rescue by
the back-up crewman, the docking module will remain depressurized during
these operations and the crew of pressurized module will remain isolated for
at least 76 minutes plus whatever time is required to perform rescue
operations.
The second impact is on the EVA crewman. If after vehicle egress the docking
tunnel hatch is closed for docking module repressurization and cannot be
opened (due to malfunction) for vehicle ingress, the EVA crewman is marooned
outside the vehicle and an alternate method of affecting EVA is required to
accomplish his rescue.
Conclusion: Concurrent EVA/shirtsleeve operations during sortie module
operations is not recommended.
D.2.2.3 Case 3: Sortie Lab Type Mission (Docking Module Depressurized)
This configuration involves a pressurizable module in the Orbiter payload bay
which is attached to the docking module. The pressurizable module is
pressurized and the docking module is depressurized.
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This case is similar to Case 2 with regard to EVA operations. EVA cannot be
initiated unless shirtsleeve operations in the pressurizable module are
terminated and the crew returns to the safety of the crew cabin, or unless
the shirtsleeve crew is isolated from the crew cabin and remains in the
sortie module.
In this case, during EVA operations, the docking module is depressurized for
six hours during which the crew in the pressurized module is completely
isolated. Similar to Case 2, in the event of an emergency, the safety of the
shirtsleeve crew is endangered.
Conclusion: Concurrent EVA/shirtsleeve operations during sortie module
operations is not recommended.
D.2.2.4 Case 4: Sortie Lab/Orbital Element Servicing Mission
This configuration involves a pressurizable module in the Orbiter payload bay
which is attached to the docking module and an orbital element which is
attached to the extended docking tunnel of the docking module. The pressuri-
zable module is pressurized and the docking module and orbital element are
unpressurized during IVA servicing.
This case is similar to Case 2. During IVA operations when the docking module
is depressurized, the shirtsleeve crew is isolated from the crew cabin of
the Orbiter in the event of an emergency. Should an emergency arise in the
sortie mdoule, about 21 minutes would be required to secure and repressurize
the docking module in order to rescue the shirtsleeve personnel. For this
condition, the pressurizable module must provide pressure suits for each of
its crewmen. Since emergency egress is precluded for this 21 minute period,
crew safety is endangered for up to eight minutes until each crewman can
perform an emergency suit-up. In addition, if the docking module cannot be
secured, and contingency suits are not provided, the shirtsleeve crew is
marooned in the pressurized module.
Conclusion: Concurrent IVA/shirtsleeve operations during sortie module
operations are not recommended (Table D-l).
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TABLE D-1
CONCURRENT SHIRTSLEEVE AND EVA/IVA 416
OPERATIONS CASES STUDIED
PROBLEMS RECOMMENDATION
CASE I 0 CONCURRENT EVA OPERATIONS ISOLATE EVA CREW FOR
UP TO 6 HOURS
* EVA CREW SAFETY ENDANGERED
* EMERGENCY RETURN TO ORBITER BY EVA CREW
PROHIBITED
*DISABLED EVA ASTRONAUT CANNOT BE REACHED FOR AT
LEAST 44 MINUTES
*MALFUNCTION OF DOCKING MODULE HATCH MAROONS
EVACREWMAN
CASE 2 *CONCURRENT EVA OPERATIONS ISOLATE SHIRTSLEEVE
CREW FOR 36 MIN DURING EVA EGRESS AND INGRESS
AND FOR AT LEAST 76 MIN DURING DISABLED EVA NO CONCURRENT EVA/IVA
ASTRONAUT RESCUE OPERATIONS AND SHIRTSLEEVE PAYLOAD
OPERATIONS
*SHIRTSLEEVE CREW SAFETY ENDANGERED
*EMERGENCY RETURN TO ORBITER PRECLUDED
0 MALFUNCTION OF DOCKING MODULE TUNNEL MAROONS
EVA CREWMAN
CASE 3 0 CONCURRENT EVA OPERATIONS ISOLATE SHIRTSLEEVE
CREW FOR UP TO 6 HOURS
*SHIRTSLEEVE CREW SAFETY ENDANGERED
SEMERGENCY RETURN TO ORBITER PRECLUDED
CASE 4 0 CONCURRENT IVA OPERATIONS ISOLATE SHIRTSLEEVE
CREW
*SHIRTSLEEVE CREW SAFETY ENDANGERED
*EMERGENCY RETURN TO ORBITER PRECLUDED
D.2.3 Disabled Orbiter Rescue Operations
Disabled Orbiter rescue operations represent the most critical and complex
aspect of docking module operations. A schematic rescue operations scenario
derived from Rockwell International drawings is presented in Figure D-14.
For analysis purposes, it was assumed that the disabled Orbiter was launched
without a docking module and utilized the full 60 foot payload accommodation
capability of the payload bay. It was further assumed that the payload
launched was either of the deployable or non-deployable class.
In the case of a deployable payload, such as that of a TUG-S/C, an additional
constraint was imposed by assuming that the spacecraft required a support
beam/cradle which remained in the payload bay after payload deployment.
For either class of payload, either the payload itself or any remaining payload
associated ancillary equipment which would physically or operationally inter-
fere with Orbiter/docking module on-orbit assembly must be relocated or removed
from the payload bay.
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Examples of the two configurations in question are illustrated in Figure D-15.
In order to determine whether the payload bay must be reconfigured (or equip-
ment removed from the payload bay), the on-orbit docking module-to-Orbiter
assembly envelope must be known. Available Rockwell International drawings
were reviewed and it was estimated that on-orbit docking module assembly
requires about a 15 foot operational envelope. This estimate is corroborated
based on the following assumptions:
A. The in-place docking module operational envelope is essentially
a right-cylinder having an 8 ft. diameter and an 11 ft. length
(when retracted).
B. The worst case docking module operational dimension during on-
orbit assembly is approximately 13.5 ft. (cylinder base-to-top
diagonal).
C. Allowing 10 percent operational margin, the worst case operational
dimension during on-orbit assembly is approximately 15 ft.
FIGURE D-14
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B. DOCKING MODULE TRANSFER RESCUE
C. EVA RESCUE (NO DOCKING MODULE)
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FIGURE D-15
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Payloads or payload ancillary equipment remaining in the payload bay must,
therefore, not interfere with this handling envelope and should not be
closer than 15 feet from the payload bay forward bulkhead. (Note that the
handling envelope corresponds to the payload bay diameter.)
This dimensional constraint results in the following considerations:
A. For a sortie lab mission requiring an OMS kit of 13.5 ft. in length
and an Orbiter/lab access tunnel of about 2 ft., in order not to have
to jettison the payload, the maximum allowable payload length is
[60' - 2' - 13.5' - 15'], or about 29-1/2 feet. This assumes that
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the payload can be relocated from the forward to the rear from the
payload bay.
B. For deployable payload missions not requiring a 13.5 ft. OMS kit,
any payload greater than 45 ft. in length must be removed from the
payload bay.
C. Any payload ancillary equipment within 15 ft. of the payload bay
forward bulkhead must be relocated prior to on-orbit docking module
assembly operations.
Re-configuration of the payload bay involves the two basic options of re-
location of equipment or deployment of equipment out of the bay.
In order to relocate payload associated ancillary equipment which remains in
the bay after payload deployment, there are three potential operational modes
available.
A. Remotely controlled automatic equipment relocation.
B. Relocation of equipment utilizing the Remote Manipulator.
C. EVA operations.
Automatic equipment relocation requires appropriate relocation devices and
Orbiter interface controls. No attempt is made here to assess the impact
which this capability would have on the Shuttle or the payload except that
for weight-critical deployable payloads, introduction of such payload charge-
able equipment may be prohibitive from a weight standpoint.
Relocation of equipment (such as a support beam/cradle) utilizing the manipu-
lator system appears feasible if the appropriate manipulator/equipment and
equipment/payload bay interfaces are provided. It is assumed that provision
of such interfaces would be negligible from a weight standpoint. Relocation
operations would ty pically involve:
A. Grasping the equipment with the manipulator.
B. Disengaging equipment tie-down hardpoints.
C. Translation of the equipment to its new location in the bay where
it will not interfere with docking module/Orbiter assembly operations.
D. Installation of the equipment on its new mounting provisions.
E. Engaging the equipment on its new mounting provisions.
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EVA reconfiguration operations exhibit several significant disadvantages as
follows:
A. If unscheduled EVA is required the Orbiter must fly EVA suits for
the two man EVA operations plus any additional equipment necessary
to affect payload bay equipment relocation. The combined weight of
this equipment could be as much as 600 pounds. This weight would
be chargeable to the payload and for weight-critical missions, this
extra weight could make mission accomplishment prohibitive.
B. Equipment, such as a spacecraft support beam/cradle will probably
weigh on the order of 200 lb. and be dimensionally about 13 ft. long
and 10 ft. wide. Mass handling of equipment of the 100 to 300 lbm
category requires the EVA astronaut to utilize rigid waist restraints
in addition to foot restraints in order to have the capability to
exert forces which may be out of his plane of restraint. Such
restraint requirements make relocation of equipment different if
not impossible.
C. A malfunctioning (leaking) crew cabin/payload bay hatch would require
the entire Orbiter crew to suit-up prior to any unscheduled EVA
operations. For this condition, an additional 90 lb. of equipment
would be required for each crewman in addition to the two EVA
astronauts.
D. Appropriate volumetric storage accommodations in the Orbiter crew
compartment would have to be provided for stowage of unscheduled EVA
equipment. For a four man crew this would amount to 40 cubic feet.
Available Orbiter documentation does not reflect provisons for such
stowage accommodations.
For payloads which are normally not deployed (typically the size and mass of
a Sortie Lab), EVA reconfiguration of the payload may not be feasible.
When a large payload envelope is involved (greater than 45 ft.) reconfiguration
of the payload bay is not acceptable and the payload must be removed from the
payload bay.
In order to determine the impact which on-orbit docking module assembly has on
the Shuttle program, the NASA TM X-64731 Shuttle Traffic Model was reviewed.
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For purposes of the analysis it was assumed that the Shuttle had completed
its orbital mission but that a main propulsion and back-up deorbit system
failure had occurred. The traffic model revealed (Figure D-16A & B) that 65
(27%) of the payloads to be returned to earth exceeded the 45 ft. length
limitation. Since on-orbit docking module assembly operations are not pos-
sible while these payloads remain in the payload bay, an evaluation of
whether they could be erected out of the bay (in a manner similar to that
of the TUG) such that they would not interfere with docking module rescue
operations. One of the key considerations involved in making the evaluation
was that the rescue orbiter must approach to within 30 ft. of the disabled
Orbiter in order for the manipulator system to perform the necessary docking
module assembly operations. In all cases, for payloads whose length exceeds
45 ft., erection of these payloads prohibits the rescue Orbiter from closing
to within the 30 ft. distance requirement (Figure D-17).
Deployable payloads which are longer than 45 ft. must therefore be jettisoned.
Payloads which are not normally deployed and which are less than 21-1/2
feet in length do not have to be jettisoned if the necessary payload bay
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FIGURE D-16B
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reconfiguration equipment is provided. Reconfiguration would, for example,
require that the payload be rail mounted and remotely repositioned from the
Mission Specialist Station prior to rescue docking module assembly operation.
To satisfy the payload jettison requirement, certain payload and Orbiter
accommodations must be provided. The payload mounting hard-point tie-downs
should be capable of automatic disengagement and the payload should be pro-
vided with a propulsive device capable of providing sufficient separation
distance between it and the disabled Orbiter to ensure no recontact subsequent
to jettison or during rescue Orbiter operations while in the vicinity of the
disabled Orbiter.
The jettison operations are accomplished by the manipulator system. The
Orbiter attached payload access tunnel remains with the payload and is dis-
engaged from the Orbiter, the manipulator grasps the payload and payload tie-
down devices are disengaged. The manipulator deploys the payload out of the
bay, properly orients and releases it. The propulsive device on the payload
is then initiated by command from the Orbiter.
Up to 65 Shuttle missions are scheduled to return payloads whose length pre-
cludes on-orbit docking module assembly and shirtsleeve rescue operations.
Alternate methods for docking and rescue were considered in order to maximize
the capability of shirtsleeve rescue. The most acceptable alternate docking/
rescue concept involves the use of an in-bay docking module/airlock which has
similar operational and dimensional characteristics to that of the PRR Base-
line docking module. The configuration selected (Figure D-18) was derived
from information contained in Rockwell International drawings. The signifi-
cant features associated with this alternate concept are listed below.
A. The docking module/airlock is located in the payload bay and per-
forms both docking and airlock functions.
B. The airlock currently located in the crew compartment is not required
and an additional operational volume of about 150 cu. ft. can be
added to the lower deck of the crew compartment.
C. Shirtsleeve rescue can be accomplished for all Shuttle missions.
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FIGURE D-18
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D. Direct "straight-through" Orbiter/payload access is possible.
E. On-pad access to payloads through the module is possible.
The alternate concept has the following drawbacks however.
A. The module must be flown on every Shuttle mission and payloads
are limited to a maximum length of 53 ft. 4 in. As a result
(Figure D-19), 47 (13%) of the non-DoD payloads scheduled for
launch require length revision. Also, as in the case of the PRR
Baseline docking module, 65 (27%) of the planned return-to-earth
payloads cannot be accommodated due to excessive length.
B. As in the case of the PRR Baseline docking module, concurrent
EVA/IVA and shirtsleeve operations are not recommended because
of crew safety considerations.
Seventy percent of the Shuttle missions in the NASA TM X-64731 Traffic Model
on which DOD payloads are not launched do not require the use of a docking
module and nearly 30 percent of these missions would require the jettison
of a return payload to accomplish shirtsleeve rescue of a disabled Orbiter
crew.
In the event that a payload cannot be jettisoned the crew cannot be rescued
via the docking module (Figure D-20) and rescue operations must be affected
via EVA. The Space Station Study performed by McDonnell Douglas identified
a requirement that each operational volume occupied by the crew should have
at least two escape routes available. Based on this requirement, it is
recommended that the Orbiter crew compartment be provided with an EVA escape
hatch in addition to the crew compartment/payload bay hatch.
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Appendix E
PAYLOAD VENTING REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS
The payload venting analysis task consists of the definition of the Shuttle pay-
load venting requirements. This is followed by the evaluation of the venting
requirements and the analysis of the various methods of satisfying them. Reso-
lution of the vent provisions results in impacts on the payload, the Shuttle or
both.
Payload venting may be produced by outgassing, purging of the payload, or boil-
off of payload gases for all phases of the Shuttle mission including Shuttle
abort modes. The payload gases being vented are identified, including their
amounts and state and the mission periods when venting occurs.
The general guidelines of the Space Shuttle system specification performance and
design requirements document for expelling hazardous fluids were followed in
defining the methods of venting payload fluids. The expected results of this
task are definitions of the payload venting interface requirements and the im-
pacts of the Orbiter interfaces upon the payloads.
Payload venting in Shuttle missions influences both the payload and the Shuttle
design and operations. The magnitude of the impact is dependent upon the rigor
of safety requirements and the Shuttle's capability for vent installations and
operations constraints on venting. Safety requirements that call for all pay-
load pressure vessels to provide pressure limiting relief vents are a key factor.
Conditions where design conditions will permit no-vent operations may relieve
some payload impacts. The definition of the Shuttle vent services to the pay-
loads is an evolving activity with some basic features yet to be defined.
There are degrees of payload fluids venting impacts depending upon the fluid
hazards and flows. Even some inert fluids may be limited in free vent in the
payload bay due to Shuttle bay atmosphere conditions and bay door structure
limitations.
E.1 TYPES OF PAYLOAD VENTING
Payload venting can occur under a wide variety of conditions and at various
times during the mission. Three general classes of venting can exist: (1)
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the pressure relief of tanked fluids to maintain safe operation, (2) scheduled
flows of process fluids, and (3) unscheduled flows, Table E-1.
Pressure relief can involve planned tanked fluids that may require ground as
well as flight tank vent discharges that can usually be scheduled to minimize
undesirable side effects. Other, unscheduled venting infrequently occurs when
unplanned tank pressure rise approaches unsafe conditions such as in the lifting
of a pressure relief valve.
Scheduled flows frequently have limited venting at specific mission times. For
example, the purge gas flows are usually ground-active. Flight-active purge is
usually associated with a potential hazard event and is time-limited. Dumping
of fluids in emergency situations to passivate the payload is a special condi-
tion where continued normal payload performance is discarded (frequently shared
with venting provisions or with fill and drain lines).
More difficult venting to handle is unscheduled flows, particularly leaks and
the outgassing. The flow rates can be kept low with proper attention to pay-
load design. A more unmanageable situation that can occur is a damaged payload
where a fluid system is ruptured.
E.1.1 Payload Effluent Discharge
The four payload mission classes have fluids that may require venting as listed
in Table E-2. A fluid not listed for the Sortie Lab is the breathing atmosphere.
The impact of payload outgassing on the Orbiter payload bay is estimated to be
negligible. Payload batteries may be a problem depending upon the battery
design. Battery encapsulation appears to be the simplest solution. This may
require the replacement of vented batteries where they are used.
The monopropellant hydrazine used for a number of payloads can present a venting
problem while the payload is in the Orbiter payload bay. The hydrazine system
is inactive during these bay periods and could be held at a low pressure.
Another solution is to increase the hydrazine system design safety margins to
4.0 with the plan that no venting will be required. Should the impact on the
satellite of this possibly heavier tank and piping system be undesirable, a
design solution could be to use high-design-safety margin hydrazine holding
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TABLE E-1
Types of Payload Venting
Pressure Relief of Tanked Fluids
- Planned Discharge
- Unscheduled for Tank Pressure Safety
Scheduled Flows of Process Fluids
- Purge Gas Disposal - Cooling Gas Disposal
- Cryogenic Fluid Control
- Experiment Operation
- Operations Dumps, i.e., EVA Coolants
- Propulsive Dumps
- Payload Passivation - Dumps
- Venting During Tank Filling
Unscheduled Flows
- Boil-Off of Fluids that are Unpressurized
- Leaks
- Fluid Vessel Catastrophe
- Outgassing
- Fluids Dump During Abort Mode
is TABLE E-2 40465
PAYLOAD EFFLUENTS DISCHARGE
PAYLOADS FLUIDS TYPES
I EOS YES YES YES YES YES VENTS POSSIBLE
II ATS YES YES YES YES VENTS POSSIBLE
SMS YES YES YES YES VENTS POSSIBLE
DSCS-II YES YES YES YES YES VENTS POSSIBLE
TUG POSSIBLE YES YES YES YES VENTLINES
II LST YES YES YES YES VENT LINES PROBABLE
ANCILLARY YES YES YES YES VENTS POSSIBLE
EQUIPMENT
USED ON
CLASSES I,
II, III
IV SORTIE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES VENT LINES PROBABLE
LAB
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tanks that remain in the payload bay and are capable of fully containing the
hydrazine without the need for payload venting.
These same types of solutions are possible for many tanked fluids and in partic-
ular the small tanks. A payload tank of sufficient strength (and safety factor
such as 4.0 or above) may be acceptable with no vent provisions. Other tanks
can be operated in a two pressure level mode where the tank is kept "unchanged"
- pressure wise - while Orbiter attached to achieve a similar "no vent" accep-
tability. Later, after the payload is safely clear of the Orbiter, the tank is
pressure activated to its operational condition. Another "no-vent" type of
solution is to utilize payload holding tanks carried in the payload bay which
have sufficient volume and strength that the fluids are successfully managed
without vent provisions in the Shuttle.
The stored gases: helium, nitrogen, and C02 woil be exnected to need venting
only for emergency pressure-reducing safing. The quantities of oxygen in the
spacecraft do not present large venting problems. The Space Tug is the exception
needing large quantity venting, and the present Tug concepts recognize these
vent needs by providing Tug vent piping to the Orbiter for appropriate overboard
management. The Tug abort dumping plan to dump L02 and retain LH2 as proposed
in the SOAR-II analysis was retained.
E.1.2 Payload Effluent Flows
The payload flow conditions for the five spacecraft for which data are available
is listed in Table E-3. Although hydrazine is a commonly used RCS propellant
and the quantities are significant, 100 to 200 lbs, the existing RCS system
designs are closed package systems not normally designed for venting in the con-
ventional sense. In flight, an unsafe condition where venting could provide
relief could be handled by hydrazine burn through the thrusters. The enforce-
ment of a Shuttle requirement that the hydrazine pressurized tanks be ventable
while in the Shuttle, and that the hydrazine be capable of unloading on the
launch pad appears to involve new plumbing additions to the spacecraft and a
potential reduction in the integrity of the tank-piping system of the present
spacecraft.
E.2 TUG-SHUTTLE VENTING
The Tug is the major venting element in many of the payloads with its large
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TABLE E-3
EFFLUENTS PROBLEM
EFFLUENTS
AMOUNT
SPACECRAFT TYPE (LBS) TIME FLOWS CONTROLLED VENTING
EOS
LEN RABB. GSFC HYDRAZINE 100 * ORBIT TRIM (1/30 DAYS) THRUSTERS CAN BE FIRED AS
EOS PROJECT OFFICE AND GN2  50 ATTITUDE CONTROL WITH COLD GAS NECESSARY TO USE UP REMAIN
STATIONKEEPING WITH HYDRAZINE ING GAS
SMS
GSFC PHASE-B STUDY HYDRAZINE 72 INITIAL ADJUST = 6 BURN-OFF IS POSSIBLE
JANUARY 1970 S/C ORIENT= 5 =
E-W STATIONKEEP 3
N-S STATIONKEEP 
= 
37 =
NUTATION CONTROL = 15 =
STATION RELOCATE = 5
ATS H I
ATS H/I SYSTEM HYDRAZINE 180 HYDRAZINE IS BACKUP SYSTEM FOR UNLOAD- BURN OFF IS POSSIBLE IN THEORY
FEASIBILITY REPORT SECONDARY ING THE GYROS AND FOR 1 LONGITUDE RESPOSI
VOL II, JUNE 1972, SYSTEM TIONING MANEUVER. LIFE TIME IS 1 YR PLUS
LEWIS RES CENTER 1 REPOSITIONING, OR 2 YR W/O REPOSITIONING
LST
NASA TM X 64726 GN2 COLD 43 EMERGENCY/BACKUP SYSTEM ONLY. ALSO NO PROBLEM VENTING GASPHASE-A FINAL GAS) USED AS PRIMARY FOR DOCKING MANEUVER BECAUSE COLD GAS THRUSTERS
REPORT, (VOL. 5), AGENA THRUSTERS USED ARE INACTIVE (I.E., NO HEAT IS
DECEMBER 1972 GENERATED)
DSCS-II
DON SNOKE. HYDRAZINE 120/SAT. AS NECESSARY EVERY 21 DAYS AFTER ON- THRUSTERS CAN BE BURNED
DSCS-II AREA ORBIT. MOST FUEL USED FOR REPOSITIONING CONTINUOUSLY TO USE UP ALL
TRW ON DEMAND. INITIAL STATION ACOUISITION FUEL
= 22 =. STATIONKEEPING = 50-60 =
quantities of cryogenics including its hydrogen. The Tug fluid conditions and
flow rates are listed in Table E-4 for all fluid events including vent. The
Tug is mounted to a bifurcated cone tilt table for deployment out of the pay-
load bay. Two umbilical disconnect panels are separated prior to tilt table
deployment which cuts off the GO2 vent connection to the Orbiter vent system,
Figure E-1. After recovery of the Tug to the tilt table and a depleted Tug
propellant load, the tilt table helium supply is available to purge the Tug at
a tilt table umbilical connection. After the tilt table has returned, the Tug
into the stowed position in the bay, the two previously disconnected umbilical
panels are reconnected and the normal Tug vent is available through the Orbiter
piping. The overall Tug services in the Orbiter including the propellant dump-
ing and Tug venting is shown in Figure E-2.
E.2.1 Spacecraft Propellants Management Options
The payload venting needs can vary with different payload fluid loading plans.
Current Shuttle specifications require that payload storable propellants be
loaded before the payload is inserted into the Orbiter, Figure E-3. It would
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TABLE E-4
Panel Line Interface Remote
Functions Size Temp. Press. Flow Rate Reconnect
LH 2 Tank Fill 2" 37 OF 22 psig. 100-600 GPM 
Yes
GH Z Tank Vent 2" 37 OR 10 psig 10 lb/min 
Yes
GH 2 Accum. Fill 1/2" 300 R 500 psia 2 lb/min No
Cold He Fill 1/2" 40 'R 3000 psia 2 ib/min No
*Panel Purge Vent 1/4" 200 'R 15 psia .02 lb/min N/A
LO 2 Tank Fill 2" 163 
0 R 20 psig 55-150 GPM Yes
GO 2 Tank Vent 2" 163 OR 9 psig 9 ib/min Yes
GO 2 Accum. Fill 1/2" 500 °R 500 psia 4 lb/min 
No
He Purge 1/2" 520 oR 500 psia (TBD) Yes
Ambient He Fill 1/2" 520 OR 4500 psia 4 lb/min No
*Panel Purge Vent 1/4" 300 R 15 psia . 07 lb/min N/A
L0 2 Dump 7" 163 OR 23 psig 3, 000 GPM 
No
Note: LH 2 dump is not currently recommended. in the SOAR II study. Space-
craft or interim Tug storable propellants not shown based on preloaded
as sumption.
*Aft bulkhead only.
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FIGURE E-2 36585
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be consistent therefore if all (except cryogens) payload fluid loading would be
specified as pre-loaded. The Shuttle safety criteria for payloads with pre-
loaded propellants has not been published. The two extremes possible when
safety criteria are available, are: (1) the payload is expected to have safe
tanks so that no vent or dump provisions are needed while the payload is in the
Orbiter bay, or (2) payload vent and drain plumbing is required to be capable
of operation at all times in the Orbiter bay.
Several options are available for the second case where vent and dump is re-
quired. Direct overboard piping may be lead from the spacecraft to the Orbiter
bay wall or it may be directed from the spacecraft to the Tug and then to the
Orbiter bay wall fittings.
Indirect overboard provisions where the fluids are held in the payload bay until
it is convenient to discharge them overboard may be possible using fluid holding
tanks. The tanks can provide the safety and the volume needed to remove the
loads from the spacecraft. The holding tanks could be located on the Space Tug
or in the payload bay. The latter location should minimize the impacts to other
mission elements. Other vent provisions may be resolved by providing ground
umbilical vent connections that are active for a limited period and on a one-
time basis such as for fluid loading where tank venting for pre-load and load is
required.
E.2.2 Orbiter Overboard Payload Venting
The Orbiter design concepts for payload venting have been identified to the
detail shown in Figure E-4. Opportunities for payload piped vents exist in three
places: one forward umbilical panel disconnected at T-26 minutes and two aft
umbilical panels disconnected at T-O. All three of these umbilical panels appear
to have door covers after the ground disconnect and the acceptability of venting
under the closed door is unknown.
There are also propellant dump lines for the Orbiter in the aft boat-tail panel
and it is expected that payload propellant dumps (Space Tug or Stage) also could
utilize the boat-tail area. A hydrogen vent is also provided in the vertical
fin.
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FIGURE E-4 40462
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The payload bay has ten discharge ports, five on each side spaced along the
centerline. These vents nominally dump the bay atmosphere during ascent and
allow atmosphere inflow during reentry. The port sizes and their flow capacity
have not been published. The bay purge gas flows and any payload gas dumps in
the bay could exit through these ten ports plus any bay door leakage through
some 250 feet length of door seals. Adequate flow discharge is required to pre-
vent excessive pressures within the closed bay and avoid overloading the doors
which have a very limited pressure capability.
The present indications are that the cooling gas flow and purge gas during the
launch pad operation is ducted into the bay along the bay keel and into the bay
at the top centerline of one of the payload bay doors.
Although the Shuttle specification calls for nonpropulsive vents for payload
gases, the concepts do not appear to vent under nonpropulsive conditions.
An example of a recent Orbiter design detail is shown in Figure E-5 where the
left forward umbilical plate is detailed. This umbilical is disconnected at
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FIGURE E-5
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T-26 minutes and a door closure is made over the plate. There are two vent
outlets highlighted by "Orbiter systems" that appear to remain uncovered with
the door closed. These hydrogen vents would appear to require separate vent
stack piping prior to launch unless the associated tankage pressure is locked
up prior to T-26 minutes and is not released until the Orbiter is clear of the
sensible atmosphere. There is also an implied condition that suggests that all
umbilical openings under the umbilical door are not properly usable as vent
sources with door closed. If that is true, the space reserved for payload ser-
vices woul not allow navload ventinr with the Ooor closed. tbhre is a niiastion
as to whether it also applies to the two rear umbilical panels which also appear
to have covering doors. Even in the event that some venting is permissible from
beneath the door, the quantity probably is small and limited and the type of
vented fluids are probably limited to non-hazardous fluids. If hydrogen venting
exists for the Orbiter at the left forward umbilical panel, it also could be an
attractive vent for the Tua hydrogen prior to launch.
The satellite provides on-the-pad cooling air flows into the payload bay from
the T-0 umbilical connection. This flow is replaced by a nitrogen purge flow
prior to the hydrogen/oxygen propellant loading. The general distribution of
the gases into the bay and the uncertain quality and quantities at a particular
payload location can lead to the use of customized payload gas flows supplied by
dedicated payload umbilical connections as shown in Figure E-6. Another custom
supply source could be from gas supply tank farms within the payload bay par-
ticularly for low flow rates, special gas needs, and for continuity of gas flow
to the payload after liftoff and launch umbilical disconnect. The dumping of
these custom flows into the payload bay could be limited by Shuttle bay flow
rates, quality and location which have yet to be specified.
E.2.3 Spacecraft or Tug Venting
The spacecraft mounted to the Tug introduces possible venting complications in
that the spacecraft venting lines would be conducted down the Tug and into the
Orbiter as generally indicated in Figure E-7 or the vent lines are disconnected
from the spacecraft prior to Tug-spacecraft deployment out of the payload bay.
Added complexity is introduced when more than one spacecraft is carried by the
Tug. Depending upon how the multiple spacecraft are mounted to the Tug, a vent
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line passage from one spacecraft across a second spacecraft to the Tug could be
proposed. On the other hand, multiple payloads venting such as shown in Figure
E-8 may be best handled by direct vent lines from each spacecraft to the Shuttle
bay that are disconnected prior to Tug/spacecraft deployment out of the bay.
E.2.4 Payload Vent as a Bay Contaminant
The payload in the payload bay is one significant source of bay contamination
if payload venting of any consequence is freely allowed. The bay contaminants
from other sources are also significant and when the two sources are combined,
the prospects to the payload in the bay are not pleasant as indicated in Figure
E-9. Venting may only be a part of the payload shedding for particulant sepa-
ration is probable and undesirable. Particulant and even debris material
removal from the payload before Shuttle loading is closely associated with the
payload cleanliness and housekeeping controls exercised and in the payload
design of exterior materials and components.
E.2.5 Apparent Shuttle Venting Limitation
The general Shuttle concept description implies that there can be limitations
on payload venting. These limitations can be applied differently for various
fluids. Hazardous or corrosive fluids vents will always require positive
management and associated plumbing connections. On the other hand, modest
quantities of nitrogen or oxygen may be acceptably vented freely from the pay-
load surface.
General venting in the VAB, and during Shuttle transport to the launch pad will
possibly be limited or denied, Table E-5. Venting after launch can be denied
for a short time period for fluids such as cryogenic hydrogen. Payload venting
that results in propulsive reaction on the Orbiter could be detrimental to on-
orbit fine pointing or to the Orbiter's ability to hold close station keeping
on a payload target.
Payload venting in the payload bay can be limited when the bay doors are closed
in order to avoid overpressurizing the bay doors. Likewise on-orbit venting of
corrosive or hazardous payload fluids in the bay would be no more acceptable
than it would be on the ground. Positive fluid management with plumbing is
required.
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TABLE E-5
Apparent Shuttle Venting Limitations
OPERATIONS - NO VENT
o VAB (TBD)
o Orbiter to HO Tank Mating (TBD)
o Shuttle Transport to Launch Pad
o 60 (TBD) Seconds After Lift Off
o Below 160,000 (TBD) Feet for LH Dump
o When Propulsive Vents During Or iter Fine Pointing
or Micro Station Keeping
o During EVA
PAYLOAD BAY
o Purge Gas Flows in Excess of (TBD) Orbiter Flow Limits
o Reactant or Corrosive Fluid Discharges
o During EVA
PAYLOAD DEPLOYED ON SANS
o Propulsive Venting in Excess of SAMS Loads or Moments
(TBD)
o During SAMS Release or Retrieval Operations
o During EVA
Payloads deployed on the SAMS will have been disconnected from any vent plumb-
ing in the bay. Unless the payload includes nonpropulsive vents, payload vent-
ing would produce forces and moments on the SAMS that could negate the SAMS
movements. Vent forces, if excessive, could overload the SAMS even to the
point of structural damage to the SAMS. Denial of payload venting while
deployed on the SAMS for these reasons as well as to eliminate payload tipoff
motions at release or capture appears to be reasonable. It may be difficult
as the SANS attach period is prolonged and when the Orbiter moves from sun to
Earth shadow.
Payload venting denial during EVA operations, particularly where EVA is conduc-
ted close to the payload, is a reasonable requirement. The payload may have
to have plumbing venting to allow venting during nearby EVA activity.
E.3 SHUTTLE ABORT PAYLOAD VENT
In achieving the objectives in a Shuttle abort case of Shuttle successful mis-
sion termination in which the crew, the Shuttle and the payload remains intact,
the desirability of payload venting during abort can be an important
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consideration. The continuation of payload continuous or unscheduled venting
has the potential of releasing hazardous gas. In the case of substantial
venting through propulsive vents, there is also a risk of impacts on Shuttle
controllability. A third impact could occur where substantial internal bay
venting exists which when added to in-flowing atmosphere results in an internal
pressure buildup with the possibility of exceeding the bay doors structural
limits.
There are several payload differences in the Shuttle abort operations as com-
pared to normal Shuttle reentry, de-orbit and landing. The payload fluids are
largely or completely consumed in the course of a normal mission.
The result is that payload venting is infrequently involved on landing and in
some cases can be a negative vent condition where atmosphere or a purge gas is
entering the payload tanks. Shuttle abort usually connected with a launch mal-
function is normally faced with a payload with full load of fluids and possibly
a maximum vent flow rate condition with limited ability to limit or deny vent-
ing.
The full fluid tanks can result in payload weights in excess of normal Shuttle
landing capabilities, in payload tanked weights that present reduced design
safety factor conditions when exposed to abort and landing loads with the
increased risk of payload structural failure, or in a payload C.G. location
that is marginal or even unsafe for normal Shuttle landing maneuvers. These
factors plus general prudential practice which calls for offloading all possible
tanked fluids in abort results in a payload major fluid dump operation on orbit
to reduce payload hazards to the Shuttle and to itself.
Some payload venting can then give way to some fluid dump. The propellants in
propulsive stages in payloads are major dump candidates. Reducing pressure on
high pressure storage systems is also desirable. The payload fluid dumps are
constrained by available dump time, and allowable types of fluid dumps. The
Space Tug concept recommends LOX dump but retains the LH2 because of the much
lower hydrogen structural loads and the longer times for hydrogen dump. The
LH2 vent is a continuing need and can be a major vent item. There has also
been a concern about hydrogen dump in the sensible atmosphere, below 100,000
feet, with the burn/explosion risk. Hydrogen dump recirculation flow and
possible ingestion into Orbiter voids has also been considered.
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The possibility of large quantity propellant dumping during abort can emphasize
the need for minimized propulsive dump/vent reactions or its limitations to
longitudinal propulsive reactions. This vent/dump exit is Shuttle designed,
however it may impact the payload as dump line length increases.
Venting during abort implies that venting will occur in the sensible atmosphere
with in some cases high temperature orbiter skin conditions and flow fields at
vent outlets that can dictate the Orbiter surface impingements of the vented
fluids. Launch venting with fluid lockup until clear of the sensible atmos-
phere as in the case of the Tug LH2 lockup, probably cannot be duplicated for
the abort and landing phases due to the extended time period as well as the
higher payload temperature environments. The maximum of payload fluids dumping
even down to a partial tankload followed by a residual tank lockup to deny
venting until on the ground appears to result in reduced risks in abort. The
denial of venting during abort for those payload fluids that are not dumped is
likewise desirable in order to reduce the payload active interactions with the
Orbiter.
This schedule of non-vent operational periods can in some cases be a direct
confrontation with the general Shuttle safety directive that all payload pres-
sure vessels shall have pressure relief systems. There are in many cases
similar pressure vessels in the Orbiter for which corresponding solutions will
be needed.
E. 4 PAYLOAD VENTING REQUIREMENTS
Most payloads have venting requirements during the Shuttle mission and within
the mission mode the amount of venting on each mission is appreciable. The
present Shuttle payload conceptual solutions for venting are only in the for-
mative stages. The Table E-6 venting direction from the Shuttle Program is
needed for payload conceptual definitions.
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TABLE E-6
SHUTTLE CRITERIA FOR PAYLOAD VENTING
o Definition of Pressure Vessel Criteria
- Where Pressure Relief and Venting is Required
- Where No Pressure Relief and No Venting is Required
- Payload Caution and Warning Requirements, Diagnose Capability
and Controls for Pressure Vessels
o Definition of Vent Fluid Acceptability
- No Quality Restrictions
- Quality Restrictions
- Quantity Restrictions
Free Flows
Piped Flows
Bay Doors Closed
o Operations Mode Vent Limitations
- Prelaunch - SAMS
- Launch - EVA
- Abort - Deorbit/Re-Entry
- Orbit - Post-Landing
o Vent Outlet Limitations
- Free Flow
- Piped Flow
Location
Type of Vent
Mission Mode Limitations
o Payload Bay Vent System Interfaces
- Piping Raceways
Location/Size
X Direction, YZ Direction
- Wall Location/Size
- Overboard Outlet
Location/Size
Features
- Bay Liner Fluid Barrier
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Appendix F
PAYLOAD PLACEMENT AND RETRIEVAL ANALYSIS
This task consists of the study of payload placement and retrieval operations
from the Orbiter. The analysis includes examining the payload requirements and
their comparison with the Shuttle capability. Two placement systems were
examined, the Manipulator SAMS and the Swing Table (or Tilt Table) placement
systems. Both active and passive satellite stabilization systems were con-
sidered in determining what payload tip-off disturbances can be tolerated.
Payload requirements upon release from the Orbiter placement system include the
payload attitude reference and stabilization accuracy. The residual distur-
bances in the payload after release, the tip-off rates and dynamic transient
overshoot characteristics and payload constraints were determined. The Shuttle
performance characteristics were defined consistent with the current Shuttle
interface specification.
The relative desirability of the manipulator arm, SAMS and the swing-table
placement systems were examined compared to their payload placement and re-
trieval capabilities. Payload retrieval concept features were analyzed to
determine if the offered Shuttle characteristics are adequate for the needed
payload services.
The payload may expect to experience much lower tip-off disturbances from
Shuttle departures, as much as 1/3 to 1/5 of those disturbances possible in
the present expendable Launch Vehicles. This is partially due to the large
mass and low impulse of the orbiter and partially due to the low force, moment
acceleration and velocity performance of the manipulator SAMS. Likewise, the
payload retrieval by the orbiter allows "soft docking" for much the same
reasons. "Hard docking", the drawing of the shuttle into the Payload and
capturing and latching by impulse systems is a contingency operation and
should be no more severe than the previous CSM docking. The full extent of
the soft docking performance is not reflected in the basic shuttle specifica-
tion so that its feasibility is unclear.
The Swing Table Payload extension system is a more positive Payload manipu-
lation system than the SAMS. Although its dexterity is much less than the
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SAMS, the Payload extension and Restow functions are more positive. The
extension rates and the features for hard docking are more flexible with much
more growth potential than the SAMS.
The SAMS performance with large payload involves substantial elapsed times for
Payload Placement and other payload movements. Payload Safe Separation from
the Orbiter can also require extended elapsed time after payload release.
F.1 PAYLOAD PLACEMENT AND RETRIEVAL
For shuttle delivery, there is a basic need to place a payload in a specified
orbit within some tolerance of altitude, orbit inclination, and orbit eccen-
tricity, Table F-1. A few payloads are critical and require accurate orbit
location and accurate position time. These usually involve propulsive stages
and later flight maneuvers.
Payload attitude and sometimes reference platform and tracker lock-on are
desired. Attitude for the gravity gradient stabilization vehicles is impor-
tant.
Payload residual motions at release include disturbances which may produce tip-
off rates in excess of payload recovery capability. Other intentional dis-
turbances include payload separation velocities, and, in some cases, payload
rotation for stabilization.
The residual motions become important when the elapsed time to payload acti-
vation is extensive. An inertial drift payload with even low angular velocity
can change, and even rotate, if a large separation distance is desired for
safety before payload activation.
As an example the simulation analysis of the LST Spacecraft to determine the
sizing adequacy of the attitude control system considered the capability of the
spacecraft to recover from a worst case tip-off condition of 3 degrees per
second about each axis. As the RCS system removes the tip-off momentum and
returns the Spacecraft to its critical attitude, peak angular excursions were
10, 28 and 66 degress about the roll, pitch and yaw axes respectfully. The
total time for the system to converge for this worst case tip-off momentum
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TABLE F-1
PAYLOAD PLACEMENT OBJECTIVES
ORBIT: ALTITUDE- INCLINATION~ ECCENTRICITY
ORBIT LOCATION: TRUE ANOMALY - TIME
PAYLOAD ATTITUDE: AXIS DIRECTIONS - STARISUN LOCK ON -
EARTH HORIZON LOCK ON
PAYLOAD RESIDUAL MOTIONS
- DISTURBANCES
* RESIDUAL RATES EACH AXI S EACH DIRECTION
- SEPARATION VELOCITIES
* PAYLOAD FROM ORBITER
- ROTATION
* STABILIZATION
PAYLOAD ELAPSED TIME TO ACTIVATION
- SEPARATION DISTANCE FOR
* FUNCTIONAL ACTIVATION
* SAFE ISOLATION FROM ORBITER
was 3 minutes. There was no loss of reference due to gyro separation; how-
ever, the RCS burn was initiated immediately after Spacecraft release. Had
there been a wait period of several minutes, there would have been several
revolutions of the Spacecraft. Tipoff rates of 3 degrees per second are over
an order of magnitude greater than those expected from the Shuttle. Never-
theless, a prolonged wait after release before activation can be significant.
F.1.1 Mission Model Activity 1979-1990
An examination of the March 1973 Mission Model (excluding the DOD missions
and the Sortie Lab Missions) shows that payload placement and retrieval has
a high-frequency occurrence.
In payload placement, 363 missions involved one or more payload placements,
Table F-2. Over a third of the missions were payload deliveries into low-
earth orbit while the remainder were propulsive stage and satellite deliveries
to low-earth orbit. These stage plus satellite missions included one third
with the Tug and the other third divided between the Centaur stage and the
Agena stage operating in an expendable mode. The peak year of placement
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TABLE F-2
11s MISSION MODEL ACTIVITY 1979-1990 40454
NASA TM X-64731, MARCH 1973
DOES NOT INCLUDE SORTIE LAB MISSIONS OR DOD MISSIONS
PAYLOAD PLACEMENT (363 MISSIONS) PEAK YEAR 1985 - 44 EVENTS
- LOW EARTH ORBIT 37. 5% OF MISS IONS
- SATELLITE PLUS STAGE 62.5% OF MISSIONS
* CENTAUR 12.4% OF MISSIONS
* AGENA 16.1% OF MISS IONS
* TUG 34. 0% OF MISSIONS
(1985 INITIATION)
PAYLOAD RETRIEVAL (237 OF 363 MISSIONS) PEAK YEAR 1989 -39 EVENTS
- LOW EARTH ORBIT 31. 5% OF MISSIONS
- TUG 33.9% OF MISSIONS
- NO PAYLOAD RETRIEVAL 34.6% OF MISSIONS
activity occurs in 1885 with 44 events for that year.
Payload retrieval missions occur for two thirds of the placement missions be-
cause not all satellites are recovered and because the expendable Centaur
and Agena stages are not planned for retrieval.
The payload retrievals are about evenly divided between payloads in low Earth
orbit retrievals and Space Tug retrievals. The Tug retrievals include some
Tug-only retrievals and other Tug and satellite retrievals.
Payload placement and retrieval operations occur in a majority of the Shuttle
missions and therefore are an important operational factor for which adequate
Shuttle performance must be provided.
Future mission models can be expected to vary in number of missions as well as
types. Even if there is a significant shift toward Sortie Lab missions, the
NASA placement missions coupled with the omitted DOD missions which are
heavily payload placement and retrieval oriented, should more than balance
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NASA emphasis shifts. Placement and retrieval is a fundamental part of the
Shuttle transportation concept.
F.1.2 Placement and Retrieval Classes
The four payload classes being studied in SOAR-IIS (Table F-3) all involve
payload placement and retrieval except for the Sortie Module class missions.
The low Earth orbit EOS missions are transporting spacecraft that now utilize
Titan IIIC and Delta Launch Vehicles. Their requirements of the Shuttle would
be to not exceed the residual motions of these earlier launch vehicles.
The Tug, Class II, delivers and retrieves the ATS, the DSCS-II and the SMS
satellites. Although the Tug can tolerate large disturbances at release, the
rotational loads on the satellite attached to the Tug cannot tolerate large
disturbances. In fact even the small disturbances such as satellite tip-off
from the Tug may be marginal when the same Tug from Shuttle disturbance
occurs due to the large satellite radius of gyration while Tug is attached.
The LST spacecraft generaly has self stabilization capabilities; however,
the structural nature of the large telescope would dictate as low a residual
disturbance as practicable upon LST release.
The three mission classes all involve active guidance payloads with a built-in
degree of self recovery. The LDEF payload on the other hand with its passive
stabilization system has definite limits as to the maximum disturbance from
which it can successfully recover.
F.1.3 Historical Tip-Off Rates
Five of the Spacecraft in the Mission classes are currently planned or are
flying on present expendable Launch Vehicles. The present maximum tip-off
rates that these five Spacecraft could experience are listed below.
ATS-H/I
Ref: ATS-H/I System Feasibility Report, Vol. III, June 1972
o Configuration 'A' is the version preferred by Lewis Research Center
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TABLE F-3
PLACEMENT AND RETRIEVAL PAYLOAD
CLASS REQUIREMENTS
CLASS REQUIREMENT
I EOS EQUAL TO TITAN IIIC AND DELTA RATES
II TUG WITH: TBD
ATSI (SATELLITE PLACEMENT BY TUG:
DSCS-I II DSCS-II TIP-OFF 0. 5 DEGISEC)
SMS
III LST TBD
IV SORTIE REMAINS ORBITER ATTACHED
MODULE
OTHER LDEF TBD - PROBABLY LOW, 0. 1 DEGISEC
DUE TO ONLY GRAVITY GRADIENT STABILIZATION
o Titan-IIIC is the selected booster
o Transtage injection errors: Roll 0.75 0/sec
Pitch 0.45 0/sec
Yaw 0.45 0/sec
EOS
Ref: EOS Definition Phase Report, GSFC, August 1971
o Titan-IIIC for larger versions of EOS: Roll 0.75 0/sec
Pitch 0.45 0/sec
Yaw 0.450/sec
o Delta 2910 for smaller versions of EOS: Roll 30/sec
Pitch 30/sec
Yaw 30 /sec
Note: The GSFC Study (p. 7-12) says that the ACS performs "acquisition of
the desired earth-pointing orientation from any initial attitude,
with initial rates of a few degrees per second".
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SMS
100 RPM rotation rate prior to Tip-off
o Delta 2914
Injection accuracies for the Delta 2914 are quoted at 30 half-cone angle.
DSCS-II
o Titan-IIIC deploys both spacecraft: Roll 0.75 0 /sec
Pitch 0.450 /sec
Yaw 0.450/sec
o Upon activation of the separation devices, compressed springs will im-
part a velocity to the satellite, relative to the transtage, of 1 ft/
sec minimum. The torque-impulse of the separation springs shall be
less than 35 in-lb-sec total in pitch and yaw combined with respect to
the transtage longitudinal centerline. (Ref: IFS-STC-23100)
LST
Ref: LST Preliminary Study, MSFC, 25 February 1972 (p. 23)
o Titan-IIIC is considered for purposes of the Phase-A Study Roll 0.75 0/sec
Pitch 0.450/sec
Yaw 0.45 0/sec
F.1.4 Shuttle Payload Placement
The major elements in payload placement include the payload deployment out of
the payload bay, the payload release, and the payload separation from the
Orbiter, Table F-4.
The Orbiter systems require time to complete the deployment, time to stabilize
to the no-disturbance conditions for release, and planned operations for
separation from the payload. In addition, there are associated events that
can occur during or at the end of each placement.
These payload events may occur concurrently with the Orbiter events or in
some cases they may need added time. Consequently, the total placement phase
could become an extended-duration activity.
The Shuttle baseline concept involves the manipulator, SAMS, and withdrawal
of the payload from the payload bay to the release position. Then, the SAMS
releases the payload and the Shuttle RCS translates and rotates the Orbiter
from the payload.
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iTABLE F-4 40466
SHUTTLE PAYLOAD PLACEMENT
EVENT SCOPE ASSOCIATED EVENTS BASELINE DEPLOYMENT 
CONCEPT
PAYLOAD FROM: PAYLOAD: SHUTTLE MANIPULATOR
DEPLOYMENT PAYLOAD LATCHED - ACTIVATION
IN PAYLOAD BAY - EARTH LINK
- STAR LINK
TO: - READINESS CHECKS
PAYLOAD READY
FOR RELEASE
PAYLOAD FROM: SHUTTLE: MANIPULATOR UNLATCH
RELEASE PAYLOAD READINESS - STABILIZATION
PLUS SHUTTLE - POINTING
READINESS - UNLATCHING
TO: PAYLOAD:
PAYLOAD RELEASE - STABILIZATION
FROM SHUTTLE - RESIDUAL MOTIONS
PAYLOAD FROM: SHUTTLE: ORBITER RCS TRANSLATION AND
SEPARATION MOMENT OF - CONTROL OF RCS ROTATION FROM PAYLOAD
FROM RELEASE EFFLUENTS
SHUTTLE - CONTROL OF OVER.
TO: BOARD DISCHARGES
SAFE SEPARATION
DISTANCE FOR PAYLOAD:
ACTIVATION OF - CONTROL OF EFFLUENT
PAYLOAD SYSTEMS IMPACTS ON SHUTTLE
- CONTROL OF HAZARDOUS
PAYLOAD SYSTEMS
F.2 PAYLOAD PLACEMENT
Payload deployment for small payloads can be simple and timely; however, pay-
loads that fill the entire 15 foot by 60 foot allowable envelope, and the full
65,000 pounds, require sequential planned movements in order to control and
prevent undesired payload contact with the Orbiter or with the SAMS, as shown
in Figure F-1. The payload vertical motion (, of 8 feet will allow the
SAMS to rotate the payload in the YZ plane through 180 degrees to the (
position. The SAMS can then rotate 150 degrees forward to place the SAMS end
effector directly over and 30 feet above the orbiter cockpit position
This release and capture position for the payload is achieved after about 29
minutes for the SAMS full-load performance accelerations and velocities. The
time may be shortened if step T and the last half of step T are simultan-
eously performed if the SAMS can do that (not specified in the documentation).
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FIGURE F-1
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15 FT X 60 FT
SPAYLOAD ENVELOPE .
RELEASE AND 318
CAPTURE 150XZ .... YZ
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- o
Q-* VERTICAL 96 IN.
S/-TUG 11020 ® ® . / GRAPPLER
z= YZ = xz
8 FT 1800 1500- -.- -
VMAX 
k
0.2 0.2 0.2
FT/SEC DEG/SEC DEG/SEC
1.2 15.2 13
MIN MIN MIN
TOTAL TIME TO DEPLOY
29.4 MINUTES
F.2.1 SAMS Payload Deployment
The total deployment described in the previous figure involves a two-step
payload withdrawal from the payload bay as indicated by Figure F-2. The pay-
load cylinder is vertically withdrawn from the payload bay for a little over
8 feet, position a to e. The SAMS wrist can then rotate the payload cylinder
to the side opposite the SAMS and clear of the bay door hinge line, f to h.
This rotation continues for 180 degrees to clear the fore and aft bay bulk-
heads and remain clear of the SAMS. The SAMS end effector is located at the
Space Tug grappler fitting in the previous figures at Tug station 1102. Other
payloads with more forward grappler fitting locations will reduce the SAMS
potential interference up to some point. The proximity of the SANS to the pay-
load path as it clears the bay introduces a degree of awkwardness for most
payload grappler locations unless the payload volume is small.
F.2.2 Payload Micro-Separation
Once the payload has been deployed and the payload, the SAMS and the Orbiter
motions are minimized, the SAMS grappler unlatches from the payload, which
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sFIGURE F-2 40460
SAMS PAYLOAD DEPLOYMENT
SAMS
1800
TOTAL
Z= YZh
8 FT 1800
VM x  PAYLOAD T
0.2 0ENVELOPE0.2 0.2
FTI DEG]
SEC SEC
1.2 15.2
MIN MIN
remains in an inertial drift mode, Figure F-3. The SAMS unloaded velocity
after separation can attain 2 feet per second. Once the grappler is clear
of the payload skin, the SAMS can begin rotation back into the payload bay.
Unloaded, it can reach 2-degrees-per-second rotation.
The payload position relative to the Orbiter remains at the 30-foot separation
established by the movements during deployment. The payload has no impulse
loads applied except for the disturbances that occur at grappler release.
F.2.3 Payload Macro-Separation
After the SAMS micro-separation from the payload described in the previous
figure, a second phase of separation is initiated when the Orbiter thrusts
backwards (-X) with its RCS, Figure F-4. The duration of this thrusting will
determine the Orbiter separation velocity and the speed of separation from
the payload. An example of a 10-second burn for the Orbiter to reach a
velocity of 2 feet per second would force back the Orbiter 90 feet in 50
seconds. This velocity and the 10-second burn may be in excess of the desired
payload contamination risk.
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FIGURE F-3
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FIGURE F-4
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After the Orbiter has backed off a distance, a second RCS thrust in the Z
direction will pitch the Orbiter and allow other RCS thrusting away from the
desired payload and Orbiter maneuvers. Earlier studies indicated that a
separation of 1,500 feet would be nominal before full activation of the pay-
load. However, activation of payload RCS thrusters for coarse stabilization
may be feasible earlier and at a much closer separation distance.
The on-orbit relationships between the Shuttle and its payload and the factors
that would influence these relationships and the effects they might have at
varying separation distances in low earth orbit are shown in Figure F-5.
Considering the effects of each parameter in toto suggests a separation
range of 1,500 ft for such activities as escort, checkout, testing, or
loitering, and the following payload Propulsion system activation.
F.2.4 Payload Disturbing Motions
The Residual Motions of the Payload in its free-in-space conditions is one
factor that determines how successful the Payload will be in the next phase
of its operations. Payload Tip-off normally is characterized by roll rates
about its axis, i.e., angular velocities, linear velocities can also be in-
volved; however, the angular rates denote a possible tumbing state and one
that requires attitude stabilization to correct. The linear velocities
relatively small - only become of interest as separation velocities, or when
associated with propellant settling accelerations, and both of these con-
ditions involve from one up to five feet per second payload velocity differen-
tial which requires an impulse system - normally a spring or a stored energy
device. These velocities are then not residual or error motions but
distinct performance conditions.
Definitions of Payload Tip-off, Table F-5, include Payload Release Tip-off
as well as Payload capture Tip-off situations.
F.2.5 Payload Tip-Off at Payload Release
Disturbing motions imparted to the payload at payload release by the SAMS
(tip-off) can be traced to several motions. Basically, the Orbiter's insta-
bility can influence the entire system up to the point of payload release.
Assuming that the Orbiter's RCS thrusters are maintaining attitude, the 900
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FIGURE F-5 34982
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TABLE F-5
PAYLOAD TIP-OFF CONDITIONS
o PAYLOAD TIP-OFF
PAYLOAD TIP-OFF IS THE RESIDUAL DYNAMIC CONDITION BETWEEN THE
ORBITER AND THE PAYLOAD THAT INVOLVES PAYLOAD MOTION DISTURBANCES
THAT IF UNLIMITED COULD LEAD TO UNCONTROLLED PAYLOAD MOVEMENTS
(THE PAYLOAD BEING THE PASSIVE AND THE ORBITER THE ACTIVE VEHICLE)
o PAYLOAD RELEASE TIP-OFF
RESIDUAL MOTIONS OF THE PAYLOAD AT SEPARATION FROM THE ORBITER
(MANIPULATOR, TILT TABLE, OR DOCKING FITTING) THAT HAVE THE POTENTIAL
OF PAYLOAD TUMBLING, OR OF PAYLOAD COLLISION WITH THE ORBITER
o PAYLOAD CAPTURE TIP-OFF
RESIDUAL MOTIONS OF THE PAYLOAD AT INITIAL CONTACT AT THE DOCKING
FACE OR CAPTURE FACE OF THE ORBITER (MANIPULATOR, TILT TABLE OR
DOCKING FITTING) THAT HAVE THE POTENTIAL OF PAYLOAD JACK-KNIFING
WITH THE ORBITER, OR OF PAYLOAD FAILURE TO COMPLETE THE CAPTURE
ENGAGEMENT AND STROKE THE ATTENUATION SYSTEM
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pound thruster (baseline can hold 0.1 degree per second) and the 25 pound
thrusters can reduce this to 0.01 degree.
The SAMS dynamic excitation could be a source of significant motion due to its
limited stiffness. The excitations that lead to SAMS motion can be responses
to Orbiter RCS firing or other Orbiter vibrations. The SAMS drive or braking
motions can also contribute. SAMS structural distortions due to thermal
changes and payload dynamic forces are also possible contributors to motion.
A separate source of motion excitation is the forces generated by opening
the SAMS grappler jaw. The frictional forces of the jaw release and the
effect of a one jaw hang-up could tip off the payload, Figure F-6.
Should the end effector be required to impart a separation velocity to the
payload as is now specified in the Shuttle requirements, payload velocities
of from 1 foot per second to 5 feet per second can represent substantial
stored energy devices. SAMS design concepts do not now provide these pay-
load separation velocities and should they be provided, the payload accelera-
tions will need to be restricted so as not to exceed the forces or moment
structural limits of the SAMS.
The residual motions of the payload will reflect these various sources. The
resulting motion is generally meaningful to the payload in terms of inertial
space for conditions occurring from payload release to free flight. Another
motion reference can be important. The payload motion relative to the Orbiter
immediately after release will indicate the risk of subsequent undesirable
payload-Orbiter impact.
F.2.6 Constraints in Payload Release Tip-Off
The desired limits of payload tip-off motion are generally agreed to be 0.1
degree per second on any axis and 0.1 foot per second for a soft separation
involving only inadvertent disturbing motions. On the other hand, specific
payload separation velocities considered to be hard-separation conditions
could be 1 foot per second for simple separation and up to 5 feet per second
where payload propellant settling is desired, Table F-6.
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FIGURE F-6
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TABLE F-6
CONSTRAINTS IN PAYLOAD RELEASE TIP-OFF
- SOFT SEPARATION < 0.1 DEG/SEC HARD SEPARATION < 1.0 DEG/SEC
< 0.1 FT/SEC < 5.0 FT/SEC
- SHUTTLE VOLUME X < 0.75 DEG/SEC, SEPARATION VELOCITY
SPECIFICATION >1<5 FT/SEC
VOLUME XIV < 0.10 DEG/SEC, SEPARATION VELOCITY
>1<5 FT/SEC
- OPENING VELOCITY o VEHICLE SEPARATION: 1.0 FT/SEC
o VEHICLE PROPELLANT SETTLING: 5.0 FT/SEC
- RELEASE
ACCELERATION < 0.1 FT/SEC2  PERMITS SATELLITE BOOM, ANTENNA AND
PANEL DEPLOYMENT BEFORE SEPARATION
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The 0.75 and 0.15 degree per second rates remain to be settled. Also, a.clear
distinction should be made between the disturbance limits and the intentional
separation velocities, the 1 and 5 feet per second.
Payload accelerations limits at the moment of release are useful to ensure
that the payload structure is adequate. An acceleration of less than 0.1 foot
per second2 is generally used. This permits payload booms and panels to be
deployed at separation.
Payload residual motions after release, if excessive, can make the payload a
difficult target in the event that the Orbiter captures the payload.
In general, the relatively low acceleration capabilities of the SAMS and the
low acceleration capabilities of the Orbiter RCS indicate that even with
intentional SAMS movements and Orbiter thrusting, the motions of the payload
will be modest and residual motions - disturbances - likewise will be modest.
F.3 SWING-TABLE PAYLOAD DEPLOYMENT
The baseline Shuttle Payload Deployment system, the Manipulator SAMS described
in the previous Sections, performs the basic functions of extending the payload
out of the bay and releasing the payload. In the Payload retrieval mode, the
SAMS captures the payload and stows the payload in the bay for earth return.
There are a number of other possible functions and services suggested for the
SAMS including payload services and shuttle services; however, the basic pay-
load placement and retrieval functions are the justification for the SAMS.
Other payload placement and retrieval concepts or the lack of such a payload
need are possible and are recognized by the SAMS feature that allows the arm to
be removed and not flown for selected missions.
The most frequently suggested concept in lieu of the SAMS is the Swing Table
or Tilt-table, which can totally replace the SAMS fundamental services, or can
be used in conjunction with SAMS as is presently proposed for the Space Tug.
The Tilt table offers two improved services over the SAMS, one is the ability
to retain significant umbilical connections with the Payload up to the point of
separation from the Tilt table. The second is the greater structural capa-
bilities (and alignment) and the more expeditious movement of the Payload out
of and into the bay. The Tilt table provides essentially a "hard mount" for
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the payload to the Shuttle both in the bay and extended out of the bay. Two
general tilt table approaches have been proposed. Figure F-7, where one is
mounted in the forward end of the bay and other is mounted in the aft end of
the bay. A third tilt table concept for smaller payload could be considered
in conjunction with a Payload pallet such as drawn in Figure F-8. Tilt table
detailed features such as manned pressure tunnels, docking mechanisms, large
load capabilities and the angular movement, 90, 50, 45 degrees all relate to
specific payload, mission and operation needs.
F.h SPACE TUG TILT TABLE
The present space tug concept uses an aft tilt table that utilizes the SAMS
to pick the tug off of the table. The lowest figure option of the options
shown in Figure F-9. The SAMS also remounts the tug to the table on retrieval.
The table thus only provides tug latch/unlatch functions and structurally only
need to pivot the tug in and out of the bay. The SAMS tug attachment removes
any tug-table docking/redocking functions. Therefore tug release and capture
is performed by the SAMS in the shuttle baseline mode. Other concepts using
tilt tables without the SAMS involve release and separation from the payload
such as shown in Figure F-10. Although a payload unlatch from the tilt table
and an orbiter "fly-away" from the inertially drifting payload, or the
opposite mode, where the payload could fly-away from the orbiter is possible,
present separation techniques suggests that the tilt table impart a separation
velocity of about one foot per second to the payload at release from the tilt
table. The SAMS concept thus involves "soft release" and a passive payload
where virtually no payload release tip off disturbances appear to be possible.
The Non-SAMS release probably involves a "hard release" with the potential
of greater residual tip-off disturbances.
F.5 ELEMENTS OF SHUTTLE PAYLOAD RETRIEVAL
Payload retrieval is based upon a sequence of events in which the payload and
the Orbiter initially perform readiness and gross location actions. There-
after, the Orbiter is the active element and the payload is a passive, coopera-
tive target, Table F-7. The relative separation of the two are closed to 30
feet for this baseline concept. The SAMS is then brought up to the payload
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FIGURE F-7
SWINGTABLE AFT MOUNTING ATTACH POINTS
1500 LBS
7 FT 2000 FT-LBS
150 LBS T
FORWARD MOUNTED SWINGTABLE WITH DEPLOYABLE TUNNEL
AFT EU AT SWINGITALC
A CTALCOC .V-VICINITY OF
7.483 Y**36
t S WINGTABLE LOADS
EXTENDABL C ... OPLOVMENT
A *POAT ATTACHMENT
VoNITY Of 2-384 Y -I6
FIGURE F-8
PALLET SWING TABLE
I I - - - _
DRAG STRUT SUPPORTITRUNION
TIL TABLE
SHUTTLE PAYLOAD ENVELOPE
IREF)
iF-18
I! _ '_ _ _ N - 1/
F-18
FIGURE F-9
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FIGURE F-10
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STABLE F-7
ELEMENTS OF SHUTTLE PAYLOAD RETRIEVAL 40461
EVENT SCOPE ASSOCIATED EVENTS BASELINE RETRIEVAL CONCEPT
PAYLOAD FROM: PAYLOAD BEACON, PAYLOAD: TUG CLOSING AV 70 NMI TO
MACRO INITIAL PAYLOAD 
- POSITION KEEPING 24 NMI
RENDEZVOUS LOCATION (UP TO - STABILIZATION ORBITER CLOSING 24NMI TO 1 NMI
24 MILESI 
- COMMAND LINK
TO: 
-PAYLOAD CONTROL
PAYLOAD LOCATED TRANSFER FROM
WITHIN ONE r1ILE GROUND TO ORBITER
OF ORBITER ORBITER MANEUVERS
PAYLOAD PAYLOAD: ORBITER: PAYLOAD:
-READINESS 
-STABILIZATION STATUS LINK SELF SAFING
FOR CAPTURE -COOPERATION 
- READINESS TEST COMMANDED FROM GROUND
- PASSIVATION COMPLETION -COMMANDED FROM ORBITER
- FINAL APPROACH TO
30 FEET
PAYLOAD FROM: ORBITER: ORBITER CLOSES 1 MI TO 30 FT
MICRO PAYLOAD ABOUT 1 MI - MANEUVERS TO 30 FT - MANIPULATOR CLOSES 30 FT
RENDEZVOUS TO: UP TO ONE TENTH FPS TO 2 FT
PAYLOAD FITTING
2 FT ENVELOPE
PAYLOAD FROM: ORBITER - 2 FT SPHERE - MANIPULATOR CLOSES 2 FEET
CAPTURE ORBITER SYNCH- ENVELOPE
RONIZATION OF PAY- - ONE 0.010 PER SECOND
LOAD MOTIONS ERRORS
TO: MANIPULATCR- CLOSE AND
MANIPULATOR TO LATCH
PAYLOAD ENGAGE
MENT AND CAPTURE
PAYLOADSTATUS PAYLOAD: ORBITER: PAYLOAD:
READINESS FOR - SYSTEMS PASSIVATION LIMITATIONS ON 
- AUTOMATIC SEQUENCING
MOUNTING/STORAGE INDEXING FOR MOUNTS MANEUVERS 
- RF ACCESS
- APPENDAGES TOWAGE - LIMITATIONS OF 
- NO HARDWIRE
- SAFETY INSPECTION MANIPULATOR LOCATIONS
PAYLOAD PAYLOAD DE-DEPLOYMENT. MANIPULATOR MOTIONS PAYLOAD:
MOUNTING IN MOUNTING AND LATCHING PAYLOAD FSE ACTIVATION - UMBILICALS MATED AFTER
PAYLOAD BAY MOUNTING
grapple fitting. The Orbiter maintains a very close stationkeeping with this
fitting by keeping the SAMS grappler witnin a foot of the payload fitting.
The velocity error of the SAMS grappler to the payload will not exceed 0.1 foot
per second and 0.1 degree per second about any axis. Thus, the SAMS is only
required to complete its capture within these distance and motion limits - a
soft capture.
There are a number of associated events in the various phases of payload
retrieval, including the acquisition, capture and subsequent stowage of the
payload in the bay.
F.6 PAYLOAD ORBITER CAPTURE
The baseline Orbiter capture operation discussed in the previous section
utilizes the SAMS to make a soft capture (dock) of the payload after the
Orbiter has closed-to and kept the micro-station on the payload grapple
fitting.
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Other capture options are possible, Figure F-ll, and the hard-docking of the
Orbiter to the target payload with the Orbiter docking module installed is a
planned alternate for the Shuttle program.
Other studies have suggested concepts in which the tilt table in the payload
bay is used as a docking system to capture a target payload. The docking
clearances close to the Orbiter would seem to make the concept hazardous;
however, if the Orbiter has in fact the payload target micro-stationkeeping
capabilities presently being specified, the tilt table docking may be no more
hazardous than the SAMS payload insertion into the payload bay.
In a similar concept review, if the Orbiter micro-stationkeeping motion limits
are normally maintained in payload capture, the final motion and distance
errors that the SAMS must correct in order to complete the capture are so
minor compared with the SAMS general motion capabilities that a question arises
as to the need for SAMS for payload capture.
Simulation tests have shown that a simpler linear actuator or a boom with small
pitch and haw motion can capture a payload target within the specified Orbiter
stationkeeping conditions. Except for the SAMS deployment of a payload out
of the payload bay and stowage in the payload bay functions, the payload
capture supporting equipment can be simplified.
F.6.1 Payload Capture
Some values of target and Orbiter motions during payload capture have been
quantified in various Shuttle documents. Other values have been developed in
other operations studies. In the hard-docking operation, the allowable mis-
alignments have been listed in earlier Shuttle documents; however, most recent
documents have omitted them. Payload motions limits have not yet been pub-
lished in Shuttle documents.
The stand-off distance of 30 feet that the Orbiter establishes with the target
payload in the Shuttle baseline payload capture concept, where the SAMS per-
forms the capture, may be changed with the hard-docking mode. For example, a
closer stand-off distance could be considered with the listed Orbiter micro-
stationkeeping capability.
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FIGURE F-11
PAYLOAD CAPTURE OPTIONS 40481
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SO FT DOCK TILT TABLE
CLOSUR HARD DOCKING
CLOSURE C LOSURE
MANIPULATOR
SERVICES
ORBITER BASELINE
ORBITER DOCKING MODULE
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TAR HRDT DOCK ACTUATOR TARGET INDEXING
DOCKING CLOSURE AXIAL INDEXING PITCH GENERAL
MODULE (RANGEAW PURPOSE
PITCH MANIPULATOR
PITCHPITCH TCH .
SSAMS
LINEAR ACTUATOR
SIMPLIFICATION
The soft-docking conditions associated with the baseline payload capture
operation where the SAMS completes the capture has performance values listed
in various Shuttle documents including the SAMS specification, Table F-8.
The Orbiter micro-stationkeeping performance in the SAMS capture mode appear
to be demanding on the Orbiter both in the ability to detect target relative
position and the relative motions of the Orbiter and the target payload
grappler target fitting located at a point 30 feet above the Orbiter cockpit.
The SAMS grappler tip may be of some use as a reference when the SAMS has
been moved up to the proximity of the target grappler fitting, Figure F-12.
In the SAMS soft docking grapple capture, the inertial drifting Target Motion
(Payload Motion) needs to be minimal if the orbiter is to be capable of
attaining the Micro-Stationkeeping Performance. The basic orbiter specifi-
cation does not yet list this Micro-Stationkeeping performance requirement.
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TABLE F-8
SPECIFIED SHUTTLE PERFORMANCE
RCS STABILITY
X 0.2 FT/SEC2  900 LB THRUSTERS
PITCH 0.5 DEG/SEC2  0.5 DEG POINTING
0.1 DEG/SEC
ORBITER MICRO-STATION KEEPING(A) 25 LB THRUSTERS - VERNIER
(TARGET 30 FEET ABOVE COCKPIT) !0.5 DEG POINTING
:0.01 DEG/SEC
+ 1 FT. POSITION ENVELOPE
0.1 FT/SEC RELATIVE VELOCITY
0.01 DEGREES/SEC RELATIVE RATE
+ 0.1 DEGREE DEADBAND
SAMS(A) 65,000 LBS UNLOADED
TRANSLATION 0.2 FT/SEC 2.0 FT/SEC
ROTATION 0.2 DEG/SEC 2.0 DEG/SEC
TIP ACCELERATION 0.006 FT/SEC2 0.6 FT/SEC2
TIP DECELERATION 0.006 FT/SEC2 1.25 FT/SEC2
POSITION ACCURACY + 2 INCHES + 2 INCHES
FORCE 10 LBS. MAX. 10 LBS. MAX.
STALL TORQUE 200 FT LBS. WRIST 200 LBS. WRIST
DEFLECTION 0.1 IN/LB TIP FORCE
(A) SAMS REQUIREMENTS IDRD NO. SE-493T
FIGURE F-12
SAMS-SHUTTLE
.ATTACHED MANIPULATOR SYSTEM
MANIPULATOR INSTALLATION MANIPULATOR SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS
21016400
- 401 ^ VERTICAL
300 LIFT 300
570 IN. MANIPULATOR 20 I VERTICAL w
MAXREACH STOWED 1307 1 C M
1307 cc -10
748.9 0 0'0 200300400 500 00 700
P/L ENVELOPE LIFT-POINT IIN.)
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400 _-__ 
-_--_ MANIPULATOR
MAX DYNAMIC
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MATING ADA ER 15 FT DIA
LEFT BOOM:I NEAR
TV MONITORS GA TYPE END FFECTOR NEA
RIGHT BOO F 60 FT (720 IN.)
SHUTTLE TV CAMERA
TRANSLATIONAL AND LIGHT
CONTROLLER CONOLL MANIPULATORI // MANI ULATOR ARM
RMS HAND TERMINAL DEVICE OR
CONTROLLERS END EFFECTOROR
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ADAPTER 12 IN 2 ADAPTER
SHUTTLE SHUTTLE
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F.6.2 Payload Capture by Hard Docking
Although the Shuttle baseline involves SAMS capture of the payload under
soft docking conditions, an alternate payload capture features are provided
when the Shuttle docking module is used. Two modes are possible. One, the
baseline SAMS capture and placement on the Docking Module Face and Latch
System, and two, the direct Payload docking to the Docking Module without
SAMS involvement. This latter mode will require Hard Docking and its character-
istics listed in Table F-9. Two features of this Module Harddock system and the
Payload latch system have not been published; however, the hard docking con-
ditions, the Engagement Velocities, the Impulse attenuation system stroking
values, the Misalignment correcting forces and if involved the latching force
would appear to be in excess of the SAMS with Payload dynamics capabilities.
It would, therefore, appear that a Two Mode docking system will be involved,
one compatible with the SAMS, the other compatible with Hard docking dynamics.
Another approach is to install a SAMS Payload Latch ring on the Docking
Module or a Harddocking ring for the planned Mission Mode.
F.6.3 Constraints in Payload Capture Tip-Off
Orbiter hard-docking to a payload target places great emphasis on achieving
the maximum mating potential with no damage. This involves bringing the
docking planes together so that the jackknifing angle is reduced to zero and
the rates are reduced to zero, Figure F-13.
There must be sufficient energy between the Orbiter and the payload that will
stroke the attenuation system, which normally includes the motion of the pay-
load needed to remove the docking misalignments as well as to arrest the
motions.
The energy is expressed as velocities and the motion misalignments can be
expressed as lateral velocity ratios and angular velocity ratios. Simulation
analyses in other studies have indicated that lateral velocity ratios in
excessof 15/100 and angular velocity ratios in excess of 0.1 will maximize
the mating potential. The linear contact velocity, Vc, is a major factor in
completing the attenuation system stroke.
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TABLE F-9 40483
PAYLOAD CAPTURE
HARD DOCKING SOFT DOCKING
ORBITlER CLOSING SAMS CLOSING
* APPROACH VELOCITY 0.5 FT/SEC CONTACT VELOCITY >0.8 FT/SEC
ANGULAR 1. 0 DEG/SEC ANGULAR O.1 DEGISEC
*CONTACT ORBITER STATION KEEPING
CLOSING VELOCITY 0. 3 -VC0.5 FT/SEC ±l FOOT RELATIVE POSITION
LATERAL VELOCITY VL> 0.045 TO 0.075 FTI/SEC <0.35 FT/SEC RELATIVE VELOCITY
<45 FEET ARGET FROM ORBITER CG
PAYLOAD MOTION
0. 1 DEGISEC (ANY AXIS) PAYLOAD MOTION
<1 DEG AMPLITUDE <-0.01 DEGISEC
>1.5 FT CORRIDOR <1 DEGREE AMPLITUDE (ANY AXIS)
MISALIGNMENT MISALIGNMENT- SAMS JAW
LATERAL ±0.5 FEET LATERAL ±2 INCHES
ANGULAR ±5 DEGREE ANGULAR SMALL (TBD)
ROLL 7 DEGREE ROLL SMALL (TBD)
STAND-OFF DISTANCE STAND-OFF DISTANCE AND MOTION
(WHEN SAMS COMPLETES CAPTURE WITH A SOFT DOCK) (ORBITER STATION KEEPING ENVELOPE)
230 FEET <±1 FOOT
(<45 FEET FROM CG) < 0. 01 DEGISEC (ANY AX I S)
<0. 1 FTISEC
iFIGURE F-13 40455
CONSTRAINTS IN PAYLOAD CAPTURE TIP-OFF
HARD DOCKING
OBJECTIVE - MAXIMIZE THE MATING POTENTIAL RELATIVE ANGULAR
* BRING DOCKING PLANES TOGETHER VELOCITY
- JACK-KNIFE ANGLE REDUCED TO ZERO TARGET
- RATES REDUCED TO ZERO
* MAINTAIN SUFFICIENT ENERGY TO STROKE THE VL ORBITE
MECHANISM ATTENUATION SYSTEM /
* TOLERANCE TO LATERAL AND ANGULAR
VELOCITIES DURING CONTACT DEPENDS ON:
- LATERAL VELOCITY RATIO: VLIVC 0.15
-ANGULAR VELOCITY RATIO: &/VC 0.1
* LINEAR CONTACT VELOCITY: VC IS MAJOR
FACTOR IN ATTENUATION SYSTEM STROKE DOCKING FACE
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The payload target configuration can influence the tendency for the payload
to jackknife on docking contact. A long, thin payload with the docking face
on the end is less desirable.
As the hard-docking misalignments tolerances are reduced, the docking diffi-
culty is reduced. If the previously discussed Orbiter Micro-stationkeeping
with the target payload are general operational conditions, the hard-docking
misalignment tolerances may be reexamined in an effort to reduce and simplify
hard-docking requirements. Soft Docking conditions could then be used with
the Tilt Table or the Docking Module as well as in the baseline SAMS capture
mode providing the docking system is effective for the much lower dynamics of
Soft Docking. The soft docking system may involve a remotely controlled
docking latch activity similar to the SAMS grappler capture concepts.
F.7 ROTATING PAYLOADS
The information concerning placement and retrieval of rotating payloads is
given in succeeding paragraphs.
F.7.1 Rotating Payloads Release
Some Payloads rely upon rotation for general attitude stabilization. The
rotation can be established before Payload Release or in some cases may be
initiated immediately after Release. In the first case the required rotation
system may be payload self contained or Shuttle deployment system mounted.
Such a system does not exist on the baseline SAMS or in the Tilt table concept.
The dynamically balanced Payload spin up while attached to the SAMS has a
potential hazard to overloading the SAMS should an imbalance develop. The
Tilt table, on the other hand, could be structurally adequate for a considerable
imbalance risk.
In the second case, Payload self rotation immediately after release could ex-
pose the orbiter to contamination or to impact risks should imbalance develop.
Some self rotating payloads deploy booms and panels before initiating rotation,
thus, their swept volume in rotation can influence Orbiter Separation distances.
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Payload disturbances in rotation generally are small with wobble angles,
substantially less than one fourth of a degree. Differences in dynamic con-
ditions can change the disturbance particularly where considerable Payload
Mass changes occur such as in the Solid propellant burn of an apogee motor
attached to the satellite. Present Delta launch vehicles release many
varieties of rotating Spacecraft with and without impulse motors and the pay-
loads are able to tolerate up to the Delta limit of 3 degrees half cone
angle of wobble tip-off disturbance.
Direct rotating spacecraft release from the orbiter in low earth orbit is
expected to be an infrequent occurrence. When spacecraft rotation is required,
it may be readily initiated after orbiter release and separation.
F.7.2 Rotating Payloads Retrieval
Some payloads to be retrieved may be in a spinning mode for stabilization and
would be in danger of tumbling should an attempt be made to despin before
Micro-rendezvous and orbiter capture. Capture of a spinning spacecraft in-
volves a capture engagement system that makes the initial engagement and a
system for despinning the spacecraft after capture so that it can be prepared
and stowed in the Payload Bay. This spinning capture grappler and the despin
system are not incorporated in the SAMS or in the Tilt-table concepts.
A number of spinning spacecraft involve a spacecraft spinning element and
another spacecraft element that is non-rotating such as despun platform.
A similar condition exists where a non-spinning spacecraft has on board
momentum wheels. The difference is primarily whether the spacecraft capture
fitting is stationary or is rotating and thus what orbiter capture system
will match. Examples of spacecraft of each type are shown in Figure F-14.
The DSCS-II spacecraft spins at about 60 RPM and has an antenna platform that
is despun. Spacecraft capture occurs on the spinning element. After the
spinning portion is captured and the spin rate is decreased, the de-spun
platform will start to rotate due to friction after its electric spin motor
is off. Once the spin rates of the spacecraft coincides with the platform
rate, the platform starts to despin and after some 20 minutes both elements
come to rest. During this time a maximum platform rate of 15 RPM is attained.
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FIGURE F-14
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The second example shown in the figure is a slow spinning spacecraft with a
high speed momentum wheel. Once the capture has been made the low spin rate
of the spacecraft can be braked in about 5 minutes. However, it is necessary
to use the electric spin motor as a brake to stop the momentum wheel in a
reasonable length of time. This takes about 2 hours to protect the wheel
bearings. During this time the spacecraft attitude rates must be held to
less than 0.2 deg/sec with up to 3 deg/sec rates acceptable for short periods
of up to a few minutes in order to not damage the momentum wheels.
Both of these example spacecraft are Space Tug retrieval from Geosynchronous
orbit cases. Should they be representative of low earth orbit retrievals,
the extended spin down periods 20 minutes and 2 hours present problems for SAMS
capture and retrieval. The SAMS forces and moments capabilities could be
reduced or could even be overpowered by Spacecraft gryoscopic reactions if
spacecraft angular movements are large while rotating. The alternative
of SAMS capture and remaining inertially fixed for one third up to 2 hours
borders on the impractical. Another factor is the potential risk of intro-
ducing imbalance in the rotating payload while attached to the SAMS with the
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possibility of overloading the SAMS.
F.7.3 Rotating Tip-Off at Capture
The low wobble angles and attitude rates listed in the figure are well within
capture closure capabilities. The question then is whether the capture
activity introduces disturbing forces that seriously aggrevate the wobble
rate. The characteristics of the special design grapple for rotation capture
will determine whether a risk exists. The large area cone engagement concept
shown on the DSCS II in Figure F-14 will minimize these disturbances.
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ERRATA NOTE FOR APPENDIX G
The Safety portion of this report includes MDAC interpreta-
tions of the NASA safety requirements contained in an early draft
version of Section 11, Vol. XIV, JSC 07700, and does not
necessarily reflect the NASA position. Subsequent to the analysis
in this section, the JSC Safety Office has advised that Shuttle
safety criteria have been extensively revised. The latest NASA
documents should be consulted for the current safety criteria.
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Appendix G
PAYLOAD SHUTTLE SAFETY ANALYSIS
This task involves the determination of the impacts of Shuttle safety criteria
on payloads. The available criteria were considered for all regimes of Shuttle
flight, including payload ferry flight, as well as operational phases in-
cluding loading, mating, delay launch, and unloading of the payload. The im-
pacts of multiple flights of the same payload were evaluated with respect to
the Shuttle safety criteria. The task results consist of definitions of
Shuttle safety criteria impacts on payload system design, systems functions,
and system instrumentation.
The trend in Shuttle safety criteria definition indicates that significant
safety management problems exist including the payload line of responsibility
and the authority interactions between major payload elements. Payload manage-
ment procedures are beginning to evolve and can influence payload costs in the
degree of safety documentation, testing, demonstrations and reviews. Pro-
cedures and process time are also important. A second area of payload impact
is the design impacts and the operations impacts of particular criteria items.
In the evolving criteria items there are several significant design impact
areas, some appear to be more stringent than the Shuttle, and others may develop
as more criteria evolve. Some payload impacts are not clearly Shuttle safety
oriented. Considerable criteria work remains to be done in definitions, per-
formance objectives and correlation with other Shuttle documents. Payload
impacts for the various flight modes will depend upon later criteria develop-
ment since the present criteria are primarily launch and flight oriented.
Recommended payload safety criteria are proposed.
G.1 SHUTTLE SAFETY PAYLOAD EVOLUTION
The evolving Shuttle definitions and documentations are dynamic, partially com-
plete and not always detail coordinated; however, sufficient insight into the
thrust of safety criteria is available to usefully examine possible payload
impacts.
Table G-l, with the publication of the Shuttle Level II requirements in the
JSC 07700 documents, Ref. G-1, payload safety considerations are beginning to
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is TABLE G-1 40486
SHUTTLE PAYLOAD SAFETY EVOLUTION-1973
SHUTTLE LEVEL II JSC 07700 REQUIREMENTS:
-VOLUME XIV PAYLOAD ACCOMMODATIONS
SECTION 11.0 ADDED STATING "PAYLOAD SUPPLIERS MEET NASA SAFETY REQUIREMENTS."
PAYLOAD SUPPLIERS RESPONSIBLE TO NASA FOR:
A. DETERMINE HAZARDS, TAKE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
B. ASSURE COMPATIBILITY OF PAYLOAD AND SHUTTLE INTERFACES
C. DETERMINE RESIDUAL HAZARDS AND INTERFACE INCOMPATIBILITIES
ORBITER SAFETY EQUIPMENT AND CAPABILITIES TBD
-VOLUME XIII SAFETY, RELIABILITY AND QUALITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
HEADQUARTERS NHB 5300.4 (1D) BECOMES VOLUME XIII
NHB 5300.4 (1D) SETS FORTH SAFETY PROGRAM PROCEDURES
ITEMS NOT COVERED INCLUDE:
- PAYLOAD SAFETY CRITERIA
- PAYLOAD CRITERIA RELATIVE TO SHUTTLE CRITERIA, I.E. SAFETY FACTORS, ETC
- PAYLOAD DOCUMENTATION PROCESSING FLOW AND SCHEDULES
- VOLUME X FLIGHT AND GROUND SYSTEM SPECIFICATION
3.2.2.1.5.2 ULTIMATE FACTORS OF SAFETY FOR PRESSURE VESSESL - PRESSURE ALONE
WAS REDUCED FROM > 2.0 TO >1.5
3.2.1.1.11 RESULTANT FLIGHT LOADS - THE 3.0 G LOAD FACTORS DO NOT INCLUDE
DYNAMIC EFFECTS AND DO NOT APPLY TO ABORT MODES
3.3.1.3.3.2 FLUID SYSTEM INTERFACE - EARTH STORABLE PROPELLANTS SHALL BE
LOADED PRIOR TO INSTALLING THE PAYLOAD INTO THE PAYLOAD BAY
be defined. Volume XIV initiates payload safety recognition in Section 11.0,
Reference G-lb. Later expansions of Section 11.0 will guide payload designs
and palnning. Since the payload is to a degree dependent upon Orbiter
safety equipment and capabilities, the yet-to-be published Orbiter data are
anticipated.
Volume XIII, Draft Reference G-lc, has been distributed which is a carbon copy
of the NASA Headquarters NHB 5300.4 (ID), Reference G-2. These publications
set forth only program procedures for only NASA centers and NASA contractors.
There is a need for payload safety criteria, Shuttle-related safety factors,
and safety documentation and procedure flows, which are not covered in either
Reference G-lc or G-2.
The NASA NHB 5300.4 (1D) and Volume XIII calls out the safety procedures for
NASA centers and for NASA-contracted payloads. Presumably, it will also apply
to NASA-contracted payload integrated activities.
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There are non-NASA-contracted payloads called for in mission models that may
be integrated at NASA-contracted payload integration centers or could be
integrated at other payload integration centers. The applicability of Shuttle
payload safety criteria to these non-NASA activities and the method of applying
the criteria are uncertain and unspecified at this time. It would be reason-
able to assume that they would parallel those of NASA-contracted activities.
Volume X, Reference G-la, the Orbiter specification, has three items that in-
fluence payload safety design. One is the reduction of safety factors for
pressure vessels from 2.0 to 1.5 which could relieve some payload vessel
weights. Second, the dynamic effects and the abort-mode flight loads on pay-
loads are not specified; this presently precludes payload verification of
structural adequacy. Third, the specification of storable propellant pre-
loading before the payload is mounted in the Orbiter can influence vent and
dumping provisions that could affect payload tank design safety margins.
Orbiter performance for the micro-stationkeeping specified for the SAMS is not
included in Volume X, which could influence the certainty of what may be a
demanding performance objective.
The greatest detail available on safety criteria appears in the Draft Version,
7 June, for Volume XIV JSC 07700, Section 11.0, "Safety Assurance for Space
Shuttle Payloads," Reference G-3. This draft is under active coordination and
can be expected to substantially change soon. For these reasons, the details
of the draft may be soft, however, the general philosophy and the general
directions appear to be representative.
The draft Section 11.0 addresses two major safety criteria areas: (1) payload
safety management, and (2) payload safety design constraints, Table G-2. In
the management discussion, the responsibility for payload safety is discussed,
the scope of payload safety is broached and considerable detail of payload
safety accountability activities are covered. A major portion of the draft
Section 11.0 contains payload design constraints that ellicit particulars in
expected payload safety provisions.
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TABLE G-2
SHUTTLE PAYLOAD SAFETY CRITERIA
PAYLOAD SAFETY MANAGEMENT
- RESPONSIBILITY PATH
- SAFETY SCOPE
o SHUTTLE SAFETY
o ELEMENTS CONSIDERED
- ACCOUNTABILITY ACTIVITIES
o ANALYSIS
o CORRECTIVE ACTION
- DESIGN
- VERIFICATION
- TESTS
o DOCUMENTATION
o REVIEWS
DESIGN CONSTRAINTS
- PERFORMANCE
- DESIGN SOLUTIONS
- DESIGN PROHIBITIONS
REF: 7 JUNE DRAFT SECTION 11.0
VOL XIV JSC 0770
G.1.1 Total Shuttle Payloads Safety Responsibility
The total payload responsibility for safety includes hazards control that are
potential risks to:
a. The Shuttle's capability to successfully terminate the mission which
includes the intact crew, Shuttle and payload land recovery.
b. The payload's capability to successfully carry out its mission in-
cluding its ability to successfully terminate the mission with intact
payload landing.
c. The payload hazard control of industrial operations associated with the
payload activities.
d. The payload hazard control of public safety associated with the payload
activities.
G-4
The hazards of interest are those that present the risks of:
- Loss of life crew, ground personnel, public
- Injury crew, ground personnel, public
- Property loss Shuttle, Payload, GSE, facilities, public's
property
- Property damage Shuttle, Payload, GSE, facilities, public's
property
The payload safety provisions are required for the various mission phases as
shown in Figure G-1. The safety criteria coverage in the 7 June Draft,
Section 11.0, covers the two areas blocked out in Figure G-l.
There are major overlapping effects of payload safety features that are incor-
porated for one mission phase in many other mission phases either in partial
risk or total risk control. The launch complex safety considerations are
substantially enhanced by the payload design and flight safety actions. How-
ever, the Launch Program Office is the management control for the functions
boxed in by the dashed lines. These requirements and their solutions may or
may not be concurrently resolved along with the flight safety features. Past
practice has been that the launch complex resolves their safety criteria on
the flight hardware presented for flight and can redo previous safety pro-
visions. Durin7 the Shuttle era, a ioal is to solve thes- issues nrior to
being sent to the launch site.
The NASA as an organization has an interest in all of the payload safety pro-
visions checked in the figure. The NASA management of the un-boxed items is
unclear at this time.
G.1.2 Shuttle Safety Management for Payloads
The safety management plan, Figure G-2, is based upon a two-party integration,
the Space Shuttle Program Office on one hand, and the Payload supplier on the
other hand. Recognition of a slightly different situation for multiple pay-
loads in a mission is resolved by appointing one of the owner/operators to
represent the integrated payload to the Shuttle Program Office. This two-party
integration calls for the payload supplier (the owner/operator) to be account-
able for the entire payload. This accountability required (1) the performance
of payload hazard analysis with its follow-up, (2) hazard resolution, (3)
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FIGURE G-1 41410
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preparation of safety documentation, (4) condition of safety reviews, and
(5) completing reports and tests.
The payload supplier is directly accountable to the Shuttle Program Office.
The experiment developer/supplier (PI), on the other hand, is answerable
only to the payload supplier. The Volume XIV criteria draft, Section 11.0,
specifically states that it is not the intent to impose the criteria upon
the experiment developer/supplier. Also there is no requirement for safety
traceability of the criteria beyond the payload supplier. The extent of the
criteria application by the payload supplier to the experiment developer/
supplier is thus soft and uncertain.
G.2 PAYLOAD CARRIERS
The Draft Section 11.0 safety criteria requirements are levied upon the pay-
load carriers in their design and development. Since these carriers include
the Sortie Lab/Space Lab, pallets, Tug, propulsive stages and free-flyers
(presumed to be spacecraft and satellites less their sensors), the criti-
cality of the compliance of the experiment, instrument and sensor/developer/
supplier is tempered by their transport and support on the payload carriers.
Many of the payload carriers will be NASA Contract developed and procured,
hence, safety criteria applications will be a matter for contract performance.
There could be some payload carriers, Space Lab, and some propulsive stages
and spacecraft that are not NASA contract developments. These could present
some safety compliance problems especially where the criteria have significant
impact and where new requirements are being introduced.
The Space Shuttle Program Office relationship to the payload supplier is that
of assessing the payload hazards and accepting the payload risks. These pay-
load hazards and risks are those associated with the mission safety of the
Shuttle/payload integration system only. Those other hazards or risks only
associated with payload mission objective achievements are not of concern to
the Shuttle Program Office. There are certain Shuttle Program Office approvals
required of the payload supplier's safety activities as listed in Figure G-2.
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No criteria or advice is offered (in the draft, Section 11.0) to guide the
payload supplier toward other safety compliance activities, other than the
Shuttle mission safety, that may be required of the payload in fulfilling
other NASA safety obligations.
G.2.1 Payload Accountability
The responsibility of the payload supplier to the Shuttle Program Office is
defined in the criteria draft, Section 11.0, in some detail for the five
categories previously listed. These five groups are detailed in Figure G-3.
The specified analysis appear to follow the standard hazard analysis pro-
cedures with the exception that a separate "safety analysis" is specified
but is not defined. The hazard analysis then becomes the guide to payload
corrective actions in hazard resolution which follows the standard NASA
procedures. Documentation of these analyses and corrective actions plus the
associated instructions, reports, and etc. is also a payload supplier
activity as well as the requirement that he conduct hazard reduction verifi-
cations in the area of tests, analysis and demonstrations. The eventual
formal safety reviews/assessments are also conducted by the payload supplier.
When all of these accountability activities are acceptable to the Shuttle
Program Office, the approvals listed in Figure G-2 will complete the pre-
flight safety preparation actions for the Shuttle Program Office.
G.2.2 Criteria Design Constraints
The Draft Section 11.0 criteria has a major emphasis on design for safety that
is organized into a general listing of design items and a subsystems design
item listing. Some of the design items are performance oriented, others are
in effect design solutions while others are design prohibitions. The listings
are partially complete and thus can be considered to be samples/examples.
There is a broad sprinkling of the manned rating requirements throughout and
a significant emphasis on nuclear systems. The design constraints in effect
define the design hazards that are of concern to the Shuttle which the pay-
loads are expected to resolve before flight. There is no listing of operational
constraints although some design constraints have operational implications.
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G.2.3 Safety Criteria Management Impacts on Payloads
The Draft Section 11.0 safety criteria management concept calls for a single
payload spokesman to be accountable to the Shuttle Program Office. The
identity of this spokesman could vary with different payload Shuttle Program
concepts.
G.2.4 Payload Integration
One concept involves the "ship and shoot" solution where the total payload
package is assembled at a remote facility. Another concept calls for the total
payload package to be assembled at the Shuttle launch complex such as for
Tug missions. It appears that even with ship and shoot, there will be final
total payload package integration activity at the Shuttle site before the total
payload package can be loaded in the Shuttle. It is possible that some total
payload packaging will take place at one or more remote sites while other
payloads will be packaged at the launch complex. It would then be conceiv-
able that a final integration of each of these total payload packages at the
launch complex is required before Shuttle loading. It is likewise possible
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that each packager and each integrator is a distinct organization group that
becomes specialists because of the need for low costs, timely performance and
expertize in achieving flight readiness. Is the single payload spokesman
then the total payload packager or the final payload integrator?
The magnitude of the final integration activity at the launch complex that
is required to place a total payload package in the Shuttle will influence the
relative importance of the final integrator vs. the total payload packager.
A combination of limited payload GSE, significant ground tests and the
frequent use of common FSE from mission to mission will enlarge the final
integration activities and will have safety related impacts.
G.2.5 Payload Liability
Another factor in the responsibility of a single payload spokesman, in
addition to the payload liability for technical and operational safety, is
the payload liability for costs arising from payload involved Shuttle damage
or even a Shuttle catastrophe. As the Shuttle Program tends to seek compen-
sation for actual services rendered from a wide range of payloads, a defi-
nition of the conditions under which a payload is held harmless becomes impor-
tant. Technical and financial risks to the single payload spokesman influences
the depth of his activities and his costs. If the final integrator is
relieved of this liability, then the spokesman may be the total payload
packager.
G.3 SATELLITE DEVELOPER
In any event the satellite developer/supplier is unlikely to be the total pay-
load packager and most certainly will not be the final integrator. There-
fore, under the draft Section 11.0 criteria, the satellite developer/supplier
is responsible to the single payload spokesman for such safety criteria as the
spokesman elects to levy. This uncertainty impacts safety management and
could lead to varying responsiveness to safety criteria at the satellite
design level. Clarification of the applicability of Shuttle safety criteria
down to the design responsible levels will assist the payload spokesman and
the satellite developer and contribute to the Shuttle Program Office eventual
desire for hazard tracking and traceability.
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The satellite developer/supplier in present missions selects and oversees the
satellite integration with the expendable launch vehicle. One concept in the
Shuttle-Tug era calls for the Tug being responsible for satellite integration
with the Tug and Tug integration with the Shuttle. This reversal of the
satellite developer/supplier role with the stage would tend to further de-
press the satellite position within the Shuttle mission hierarchy. Further-
more the Tug taking over dominate spokesman status with the Shuttle can
raise issues. Direct access of the satellite developer/supplier to the final
Shuttle integration process can be a factor influencing whether a single pay-
load spokesman can be workable or whether a payload group speaks to the
Shuttle on safety matters.
G.3.1 Safety Documentation
Adequate safety documentation is necessary in a complex multi-element activity
as in the Shuttle missions and a multi-layer of payload elements under the
single spokesman must be managed to avoid self serving documentation. Docu-
mentation examples and depth definition will materially assist in delegating
safety documentation to the sources of data with a minimum of duplication.
Documentation timeliness and expeditious processing will also be assisted by
guidelines in document flow and flow timelines.
G.3.2 Hazard Reduction Verification
Hazard reduction actions in most cases will be performed by a payload developer
rather than the sin gle payload spokesman. These actions are directly asso-
ciated with the hazard analysis and with the hazards tracking system. Tem-
perance in calling for tests, analysis and demonstrations will assist in
timely corrective actions and help control costs. The payload impacts can be
reduced by the availability of carefully prepared safety performance criteria
and in the maintenance of lists of qualified systems, procedures, and design
solutions to safety.
G.3.3 Safety Reviews
Formal program reviews for each Shuttle mission will develop a highly exper-
ienced Shuttle cadre. Their impact on infrequent or one time payload spokesman
has potential complications at formal safety reviews. Experienced continuing
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participant single spokesman such as the total payload packager or the final
integrator should produce routine reviews providing that the analysis, veri-
fication and documentation has been managed.
G.3.4 Management Impacts Review
An examination of the responsible payload groups representing: (1) the
sources - the Sortie Lab, the Spacecraft/Satellite, the Space Tug, Propulsive
Stages, Flight Support Equipment and the Experiments and sensors, (2) the
handlers - the payload packager, the payload integrator, the payload refur-
bisher, and (3) the major payload sponsor such as NASA Centers, DOD and etc.,
points up the variety of payload safety interested parties. Some aspects of
payloads safety are treated early in the genesis - design solutions, others
are confirmed or demonstrated in tests at various development and packaging/
integration stages. It therefore is not readily evident that a single pay-
load spokesman on safety can be practical.
The uncertainty of a single spokesman for payload safety opens up the question
of whether also a single spokesman can be assured for the space transportation
system, Figure G-4. The possible sources of safety direction and payload
safety reviews may be eventually focused into one authority so that the draft
criteria objective for a two-party safety operation could be realized. At
present, the scope of the draft criteria as generalized previously in Figure
G-l, does not appear to cover the total safety needs.
When total payload effectiveness and liability are considered as well as pay-
load costs in procedures, documentation and time, payload safety can become
a significant management problem as suggested in Figure G-5 for only the
Shuttle-related safety. The payload safety workload is appreciable in the
analysis, resolutions, reviews, and demonstrations even when it is accomplished
"on-line." If redo or retro work is involved especially where some sources
of safety direction only become active later in the flight readiness schedule,
work and schedule impacts become serious. Likewise documentation and liabili-
ties will influence safety costs particularly for missions that involve several
major payload components as suggested in Figure G-4.
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G.3.5 Impacts of Shuttle Safety Criteria Payload Hardware
The draft Section 11.0 criteria has a major portion of its criteria items
lists devoted to "subsystem safety design requirements." These requirements
can be expected to be refined, consolidated and clarified in the on-going
coordination of the draft; therefore, only the most general criteria items
impacts are detailed here. Also many of the listed manned flight 
criteria
appear to be basic design considerations that will be inherently included
thus design impacts are not examined. Likewise most of the nuclear systems
items appear to be basic design considerations that will be inherently in-
cluded; thus no design impacts are listed. These criteria, however, are
proper to the listing in order to establish the foundation for safe system
designs.
G.3.6 Specific Design Impacts
A number of the payload design impacts have been anticipated from the basic
Shuttle requirements such as a payload caution and warning system for
Shuttle monitor and control and these are included in Table G-3. Payloads
fluids management are also covered including venting, dumping and launch pad
unloading. Other design safety requirements are new and in some respects
demanding, Table G-4. For example, the requirement for payload caution and
warning surveillance and control after separation from the Orbiter could re-
quire a new RF two way communications system for most payloads as well as the
Space Tug or other stages for status of the propulsion system and the start
system logic. The Shuttle specification calls for payload hardwired caution
and warning signals and control capability. No mention is made of RF payload
caution and warning surveillance in Reference Gl-a. Similarly, no reference
to payload jettison is made in this Shuttle specification Reference Gl-a;
therefore it could be assumed that the required payload jettison provisions must
be wholly contained within payload systems which could require remote unlatch
provisions, umbilical and wiring and piping severence systems and possibly even
a payload provided deployment system.
Another example of safety criteria that appears to exceed the needs for pro-
tection of the Shuttle is the general criteria for payload design for minimum
hazard which specifies a major goal is for payload features that fail
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TABLE G-3
PAYLOAD DESIGN IMPACTS
CRITERIA ITEM DESIGN IMPACTS ELEMENT IMPACTED CRITERIA ITEM DESIGN IMPACTS ELEMENT IMPACTED
Caution & Warninn System New sensors and wiring - Payload carrier Prohibit stage firing Add: interlock on engine - Payload carrier
- Monitorinn narameters New controls 
- Experiments or propellant dump in start, interlock and dump
- Commands to control 
- FSE payload bay valves, or pipe dump lines - Orbiter
to Orbiter overboard dampPayload attached: Umbilical or RF
Deployment Umbilical or RF - Payload carrier Flammable or corrosive Add piping to Orbiter - Payload carrier
Retraction/retrieval Bay wiring raceway fluids vent vents 
- Experiments
Launch and reentry 
- Orbiter
(On-orbit not covered) - Orbiter
Time limited dump or When time established, some 
- Payload carrier
Payload detached New two-way communication - Payload carrier vent of fluids (TBD) fluid systems may have - Experiments
system with data and - FSE seconds enlarged plumbing 
- FSE
command links and crew 
- Orbiter
station (Orbiter spec only
requires hardwired C&W) Payload tanks automatic Add relief or vent valves - Payload carrier
maximum pressure limits and plumbing 
- ExperimentsPayload jettison provisions New attachment fittinos and - Payload carrier 
- FSE
mechanical actuators 
- FSE 
- Orbiter(Orbiter has no jettison
function spec requirements) Redundancy fluid lines Separate location from - Payload carrier
and wiring primary line (Orbiter 
- Experiments
Fluids dump or contained Dump system new or beef-up - Payload carrier interfaces not defined - FSE
in crash landing fluid tanks and olumbing - Experiments as separate) 
- Orbiter
- FSE
Positive sealing disconnected Add sealing fittinq 
- Payload carrier
Vent control durinn EVA Add vent controls or - Payload carrier pressurized fluid lines 
- FSE
plumbin to direct venting - Experiments
- FSE Tanks, tunnel, pressure Structural beef-up 
- Payload carrier
vessel (TBD) design 
- ExperimentsIntegrated checkout and test 
- Payload carriers factors of safety 
- FSEsafety critical payload systems 
- Experiments
- Prior to installation Add test simulations - GSE Post deployment activation Add two level controls, - Propulsive stages
- Verify after installation Add verification tests propellant pressurization valvinq and vent system - RCS payload
to system operating pressures carriersRemote activate, disable and Add activate and disable - Payload carriers
control hazard systems controls (related to - Experiments Emergency removal of Add dump system and 
- Payload carriers
- Deployment C&W item) propellants umbilicals 
- FSE
- Retrieval 
- GSE
- EVA operations
Valve lockout from induced Add valve lockout 
- Payload carrier
flight loads (qround features 
- Experimentsloads not specified)
- FSE
TABLE G-3 (CONTINUED) TABLE G-4
PAYLOAD DESIGN IMPACTS PAYLOAD SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
POSSIBLY IN EXCESS OF SHUTTLE SPECIFICATION
CRITERIA SHUTTLE DESIGN ELEMENT
CRITERIA ITEM DESIGN IMPACTS ELEMENT IMPACTED ITEM REOUIREMENT IMPACTS IMPACTED
Caution and warning C&W hardwire RF two-way link - Payload carrier
Propulsion start logic New RF communication - Propulsive stages safety critical to light matrix Payload to Orbiter - Experiments
status and valve link to Orbiter with parameter detached detached
positions data, add sensors payloads
for status
Caution and warning C&W hardwire New audible units - Payload carrier
Battery vents Add vented batteries - Payload carrier audible signal to light matrix power - Experiments
and plumbing to Orbiter - Experiments Orbiter and EVA
- FSE
- GSE Payload jettison Silent New attach fittings - Payload carrier
Eleectrical umbilical Payload ability to - FSEprovisions 
actuators - FSE
disconnect separated from comply at Orbiter umbilical - GSE Payload tanks Silent New vent on some - Payload carrier
hazardous fluids panel dependent on Orbiter automatic maximum safe operation tanks - Experiments
disconnects isolation pressure limits - FSE
Payload caution and Add new audible alarm - Payload carrier Redundant fluid T-O umbilical Separation from - Payload carrier
warning alarms audible system in addition to - FSE lines and wiring only separation primary lines - Experiments
Shuttle alarm signal lights separation 
- FSE
- Orbiter
Available in Orbiter and Unclear how payload can Uncertain
EVA personnel comply Post deployment Silent Add two level - Propulsive stages
activation controls, valvinn - RCS payload
Module noise level to not Add acoustical attenuation - Payload carrier propellant Dress, and vent system carrier
exceed 72.5 db to isolate module from to operating pressure
Orbiter environment
Electrical umbilical Orbiter panel Separate umbilical - FSE
Thermal control nuclear Add thermal loops and - Payload carrier disconnect separated details limited panels - GSE
payloads umbilical - FSE from hazardous - Orbiter
- GSE fluids disconnect
Module noise level Shuttle Payload sound - Payload carrier
to not exceed environment in attenuation
72.5 db bay 145 OASPL
0
Operational/fail safe, Reference G-3, para. 11.2.2.3.a, when in fact payloads
that fail safe satisfy the Shuttle needs for successful mission termination,
Reference G-3, para. 11.2.3.l.a.
G.3.7 Redundant Lines
Redundant fluid lines and wiring for payloads and their reasonable location
separation is a nominal safety design, but it is meaningless unless the
Shuttle provides matching separated redundant interfaces and bay raceways.
Confirmation of that Shuttle provision has been missing except for the um-
blical plates at T-O on the aft fuselage quarter panels. Another new-beyond
the Shuttle specification is the requirement for an "audible" warning alarm.
The Shuttle called for an alarm light matrix. The payload ability to provide
audible alarms in the Orbiter and for EVA personnel is unclear. Also the
need for 72.5 db level in payloads when it is unclear that the Shuttle can
provide that low a level could call for special payload performance.
G.4 PAYLOAD SELF-SAFE
The general requirements that the payload be fail safe and that it provide
various safe design features are consistent with the general objectives of the
Space Tug which is planned to be totally safe while in the Shuttle and con-
sequently will have no potential hazards for which Shuttle caution and warning
alarms would be needed. If the Shuttle calls for Tug caution and warning
alarms, it will be for the Shuttle information objectives and would not be
related to potential Shuttle hazards. Tug compliance with the combination of
the draft Section 11.0 criteria items specifically directed toward the Tug could
result in such a totally safe Tug. For example: (1) Tug isolated from Orbi-
ter support shall be in a safe condition, (2) Tug designed to operate in a
quiescent mode during launch and reentry phases, (3) interlocks to prevent
propulsion system firing or propellants dumping in the payload bay, (h)
passive Tug with post separation and safe distance activation of systems and
pressurization of propellants, (5) induced flight loads cannot initiate Tug
valve control events, and (6) Tug propulsion system start sequence logic
status and valve positions shall be monitored and signals provided to the
Orbiter.
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Tug compliance with the first five criteria should result in there being no
potential hazard to the Shuttle and thus the data required for item 6
appears to not be caution and warning data (it is not so worded in the
criteria); but represents general information to the Shuttle. If Tug
start sequence logic status and valve positions are considered to be Orbiter
safety critical parameters, then the draft Section 11.0 general requirement
would call for Orbiter monitor and control of the Tug parameters under
detached deployment conditions.
G.4.1 Caution and Warning
Other Orbiter caution and warning monitor and control conditions may force
payloads to provide RF link caution and warning services while attached to
the Orbiter. Payload deployment to a release position by the SAMS (manipu-
lator) would require either a payload umbilical to the Orbiter or an RF link
for the deployment criteria item. The umbilical concept poses a problem in
the umbilical separation action and umbilical management. A swing arm umbili-
cal could be one concept; however, if the C&W monitor and control is enforced
for detached payloads, an RF link would be required and the umbilical be-
comes duplication.
A separate facet in the caution and warning system is the new requirement for
audible alarms in the Orbiter and to EVA. The type of audible system and the
electrical power needed to drive it influences the payload caution and warning
system. The payload audible annunciators also must be intimately located with-
in the Orbiter and within the EVA system. Reduction of impacts of this
requirement would be achieved by requiring the payload to produce the caution
and warning signals to power a light matrix in the Orbiter and to power a
master caution and warning light. The Orbiter can then manage these light
signals as desired to produce the Orbiter and EVA audible alarms.
A third impact on the payload caution and warning concept is the criteria
objective to "kill payload power" under emergency conditions. The power to
operate the caution and warning sensors and power the alarm lights in the
Orbiter should be a separate power system that remains active in emergencies.
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A redundant caution and warning system could be improved by its own dedicated
power system. Separate power may also be desired for the caution and warning
diagnostic measurements and for the caution and warning controls that arrest
or solve a developing hazard. The desired payload passivation by powering
down would appear to be a sequential action with the caution and warning
system power, one of the last power systems to be powered down.
G.4.2 Design Impacts Review
These design criteria are subject to ongoing changes; however, they can be
generalized into three areas as follows and as outlined in Table G-5. Cer-
tain of the criteria appear to exceed Shuttle features. This greater level
of payload safety in itself may not be undesirable especially considering the
isolated in payload bay conditions. However, some criteria can impact
Shuttle interfaces such as the caution and warning audible signal or the need
for a payload dedicated ground return wire where the Shuttle uses a structural
return. Also, where payload safety generates non productive payload complexi-
ties and added costs, the payload sponsor can challenge the need for a two-
class safety arrangement, Shuttle class and payload class.
Another group of criteria appear to require payload safety performance in
excess of the Shuttle needs. Th Shuttle needs are to manage payload hazards to
Shuttle successful mission termination, Table G-5. A fail safe payload appears
to satisfy the basic reauirement of the Shuttle on the payload. A higher level
of payload safety performance such as fail operational/fail safe or even fail
safe/fail safe would appear to not enhance the Shuttle's capability to successful
mission termination. Payload fail operational/fail safe features appear to be
outside of the Shuttle safety area of formal concern although the payload feature
may be desired by NASA or others for other performance/assurance reasons.
Likewise, payload fail safe/fail safe appears to go beyond Shuttle formal concerns.
A fail safe payload that is reauired to be jettisoned is bein7 jettisoned for
reasons other than payload hazards to the Shuttle arising from a payload initiated
hazard. The fail safe/fail safe concept is so broad that unproductive payload
safety effort may be involved, hence a workable arrangement would be where
specific fail safe/fail safe features are only levied on the payload; for example,
a double walled sealed pressure vessel to contain micro-biological experiments
while in the Orbiter.
G-Q1
TABLE G-5
SHUTTLE PAYLOAD SAFETY CRITERIA
CRITERIA MAY EXCEED SHUTTLE FEATURES SHUTTLE SPECIFIED
PAYLOAD CAUTION AND WARNING
- DETACHED PAYLOAD ACTIVE SILENT
- AUDIBLE SIGNAL LIGHT MATRIX
PAYLOAD JETTISON SILENT - ABORT
LANDING WITH PAYLOAD
AUTOMATIC PRESSURE LIMITS -
PAYLOAD TANKS SILENT
REDUNDANT FLUID LINES- WIRING PARTIAL
UMBILICAL ELECTRICAL
- SEPARATION FROM FLUIDS PARTIAL
- DEDICATED GROUND WIRE NO
NOISE LEVEL 72.5 DB 145 DB OASPL
VENT PAYLOAD FLUIDS UNRESTRICTED
VENT UNCLEAR
REMOTE PROPELLANT PRESSURIZATION SILENT - SHUTTLE HAS
ACTIVE RCS AND OMS
SCOPE OF CRITERIA UNCLEAR , PERFORMANCE POSSIBLY EXCEEDS SHUTTLE SAFETY NEEDS
SHUTTLE SAFETY OBJECTIVES: CRITERIA STATES: PAYLOAD: COMMENT
ABILITY TO SUCCESSFULLY SILENT FAIL SAFE BASIC PAYLOAD REQUIREMENT
TERMINATE MISSION FOR SHUTTLE SAFETY
- INTACT CREW INFERRED FAIL OPERATIONAL/ WHEN DOES PAYLOAD RESIDUAL
- INTACT SHUTTLE SILENT FAIL SAFE OPERATIONAL CONDITION RELATE
- INTACT PAYLOAD SILENT TO SHUTTLE SAFETY?
REUSABLE SHUTTLE SILENT FAIL SAFE/FAIL SAFE SPECIFIC SOLUTIONS RATHER
OPERATIONS SAFETY PARTIAL THAN GENERAL
ASSOCIATED FUNCTIONS/ELEMENTS: JETTISON PAYLOAD (PAYLOAD IS BASICALLY SAFE)
GROUND SAFETY PARTIAL REMOTE PROPELLANT PRESSURIZATION
INDUSTRIAL SAFETY SILENT MICRO-BIOLOGICAL EXPERIMENTS
POPULATION SAFETY SILENT SELF SAFING NOT COVERED
PROPERTY SAFETY SILENT
A third area is the uncertainty in scope of the criteria, Table G-5. Shuttle
safety objectives are documented in Shuttle specifications, a one for one
correlation with the draft criteria is missing. Also other areas of mission
safety are not covered in the draft design criteria.
It is improper to be conclusive about the draft criteria and their payload
impacts except to observe that payload safety management is important and
deserves close attention. Likewise design and operations criteria are impor-
tant and warrant early refinements.
The draft Section 11.0 subsystem design criteria may be undergoing substantial
modification through coordination with the result that many of these impacts
have been resolved. Those criteria that remain, if they result in these
types of impacts, appear to include the following features.
a. Payload designs are substantially influenced by the criteria in that
new features and some new systems may be added.
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b. The extent to which a number of the criteria are addressed to payload
hazards to the Shuttle is unclear since: (1) the Shuttle safety
objectives are incompletely stated and vary from one Shuttle document
to another; (2) some of the criteria dictate design without clearly
specifying the expected performance; (3) some payload hazards are in-
completely covered, i.e., structural integrity.
c. Some of the criteria appear to establish new and/or additional safety
requirements on the payload in excess of those provided in the Shuttle.
d. Some payload safety related Shuttle systems definitions remain incom-
plete which constrains interpretation of payload compliance impacts.
Some of these are: (1) the payload utilities interfaces in the
orbiter; (2) the payload umbilical system in the Orbiter including
vent, dump and purge provisions; (3) the Orbiter caution and warning
system; and (4) the constraints on the payload deployment and retrieval
and mounting system.
G.h.3 Impacts of Shuttle Safety Criteria in Payload Operations
The Draft Section 11.0 criteria are not organized in a format that groups cer-
tain criteria into "operational safety criteria" although various criteria items
do have operations aspects. Payload safe operations must be considered from
prior to loading to after ground unloading. There may be periods of denial
of payload functions when other Shuttle operations are scheduled. Although
the criteria calls for all payload tanks to have relief valves and vent capa-
bility, venting could be prohibited at certain operational periods.
An important safety feature is a definition of the considerations the safe
distance for Orbiter separation from the payload before acceptable payload
activation is acceptable. For example, a simple, cold gas, limited perfor-
mance, coarse attitude hold mode may be acceptable in the payload shortly
after release from the SAMS, say within a hundred feet of the Orbiter. On the
other hand, full activation of the propulsive stage, the Tug could be denied
until possibly 1,500 feet separation is achieved. Even though these distances
are subject to refinement, a general indication would be helpful including the
elapse of time, say "1,500 feet (TBD) separation and not less than 300 seconds
(TBD) after release."
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G.5 SHUTTLE SAFETY IMPACTS ON FLIGHT REGIMES
The payload flight regimes covered in the draft Section 11.0 criteria are
primarily the flight mode with a few references-to launch pad features such
as the ability for emergency removal of payload propellants. The flight mode
impacts are probably the most demanding in that the payload is fully loaded,
the Shuttle flight environment is relatively severe and the emergency pro-
visions for Shuttle successful mission termination are limited and dependent
upon precise operational performance.
Payload ferry flight and payload unloading involve a relatively quiescent pay-
load normally without propellant and able to utilize conservative support
for improved safety with impacts only on the GSE. Payload safety impact for
launch complex total packaging, final integration, Shuttle loading, Shuttle
mating, Shuttle transport, and launch pad operations including pad payload
checkout is dependent upon the launch facilities center safety criteria which
have not been disseminated. If these launch safety criteria can be included
in the Space Shuttle Program safety criteria and joint center management of
hazard analysis, hazard reduction and hazard tracking, it would be possible
to incorporate accepted hazard reductions in the course of payload design
and development. If joint safety approvals cannot be obtained, there will be
a launch complex safety design, review, documentation and approval conducted
to the launch center's criteria in addition to and after the program office
criteria accommodation.
Payload safety criteria related to Apollo and to Skylab could be involved and
rework of safety features to the program office criteria could occur. Areas of
safety impacts would also be expected in payload preloaded propellants and the
complexity of safety services for a variety of payload movement, Shuttle
loading, Shuttle mating and transport. The ability to vent, emergency unload
and etc. may be intermittent and limited. Another impact could be the thermal,
purge and cleanliness environment of prelaunch activities from the point of
loading to launch. A third safety impact could be in the area of the limited
access to the payload prior to launch with the limited visual inspection and
timely access in case of an alarm. Last minute loading of time critical and in
some cases hazardous elements such as the nuclear elements RTG's as well as
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pyrotechnics processing places a stress on safety. Safety criteria need to
be developed for all flight regimes to complete the Shuttle advice to payloads.
G.6 RECOMMENDED SHUTTLE SAFETY CRITERIA FOR PAYLOADS
The following safety criteria (Table G-6) developed in the SOAR-II study for
payloads are recommended for dissemination as Shuttle payload criteria.
TABLE G-6
PAYLOAD SAFETY CRITERIA
The following payload safety criteria are postulated to give general guidance
to developing safety requirements.
Goal - No single or combination of events or malfunctions shall result in
hazardous conditions to personnel or damage to the shuttle or payload.
A. The payload shall not degrade the safety of the Space Shuttle.
Payloads shall be Shuttle-rated for flights in Shuttle missions.
B. Hazard management features shall provide safe conditions for the
crew, Shuttle, and the payload in that order or precedence.
1. The payload shall be fail/safe for Shuttle crew survival afte-
any single payload failure.
2. The payload shall be capable of being rendered safe in the
event of an abort.
3. The payload shall not hazard the Shuttle as a result of a Shuttle
crash landing, by excursion of payload components or fluids
outside of the allowable payload envelope.
4. The payload shall provide self-safing arrangements for payload-
generated hazards to the Shuttle.
C. Crew survivability involving escape shall be given priority in the
form of weight, cargo bay volume, and bay-location dedications
from payload allowables.
D. The payload shall manage hazards generated through interaction
within the payload, with the Shuttle, or with any other program
elements.
General Provisions
A. Catastrophic and critical payload hazards shall be eliminated or
reduced to controlled hazards.
B. All payload components, subsystem, and operations, except primary
structure and pressure vessels, shall be designed to be fail-safe for
Shuttle crew survival after any single oavload failure.
C. Payload elements and subsystems that contain hazardous devices or
material or hazardous operational procedures shall have safety
provisions in the form of emergency procedures, suitable marking,
and identification and self-contained automatic or self-contained
manual protection devices against all payload-generated hazards
and positive verification of hazard management while the payload is
mounted to or in the immediate vicinity of the Orbiter.
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D. For those payload hazards that may result in time-critical emergencies
(an emergency whose occurrence must be detected and corrective
action taken within five minutes or less to prevent failure of a
critical function), provisions shall be made for automatic switching
to a safe mode and to display caution and warning to Shuttle personnel.
E. The fail/safe provisions against payload hazards shall be provided
for payload ground operations, normal Shuttle flight regimes, post-
flight operations, and Shuttle abort conditions.
F. The payload shall provide for its primary structural integrity and
containment of its tanked fluids when exposed to Shuttle crash-
landing loads.
G. All payload subsystems incorporating redundancies which can
influence Shuttle safety shall include a means of verifying satis-
factory operations of each redundant path.
Fire Protection Requirements
A. Materials used in pressurized payloads shall be subjected to the
same flammability control procedures as those used within the
Orbiter pressurized volumes.
B. Fire- and heat-resistant protection shall be provided to payload
command and instrumentation interfaces between Orbiter and payload.
C. Ignition sources in the Orbiter payload bay, such as 
switches and
relays, shall be sealed or otherwise contained so as not 
to cause
ignition of flammable fluids.
Electromagnetic Protection Requirements
A. Capability shall be provided to switch off all electrical power to
payload from the Orbiter, except emergency power that may be
required to maintain a safed payload, or safely shut it down.
B. Adequate protection shall be provided for all high-voltage terminals,
leads and equipment and all other equipment emanating radiation
fields, such as nuclear isotope heat sources.
Ordnance Protection Requirements
A. Destruct charges shall not be incorporated in any payloads when
launched in the Orbiter.
B. Explosive charges shall be contained to prevent damage in the event
of inadvertent detonation.
Payload Manipulation Safety
A. Capability to release, eject, or extend the payload shall be provided
so as to prevent damage to the Orbiter at the expense 
of the payload.
B. No undesirable torques shall be imparted to the spacecraft 
or the
propulsive-stage vehicle by the separation and/or deployment
mechanism.
C. Redundancy shall be provided in the means for separating 
the propulsive
stage vehicle. No single failure shall result 
in uncontrolled motion
of the propulsive-stage vehicle.
Special Payload Components Safety Design
A. Large-Momentum Wheels operations with the payload 
attached to
the Orbiter shall be limited to operational readiness tests:
(1) with the wheel operational
(2) with wheel-speed monitoring provided in the form of an
audio/visual alarm
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(3) with wheel speed emergency control (hardline) capability.
(4) with emergency shut-down procedures.
Payload Safety Devices Requirements
Payload Toxicity, Corrosive, and Fire Safety Devices
A. Manually and remotely controlled means shall be provided in Orbiter
payloads for identifying, alerting, controlling and extinguishing
fires.
B. Toxic, flammable, or corrosive fluid containers shall be located
in unpressurized volumes of pressurized payloads, or shall be
double-walled contained with the capability of dumping the fluid into
space or off-loading to another double-walled container, and of
venting the space between the two containers to space.
C. Special protective garments and equipment shall be provided for
personnel working in a toxic environment or near potentially toxic
environment or near potentially toxic payload elements.
D. Means shall be provided for the local application of radiant or other
type of heat remotely or by personnel in IVA or EVA activity to
evaporate accumulations of frozen fluids from critical areas.
Payload structural Safety Devices
A. Capability shall be provided to relieve atmospheric pressure from
an Orbiter payload so as to prevent pressurization beyond the payload
structural limits. This capability shall be automatic when the
payload is not manned, and under control of the occupants when
manned. The maximum dump rate if the atmosphere is dumped
into the bay shall not exceed the venting capability of the Orbiter
cargo bay with the cargo bay doors closed.
B. Capability shall be provided for the Orbiter crew to selectively
pressurize or vent each tank of a propulsive stage vehicle if the
tanks have al common bulkhead, this requirement is subject to the
limitations outlined in the following paragraph. This capability shall
be available with the Orbiter cargo bay doors open or closed.
Payload Fluids Safety Devices
A. Relief capability shall be provided for pressurized tanks which
automatically limit maximum pressure. Venting shall be to space
or to a tank at lower pressure, and shall be arranged so that
mutually reactive fluids cannot mix and result in a fire or explosion.
B. Payload propellants shall be dumped prior to landing in theOrbiter.
G-25
TABLE G-6 (CONTINUED)
-Payload Speci1al Emphasis Safety Devices
A. Ordnance:
(1) Ilousings, interlocks, redundancy, grounding, isolation and
safety devices shall be provided on explosive'charges so that
no single detectable failure or combination of undetectable
failures shall result in premature detonation.
(2) Contaminant-free separation techniques shall be used for
component separations that take place in or near the Shuttle.
B. Manipulation:
A restraint system shall be provided for the propulsive-stage
vehicles in the Orbiter cargo bay which prevents contact of the
vehicle with Orbiter structure or equipment in the event of
partial or total release from the attachment points.
C. Radioactive Material:
Spare-shielded containers shall be available in which radioactive
materials can be temporarily stored in the event of an accident.
Payload Safety Warning Devices
Payload Caution and Warning to the Orbiter - The payload shall provide such
information to the Orbiter as is necessary to indicate its status as a payload
to ensure safe Orbiter operations. This information shall include payload
status and caution and warning data.
A. Provisions shall be made for presenting immediately to the Shuttle
crew and personnel, hazardous/emergency warning for conditions
originating within the payload while the payload is mounted to or in
the Orbiter.
B. All payload subsystems incorporating redundancies shall include a
means of verifying satisfactory operations of each redundant path.
C. Provisions shall be made for presenting to the Shuttle crew, payload
status data that indicate safe payload conditions and potentially
hazardous payload conditions. The payload is responsible for locating
sensors within the allowable payload envelope sufficient to monitor the
conditions of the payload and to detect potentially hazardous payload
conditions.
D. Potentially hazardous conditions that may exist at the interface
between the Orbiter and the payload will normally be sensed by and
controlled by the Orbiter. The payload shall provide sensing of
potentially hazardous conditions at the Orbiter interface.
Payload Toxicity, Corrosive, and Fire Warning Devices
A. Capability shall be provided to detect potential tank failures by
measurement of fluid pressures, temperatures, tank strans, etc.
B. For propulsive stage vehicles with propulsion tanks using common
bulkheads, differential pressure between the two tanks, common
bulkhead strain, or other indications of potential failure, shall be
monitored by the Orbiter crew.
C. Payload propellant temperatures and pressures shall be monitored.
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Payload Safety Operations Requirements
Payload Fluids Safe Operations
A. Emergency procedures shall be available for handling, containing,
and disposing of spilled hazardous fluids or material so as to safe-
guard the personnel, Orbiter, and payload, in that order.
B. Mutually reactive fluids shall not be handled or transferred
simultaneously, except when handled as a prepackaged module.
C. Transfer lines in pressurized areas, including double-walled lines,
shall be purged and cleaned after the transfer of hazardous fluids
and before breaking plumbing connections.
D. Dumping of propellants and pressurants from a retrieved propulsive
stage vehicle shall be accomplished before initiation of the Shuttle
Orbiter deorbit maneuver. Means of verification of the dump shall
be provided.
E. Pressurizing gas on propulsive-stage vehicles shall be isolated from
the stage tanks until immediately prior to release of the vehicle
from the Orbiter.
F. Procedures shall be available for extravehicular inspection and
release or re-attachment of partially released or depressurized
propulsive stage vehicles in orbit.
G. Cleanliness of the propellants and all materials and components in
normal contact with the fluids shall be controlled so that spontaneous
decomposition in normal and emergency environments is not
possible.
Payload Manipul-ation and Management Safe Operations
A. Capability shall be provided for visual inspection of an Orbiter
payload before initiating deployment from or retrieval and loading
into the Orbiter cargo bay.
B. Positive indication shall be provided to the Orbiter crew that a
retrieved payload has been properly secured in the cargo bay before
closing the cargo bay doors.
C. Emergency procedures shall be available for the release, handling,
and transportation of remotely controlled payload components in
the event of failure of the handling mechanism, or of damage to the
packaging of payload components.
Payload Safety Design Requirements
Structural Strength
A. All payload primary structure shall be designed to be fail/safe by
remaining integrally attached and remain within the 15- by 60-ft
allowable payload envelope after any single payload failure and
after being subjected to Shuttle Orbiter crash-landing loads.
B. All payload pressure vessels shall be designed to be fail-safe by
remaining unruptured and be able to contain any fluids in the vessels
after any single payload failure and after being subjected to Shuttle
Orbiter crash-landing loads.
C. All payload pressure-stabilized structures shall be designed to be
fail-safe as defined for primary structure and pressure vessels
above after loss of stabilizing pressure.
D. The support structure for pressure-stabilized payload elements
within the Orbiter shall allow Orbiter de-orbit, re-entry, and
landing following loss of pressurization in the pressure-stabilized
payload element while in the Orbiter payload bay in orbit. G-27
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E. The factors of safety of payload pressure vessels while in or near
the Orbiter shall be at least equal to the factors of safety for Orbiter
pressure vessels.
F. Propulsive-stage vehicle pressures shall be limited while in or near
the Orbiter so that the factors of safety are at least equal to the
factors of safety for Orbiter pressure vessels.
G. Gaseous content of pressurized containers and tanks shall be small
enough so that rapid isentropic expansion into the Orbiter cargo bay
will not result in overpressure of the bay.
11. Plumbing connections for hazardous fluid transfer in pressurized
areas shall be double-walled contained with the capability of venting
the space between the two containers to (1) space while in flight,
and (2) to GSE holding tanks or vents while on the ground.
I. The propulsive-stage vehicle shall be supported within the Orbiter
so that failure of any one structural support member will not
jeopardize support of the propulsive-stage vehicle during return to
earth and/or during any other mission phase.
J. High-pressure vessels shall be protected to avoid abnormal
mechanical impacts. Instrumentation to signal and record undesired
mechanical contacts will be considered.
K. Pressure vessels shall be qualified in ground testing to Shuttle-
induced operational environment levels, includinQ the applicable
safety factors.
Fluids Management
A. Separate lines distinctly marked and keyed shall be used for the
transfer of fuel and oxidizer. They shall be separated by a sufficient
distance to prevent mixing of reactant fluids in space whn close tr
the Orbiter.
B. Capability shall be provided to purge or dump into space a toxicant,
contaminated, corrosive, or flammable atmosphere from a
pressurized Orbiter payload.
C. Capability shall be provided for the Orbiter crew to vent and dump
pressurized, flammable, or hazardous payload fluid into space
within the time constraints imposed by any credible abort situation.
This capability shall be available with the payload bay doors open
or closed.
D. Toxic, flammable, or corrosive fluid containers shall be located in
unpressurized volumes of pressurized payloads, or shall be double-
walled contained with the capability of dumping the fluid into space
or off-loading to another double-walled container, and of venting
the space between the two containers to: (1) space, and (2) to GSE
holding tanks while on the ground.
Propulsive-Stage Requirements
A. Propellant shut-off valves shall be provided upstream from all start
valves so that inadvertent start-valve opening would not start
engines on propulsive-stage vehicles in or near the Orbiter.
B. The design of the propulsive-stage vehicle control system shall
only allow supply of electrical energy to the start valves of the
rocket engines following positive action by the Orbiter crew and/or
ground crew during stage vehicle countdown in orbit.
C. A backup means shall be provided for the Orbiter crew to vent or
pressurize propulsive-stage vehicles with a pressure-stabilized
structure.
G-28
TABLE G-6 (CONTINUED)
D. All pressure vessels shall be capable of being vented to control
pressures in the event of a pressure rise above their rated pressures.
E. For propulsive-stage vehicles with propulsion systems using common
bulkheads, the design of the prouplsion system shall not allow
pressurization of both tanks to occur so as to exceed the allowable
differential pressure between tanks.
F. All payload propellant tanks shall have the capability of dumping the
propellant without hazard to the Shuttle and Shuttle equipment.
G.7 MULTIPLE REUSE OF THE SAME SPACECRAFT
The hazard analysis of a spacecraft utilized for a single mission and the
hazard reduction and residual hazard management have been covered in the
SOAR-II reports and in part in these other safety discussions. They consider
all of the operations and the design potential hazards to the Shuttle and to
the Tug when it is used. All missions have the potential of an abort and of
a crash landing. Some missions are planned for satellite survival upon
Earth return and landing and it is these latter satellite types that may be
refurbished and reused for later missions.
Potentially reusable spacecraft can vary in complexity of systems all the way
from the simple LDEF with no active systems to the advanced technology satellite
with new sets of experiments and some subsystems for each mission. The
degree of design for refurbishment and reuse can be expected to vary especially
since reuse design features are generally not now used. System accessibility,
short life component replacement and the like will be used in the reliability
and quality assurance activities before each satellite reuse.
Safety assurance along with quality and reliability will be a factor in
decisions to fly a reworked satellite. The preciseness will depend upon the
actual knowledge of the reworked condition of the satellite. This is in part
made up of the condition of the reworked systems and otherwise derives from
the satellite condition assessment after the previous flight. This condition
assessment is the critical refurbishment factor and is a key to safety.
Satellite subsystems that are not readily accessible for assessment such as
tanks, piping, multi-layer insulation, and some structure, present assessment
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problems and their reasons for inaccessibility may also be a factor in not
being designed for refurbishment. Rework costs control can discourage sub-
stantial tear down and replacements. If the satellite design is limited for
refurbishment so that interior examinations would involve basic disassembly
of complex systems or the breaking of primary flow paths, the system status
for safety assurance may be uncertain unless added sensors and data are
taken for system status and assessment.
To be suitable for the next mission, the satellite must be confirmed and
selected components reworked or replaced to equal or exceed its minimum pre-
flight condition of reliability and it must be verified by quality assurance
that the original components and systems as well as the refurbished ones meet or
exceed the minimums. In attaining this physical state, the satellite safety
provisions can be achieved. Several satellite refurbishment actions are
potentially evident; the condition monitor that covers in-flight performance
as well as in-flight environment with sufficient data to recap the data trends
can lead to greater on-board instrumentation as well as greater quantity of
telemetry and the possibility of on-board records, Table G-7. Correlation of
preflight tests with mission operations would be a part of the data trend analysis.
Correspondingly, improvements should be made in satellite subsystem accessibility
for condition assessment as well as refurbishment. The segregation of high-
maintenance components can affect many areas if the satellite recycle costs and
time are to be held to a minimum. Less than complete satellite upgrading will
be reflected in increased risks to the mission effectiveness and to the the Tug
and Shuttle safety. Specific knowledge of these risks may make the new flight
readiness review more crucial.
Additive components that will contribute to the capability of assessing the satellite
condition and in some cases will enhance the depth of the caution and warning
or provide precursor advice of preventative maintenance needs or the need for
special examinations could include the features listed in Table G-8. Much of
the data generated would be by telemetry or recorded because of the interpretive
load; however, caution data would be of direct interest to the Shuttle. In a
sense, some of these data are added to provide confidence in the level of risk of
using a refurbished satellite in the mission. Other data are sought to provide
G-30
for an assessment of satellite condition toward the required level of refur-
bishment for the subsequent satellite mission.
The satellite environment recorded history can be important where exposure
to temperatures outside of the temperature tolerances could result in sub-
stantial electronic component replacements. These data, analysis and refur-
bishment action are properly refurbishment-oriented and reflects in reliability
and quality assurance. It does directly reflect on safety assurance where
the satellite condition is uncertain or where the point in life span of a
component is unclear.
TABLE G-7
INTERFACE IMPACTS OF SAFETY
ACTION FUNCTION INTERFACES
Condition monitor In-fliaht performance monitor Telemetry and onboard recorders
In-flinht environment monitor Telemetry and onboard recorders
FSE equipment monitors
FSE on-board monitors
Data trend analysis Prefliaht testing
Subsystems tests
System readiness
Inteqrated payload preload tests
Improved Satellite Condition inspection at Access openings
subsystems accessibility refurbishment Redundant interconnects
for assessment Partial disassembly
Component redesign for access
Refurbishment based upon Analysis of condition Increased data monitor
condition monitor monitor data and rework- Increased testing to confirm
retest decisions condition
Improved Satellite Seqreqate high-maintenance Structure
desiqn for refurbishment components Subsystem components
Tanks
Insulation
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TABLE G-8
POTENTIAL SAFETY INTERFACE COMPONENTS SATELLITE
PRIMARY STRUCTURE Strain qaqe monitors
Accelerometers
Temperature surveys
TANK STRUCTURE Strain gaqe monitors
Accelerometers
Temnerature surveys
Acoustical emission monitors
Pressure surveys
Leak detectors
SUBSYSTEMS Thermal history
Vibration pickups
Mechanical systems monitors
GENERAL Contamination
Overpressure sensors
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Appendix H
PAYLOAD CONTAMINATION ANALYSIS
Prospective payloads for the Space Shuttle have cleanliness requirements sig-
nificantly greater than are presently being considered for the orbiter bay.
In addition, delivery vehicles of the past have been a concern for only the
first few minutes of flight. The Shuttle, with its revisit and servicing
capability, will extend contamination control concerns beyond what occurs in
the payload bay. Consideration must now be given to what the orbiter does to
the spacecraft as it is deployed or retrieved and what it does to the general
environment in the payload vicinity.
The purpose of this analysis is to expand on the contamination control require-
ments identified in the SOAR-II study for payloads identified as involving
10,000 class cleanliness standards. Imposing a 10,000 class cleanliness on
the orbiter is not necessarily the most practical or perhaps even a possible
way of meeting these requirements. The approach taken in this analysis has
been to examine two representative spacecraft, the Large Space Telescope (LST)
and Earth Observatory Satellite (EOS), in some depth to discern what the clean-
liness drivers are, and then to formulate suitable contamination control con-
cepts. These control concepts were synthesized from techniques evolved for
Skylab and the Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM), techniques proposed for LST, and
successful past practices. An attempt was made to identify the most suitable
manner in which to institute the proposed control methods, i.e., how should
the task be divided between the orbiter and payload, and when is hardware
design more effective than operations or procedures and vice versa.
The critical contamination control areas of the LST are shown in Figure H-1.
The most critical areas are the Scientific Instrument Package (SIP) and Optical
Telescope Assembly (OTA) in which the spacecraft sensor optics are contained.
Thermal control surfaces and solar arrays are contamination-critical to a
lesser degree, however, they involve all the external surfaces of the space-
craft. The area within the Spacecraft Service Module (SSM) contains equipment
such as gyros, electronics, and valves which are either heremetically sealed
or otherwise relatively insensitive to contamination compared to the other
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Likewise, Figure H-2 shows the EOS and its contamination-critical areas.
Again the optics are most critical with the Thematic Mapper probably being
the most susceptible to degradation. Detector coolers are used on the EOS and
are thermal control areas especially sensitive to ice or frost. The other
external thermal control surfaces, solar arrays, and antennas are also of con-
cern but to a lesser degree.
Table H-1 presents an overview summary of the contamination control methods
proposed for these spacecraft. These techniques require little more of the
orbiter than is currently specified in the Space Shuttle System Payload
Accommodations document, JSC-07700. Table H-2 summarizes the suggested
orbiter contamination control requirements.
Both LST and EOS conceptual and Phase A studies have specified particulate
contamination control to the 10,000 class level. In addition, non-particulate
contamination levels of 10 PPM for low vapor pressure materials and 15 PPM
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TABLE H-2 40389
SUGGESTED ORBITER CONTAMINATION
CONTROL REQUIREMENTS
" PAYLOAD BAY
100, 000 CLASS CLEAN ATMOS PHERE
*VISUALLY CLEAN SURFACES (SMOOTH LINING PREFERRED)
*50% MAX RELATIVE HUMIDITY
SPAYLOAD MANNED SERVICE PROVISIONS
100, 000 CLASS CLEAN ATMOS PHERE
'10 PPM LOW VAPOR PRESSURE (10(2 MM HG) NON-PARTICULATES
*15 PPM HIGH VAPOR PRESSURE, HARD TO OXIDIZE NON-PARTICULATES
*30% MAX RELATIVE HUMIDITY
100,000 CLASS CLEAN AREA (E.G. DOCKING MODULE)
*ORB ITER EFFLUENTS
NO DUMPING OR VENTING NEAR PAYLOAD
*RCS INHIBIT DURING CRITICAL MAINTENANCE PERIODS
SMALLER (25 LBF) THRUSTERS ANDIOR LARGER ATTITUDE DEAD BAND
*NEW OR MORE STRINGENT THAN EXISTING REQUIREMENT
for high vapor pressure materials have been used in the LST contamination
control system concept of Reference i1.
It has been determined that the experiment optical surfaces are most contam-
ination critical, followed by certain spacecraft sensors such as star
trackers. Thermal control surfaces and solar arrays are sensitive only to
relatively gross levels of contamination.
Experiment optics are affected by both surface contamination and clouds which
may surround the spacecraft. For both the LST and EOS, surface contamination
is the more serious because it is persistent whereas a cloud of outgassed
molecules or particles will soon be swept clear of the spacecraft. Surface
contamination may be deposited in particulate form (dust, water droplets, RCS
unburned propellant, etc.) or non-particulate form (films of oil, frost, soot,
etc.).
Particulate deposits tend to scatter incident radiation, thereby obscurring
faint objects (which are a major source of interest for LST). It is to be
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noted that particulate build-up is a function of time and that optics left in
a 10K clean room a sufficient period can exhibit 100K clean room contamination
levels. This was amply demonstrated during the oTM two-year development
period. Although the entire ATM was constantly kept in a 10K clean environ-
ment during this two-year period, only those experiments further protected by
aperture covers and a class 100 air purge did not require recleaning prior to
launch. The experience of ATM would suggest that 10K class cleanliness is
probably too stringent for an entire spacecraft while it is inadequate for
sensitive optics.
Non-particulate contamination in the form of surface films is especially
deleterious to optical surfaces intended to transmit or reflect short wave-
length (i.e. ultraviolet) radiation. Degradation of object brightness and
resolution, and loss of spectrum bandwidth are the result of surface films.
Non-particulates are usually produced by material outgassing and effluents
introduced into the surrounding atmosphere. Films of these non-particulates
will form through condensation and adhesion. Important considerations are
therefore atmospheric dew point, optics surface temperature, contaminant
vapor pressure and concentration. Non-particulates caused by outgassing can
be effectively controlled by proper material selection during design and
adequate bake-out and cleaning during fabrication. Humidity and temperature
control of the atmosphere surrounding the spacecraft will eliminate water
condensation problems. (Regarding this matter, if the orbiter bay temperature
and humidity levels specified in JSC-07700 are simultaneously 430F and 43 grains/
pount of dry air, respectively, the dewpoint will be exceeded.) However, the
effect of humidity in conjunction with trace contaminants such as ammonia may
create compounds (e.g. ammonium hydroxide) which will chemically attach sur-
faces more readily than either non-particulate alone. Localized dry GN2 purges
are effective in controlling this problem. Controlling relative humidity to
50 percent or less has been found effective in suppressing electronics arcing
and chemical action.
The above contamination mechanisms and control techniques are understood by
industry and are common to expendable booster operation. The Shuttle however
extends contamination concern to orbital operations. Orbiter outgassing,
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venting, dumping and RCS operation must now be controlled to avoid contamina-
ting thermal control, and optical surfaces on orbit. Outgassing control is
essentially a design problem, however, orienting the orbiter such that the
payload is upstream will assist in reducing the outgassed constituent level
at the payload. Control of other effluents may best be approached through
operational procedures.
Orbiter venting and dumping should be completely inhibited during payload
deployment, rendezvous and critical servicing periods. An example of the
latter is when optics are exposed during automated replacement of instru-
ments. Inhibition of RCS operation is probably not feasible during docking
or deployment, rather the use of smaller thrusters and/or a selective orbiter
approach direction is preferred. The latter technique should be effective
since RCS contaminant deposition on surfaces occurs essentially in line-of-
sight situations.
In summary, there appears to be no justification for pursuing more stringent
orbiter bay atmosphere cleanliness requirements than proposed in JSC-07700.
However, an orbiter bay surface cleanliness level or cleaning procedure
compatible with assurance of a 100K cleanliness atmosphere should be specified.
Past experience with clean rooms indicates that 100,000 class cleanliness
can be maintained with reasonable care if the room has been properly designed.
Nooks and crannies, ledges, insulation and other such particle collectors
and generators could render a 100K class clean objective practically impossible.
Therefore, careful consideration should be given to this matter during design
of the orbiter bay.
Where more stringent payload cleanliness requirements have been found, they
appear to be a reaction to very stringent cleanliness requirements of optical
surfaces which themselves usually cannot tolerate a 10K environment. There-
fore, it appears that a more practical approach is to keep the spacecraft as
clean as the 100K orbiter environment permits, and provide localized protective
covers and purges where necessary. These localized areas are relatively small
compared to the rest of the spacecraft. The covers will also be utilized for
protection during spacecraft deployment and revisit by the Shuttle. They
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should be RF commandable, well sealed and provide an internal dry GN2 purge.
The spacecraft on-board purge system need not be large if, during periods it
is not free-flying, the orbiter or GSE would supply the purge gas.
H.1 TECHNICAL ANALYSIS
In general, spacecraft cleanliness requirements tend to become more stringent
as program definition progresses. This trend was evident during the SOAR
studies where seven baseline spacecraft increased in cleanliness requirements
while none decreased. Experience with past programs such as Skylab has shown
that unless contamination control techniques are introduced at the design
definition phase, significant schedule and funding impact may be encountered.
Hence, it is the purpose of this analysis to contribute to the definition of
Shuttle contamination control requirements as early as possible in its pro-
gram timeframe. During the course of the SOAR-II study the most stringent
spacecraft cleanliness requirement identified was class 10,000 per Federal
Standard 209A - Clean Room and Work Station Requirements, Controlled Environ-
ment. A review of the SOAR-II payloads reveals three spacecraft which require
10K cleanliness: the Large Space Telescope (LST), Earth Observatory Satellite
(EOS), and High Energy Astronomy Observatory-C mission (HEAO-C). Program
and configuration definitions of HEAO-C have undergone major changes since
its evaluation in SOAR-II; therefore, this payload was not included in the
detailed examination afforded the other two spacecraft.
The SOAR-II studies identified potential contaminant sources, examined orbi-
ter effluent discharges, and identified methods of controlling spacecraft con-
tamination. Since 10 different spacecraft were considered, the contamination
control measures were general in nature in order to be all-encompassing. In
this report the cleanliness requirements of the LST and EOS have been examined
in greater detail and recommendations made specifically for these two space-
craft. These specific control measures are the most stringent to be encoun-
tered; however, many subsystem elements such as star trackers and radiometers
are common to other spacecraft as well and recommendations should be applicable
to them also in these instances.
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H.1.1 Contamination Control Requirements
The contamination control requirements specified by NASA for the shuttle bay
and identified for the LST and EOS are presented in this subsection.
H.1.1.1 Space Shuttle Contamination Control Requirements
The effluents expected from the Space Shuttle are listed in Table H-3 and
their sources noted on Figure H-3. Of particular concern to payloads are
contaminants present in the orbiter bay and contaminants introduced by the
orbiter into the spacecraft's orbital environment.
The cleanliness requirements for the orbiter bay atmosphere as specified in
the Space Shuttle Payload Accommodations document, JSC-07700, dated April 1973
are:
Payload Bay Atmosphere. The Orbiter payload bay can be atmospheric con-
trolled independent of other parts of the Orbiter structure while on the
launch pad. Conditioned air purge will be supplied to the payload bay
at the launch pad up to 30 minutes prior to propellant loading. At that
time, GN2 will be supplied up to lift-off. The purge capability is as
follows:
a. Flow rate - 0 to 200 lbs/min.
b. Temperature - adjustable within the range from 450 to 1200 F
controlled to +20F of desired setting.
c. Class 100,000. See Federal Standard 209A - Clean Room and Work
Station Requirements, Controlled Environment.
d. Air Humidity - 0 to 43 grains/pound of dry air.
e. GN2 Humidity - 0 to 1 grain/pound of dry air.
The Orbiter payload bay is vented during the launch and entry phases and
operates unpressurized during the orbital phase of the mission. The pay-
load must provide the tankage and gases to accomplish payload bay re-
pressurization if an inert atmosphere is required for entry.
On-orbit effluents are asterisked in Table H-7. Liquid dumping is especially
critical to optical experiments and only emergency conditions would precipitate
overboard dumping. Water management aboard the orbiter as defined in JSC-00700
is:
o Water Storage - 2 tanks containing 165 lb H20 each.
o Fuel Cell Water - directed to storage tanks; or if they are full, to
water sublimator and thence overboard.
o Emergency Dump - overboard through two heated nozzles
o Humidity Control Waste Water Condensate - three tanks, 100 lb. capacity
each
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TABLE H-3
SHUTTLE EFFLUENT DESCRIPTION
External Tank System (ETS) *8. Electrical Power System (EPS) *18. Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS)
Battery Vent - GH Normal Ops Propellants - MMH & N204I. LO2 Tank Vent Media - LO2, GO2  - KO Failure Mode Normal Exhaust
N2  1% H2 1% by Wgt2. Intertank Skirt *9. Fuel Cells/Supercritical Tankage H20 1 2  OHGN2 Pre-flight Purge a. GH2 Purge Media - GH2, He CO2 NO HVent Location TBD b. GH2 Relief - GH2 CO 0 He
3. ETS/Orbiter Separation Residuals c. GO2 Purge - GO2 , GN2  Trace Metals - Fe, Mg, V
LH2, GH2, LO2, GO d. GO Relief - GO2SRe. 2H2 Relief - H20 (System Overpressure) *19. Auxiliary Power Unit (APU)
Monopropellant 
- N2H4Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) 10. Payload Bay & Midbody Vents (8 Symmetric) Normal Exhaust - N2 , H2, NH3Media - GN2 Pre-flight Purge
4. Typical SRB Exhaust Composition of - Cabin Atmosphere from Airlock 20. GH2 Vent
PBAN Propellant Operation *21. Orbiter Unpressurized Compartments
AI203 
> 1% FeCl < 1% by Wgt *11. Environment Control & Life Support System (ECLSS) GN Pre-flight Purge - Vent Thru Seals
CO N2  FeC1 2  OH a. N2 Pressure Relief and TBD
HC1 CO2  C1 H b. Sublimator Dump During System Overpressure *22° Oil from Hydraulic Actuators & Valves
H20 H2  AICI 2  c. Avionics Bay Pressure Relief
4a. Motor Emergency Thrust Termination d. Waste Management Vacuum Vent *23. Pressurized Cabin Structure Leakage
e. Water Dump (Emergency) 02, N2, H20, CO25. Separation Thrusters - Typically PBAN Media - H20, 02, N2, CO2 Trace Methane *24. EVA, Portable Life Support System (PLSS)Type Propellant, Possibly None Required 12. Payload LO2 Vent - GO2, L02  H20
Orbiter/Payload 13. Oxidizer Panel, Orbiter/Payload Launch *25. Orbiter Thermal Protection System (TPS)
Umbilical, Payload LO2 Dump - L02, GO2, N2  Outgassing - Large Carbon-Silica
6. Pyrotechnic Separation 14. Fuel Panel, Orbiter/Payload LaunchGases
Combustion Products? Umbilical, Payload LH2 Dump - LH2, GH2, He
*7. Reaction Control System (RCS) 15. Orbiter LO2 Dump - L02, GO2, N2Monopropellant Hydrazine N2H4Normal Operation Above 70K Feet 16. Orbiter LH2 Dump - LH2, GH2, He
N2, H2
, 
NH3, H20 (Trace), He (Trace) 17. Main Propulsion System (MPS)
GN2 Pre-flight Purge of RCS Compartment Normal Exhaust 
- H20, H2, 02
On-orbit effluent
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o Waste Management - collects and stores solid and liquid wastes
H.1.1.2 LST Contamination Control Requirements and Solutions
The Large Space Telescope mission objective is to place a large aperture (3
meter) near-diffraction-limited astronomy telescope in earth orbit, thereby
permitting observation of celestial objects under conditions free of earth
atmosphefe obscuring effects. This results in three distinct improvements
over ground based telescopes; (1) objects previously too dim may now be seen,
(2) light wavelengths previously obscured (principally ultra violet below
300 nanometers) may now be sensed, and (3) optical resolution can be improved
to the point where it is limited by design state-of-the-art rather than by
environment. Clearly, the introduction of contaminants into the LST environ-
ment which encroach upon its sensitivity, spectral bandwidth, or resolution
tends to obviate its purpose and usefulness to the scientific community. It
is, therefore, important to identify which contaminants are deleterious to
mission objectives and what means of their control are available.
Table H-h lists the various LST mission requirements.
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TABLE H-4
LARGE SPACE TELESCOPE MISSION REQUIREMENTS
Characteristic Value
Orbit Altitude (nmi) 330
Orbit Inclination (deg) 28.5
Mission Duration (yrs) 15
Spectral Range (nm) 110-5000
Spatial Resolution (arc-sec at
500 nm) 0.04
Wave Front Error (rms at 633 nm) 0.05X
The LST, shown in Figure H-, is composed of three major elements: the
Optical Telescope Assembly (OTA), the Scientific Instumentation Package (SIP),
and the Support Systems Module (SSM).
The OTA major elements include a 3-meter Ritchey-Chretien Cassegrain two-
mirror system supported by a low coefficient of expansion carbon-epoxy truss
structure. The optical mirrors and structure are enclosed in an aluminum
cylinder which provides thermal, light, and micrometeoroid shielding. A
sliding sun shade is extended after LST delivery on orbit to reduce entry of
stray radiation. An aperture door at the OTA forward end prevents inadver-
tent viewing of the sun, moon, or earth from damaging the OTA or SIP. This
door can also serve to prevent optics contamination during LST delivery, main-
tenance, and retrieval. The door is designed to withstand an internal pressure
differential of 0.1 psig. The OTA aft end is closed off by the SSM pressure
bulkhead. This bulkhead contains a normally open door in the optical path
which is shut during orbital maintenance operations when the SSM is pressurized
to a shirtsleeve environment.
The primary mirror is a monolithic casting of CerVit glass having an aluminum
reflective surface overcoated with soft MgF2 . The MgF 2 surface is not con-
sidered cleanable because it is soft, being deposited on the aluminum at room
temperature instead of the usual 250 0C so that the aluminum will not lose its
reflectivity.
H-ll
FIGURE H-4
LST REFERENCE DESIGN LONGITUDINAL CROSS SECTION
7,700-_ 5000 SYM
9031.) 197al)
I- I 4276- D
3ETER M IOROR (168)
36.. D I 300-0
• _ MAGkNET(2) (145m) (8 307) 0 (130 m)
the op , .tstely ad
-- ; r tuth,,> .. -
lAGNET(2) t METERING TRUSS - LIGHT SHIELD (RETRACTED) SSMsP
S METEOROID SHIELD SOLAR ARRAY (STOWED)
_9 oW o o 3000
The Scientific Instrument Package is located aft of the pressure bulkhead in
the optical path. It is a system which can select, analyze, and process in-
cident radiation energy. Energy reaching the focal plane may be selectively
imaged on a variety of detectors and spectrographs. Processed data is then
transmitted to ground receivers. Although final selection of SIP instruments
has not yet been made, Table H-5 presents typical candidates identified in
Reference HI. Arrangement of these sensors is shown in Figure H-5. The
instruments are of modular design which will enable their being serviced in
orbit or replaced with other experiments during the course of the program.
The observed radiation follows the path from primary to secondary mirror,
thence to a folding mirror assembly at the focal plane located in the SIP,
thence to the individual instruments. The optical paths of the instruments
are sealed, providing inherent contamination insusceptibility except for the
entrance window. If orbital maintenance involves instrument disassembly, this
feature will be nullified and an increased probability of contamination will
occur.
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TABLE H-5
SIP INSTRUMENTS & PERFORMANCE SUMMARY
SPECTRAL RANGE
INSTRUMENT (NANOMETERS) LIMITING RESOLUTION SPECTRAL RESOLUTION LIMITING MAGNITUDE
N-N2 (n rad) X1 /A MV (S/N=2)
High Resolution Field 115-1100 160 32.5
Camera f/96
Wide Field Camera f/12 160-700 840 - 30.5
High Spectral Resolution 115-180 - 4.5 x 104 17.2
Spectrograph I
High Spectral Resolution 180-350 - 3 x 104 19.7
Spectrograph II
Faint Object Spectrograph I 115-160 - 1.25 x 103 21
160-220 - 1.75 x 103 22.5
Faint Object Spectrograph II 220-350 - 1.23 x 103 25
350-660 - 0.75 x 103 25
Faint Object Spectrograph III 660-1000 - 1.5 x 103 22
Mid-IR Interferometer 1000-5000 - 13
LA3
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The System Support Module shown in Figure H-6 structurally interfaces with
the OTA and contains the LST attitude control equipment, electrical power and
distribution subsystem, communications and data handling subsystem, thermal
control equipment, contamination control equipment, launch vehicle structural
interface, and docking structure. An entry door on the SSM aft end permits
personnel egress for LST servicing while on orbit. With the pressure bulk-
head door closed and the aft door connected to the Shuttle, possibly via a
Sortie Lab, the SSM can be pressurized to a 14.7 psia shirtsleeve environment.
The electrical power system uses two deployable aluminum honeycomb solar arrays
of 2 x 6 cm, 10-ohm-cm cells having a 12 mil coverslide. The RCS is a cold
gas GN2 system used for docking and emergency control. If the delivery vehicle
is a Titan, the RCS would also provide attitude control during orbit adjust
stage (OAS) operation, separation, sun orientation, and control moment gyro
(CMG) spin-up. CMG's are normally used for LST fine pointing and maneuvering
and are desaturated magnetically. Therefore, during normal LST operation
there is no RCS activity.
The cleanliness requirements of the LST vary throughout the literature and
Table H-6 presents a summary of the ranges encountered. Where conflicting
requirements are shown, Reference H1 was considered to govern.
An attempt was made to identify the LST contaminant-sensitive areas and their
degradation modes, References H4 through H6. Table 3-7 summarizes the
evaluation results.
Contamination of the primary and secondary mirror system is especially critical
in the form of a non-particulate (film) surface deposit. When a film depth of
1/4 the wavelength of incident radiation is deposited on a mirror, the radia-
tion reflected from the film top and bottom surfaces is 1800 out of phase and
will be dimmed or even extinguished. Oil molecules produce a large monolayer
thickness such that relatively few layers can result in a film depth of 1/4
wavelength, especially in ultraviolet spectrum. Oil characteristically exhibit
low vapor pressure and would produce a very persistent film at LST operating
temperatures. While ultraviolet irradiation of organic films can cause poly-
merization, thereby producing an even more opaque and persistent film, the UV
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TABLE H-6
LST CLEANLINESS REQUIREMENTS SUMMARY
Acceptable or
Contaminant Design Level Location Ref.
Particulate 10,000 Class SIP H1
100,000 Class SSM H1
Relative Humidity 30% SIP H2
50% Max H3
Hydrocarbon Trace 1 ppm H3
(Methane Standard) 15 ppm SIP Hi
Ammonia 2.8 ppm SIP I1
Low Vapor Pressure (_10-2mmHg) 10 ppm SIP Hi
Non-Particulate
Hard-to-Oxidize 15 ppm SIP Hi
High Vapor Pressure
Non-Particulates
intensity to be observed by the LST is not expected to result in this problem.
Surface films also create a double reflection of incident light which in an
aggravated form produces image "ghosts" and fuzziness. This degrades the
resolution power of the telescope.
Thus, film surface deposits on the primary and secondary mirror system tend to
negate the three prime advantages which the LST has over earth based tele-
scopes, i.e., superior resolution, bandwidth, and brightness sensitivity.
Particulate surface deposits on the primary and secondary mirrors are undesir-
able but not as critical as film contamination. Particles of dust or ice act
as scatterers which increase the diffuse background light and decrease the
image intensity. The resut is a decreased ability of the telescope to sense
faint objects but little effect on bandwidth or resolution.
Molecular clouds in the LST vicinity will be created by the orbiter and LST RCS
thrusters, venting, and outgassing. Depending on the cloud constituents,
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TABLE H-7
LST CONTAMINATION CRITICAL ELEMENTS
CONTAMINANT & DEGRADATION EFFECT
ELEMENT NON-PARTICULATE FILM DEPOSIT PARTICULATE DEPOSIT MOLECULAR CLOUD PARTICULATE CLOUD
(E.G., SILICONE OIL, NH3) (E.G., DUST, WATER DROPS) (E.G., GN2 , RCS PLUME) (E.G., WATER DROPLETS, ICE)
Primary & Secondary Mirrors * Reduces spectral bandwidth a Scatters incident radiation * Decreases incident radiation e Scatters light, decreases
transmission, particularly decreasing sensitivity and filters out certain fre- signal-to-noise, creates
in UV range. Worst at 1/4 x. increasing background level quencies, decreases signal- false objects. Most scat-
* Reduces reflectance and (reduces signal-to-noise to-noise. tering produced by .2 to 100
ratio). particles.therefore ability to sense ratio). particles.
faint objects.
* Produces ghosts about the
image and therefore degrades
resolution.
Focal Plane Folding Mirror * Same as above * Same as above * Not applicable e Not applicable
Field Camera Window e Reduces spectral bandwidth * Same as above a Not applicable e Not applicab',
* Reduces brightness
sensitivity
Spectrograph Window a Reduces spectral bandwidth a Not applicable * Not applicable
Star Tracker * Decreases sensitivity, in- * Decreases sensitivity, in- a High voltage arcing if * False star lock-on, increases
creases system jitter creases system jitter critical pressure is system jitter
exceeded.
Sun Sensor * Relatively insensitive a Relatively insensitive a Relatively insensitive * Relatively insensitive
Solar Arrays a Virtually immune, operates at red end of spectrum where a Insensitive to levels * Insensitive to levels
transmission & scattering losses are least. encountered in orbit encountered in orbit
* High operating temp (150 oF) tends to vaporize films and
water.
a Corrosive films could attack cells at edges where not pro-
tected by cover slide.
Thermal Control Surfaces e Can alter a/E. Degradation tends to increase both a and E a Not a problem a Not a problem
toward unity.
Co
certain light wavelengths will be scattered or absorbed. Once the orbiter has
left the vicinity, the generation of molecular cloud matter is essentially
limited to LST outgassing and its RCS GN2 . The former will be largely complete
in 48 hours and, under normal conditions, LST RCS thrusting will not be used.
The low effluent rate, residual earth atmosphere sweeping effect, and inherent
small scattering cross section of molecules makes the molecular cloud effects
of little concern to LST operation.
Particulate clouds, typically composed of ice and dust, can pose serious pro-
blems as light scatters, particularly when viewing faint objects. Water
particles causing this phenomena are usually in the .2 to 100 P range. The
Skylab waste tank vent system underwent extensive tests and design changes to
assure that no droplets over 6P in size and preferably only H20 vapor below
the triple point would be vented.
There is no water generation or venting from the LST; therefore, once the
orbiter departs the LST vicinity, the possibility of generating these contami-
nants is eliminated. Any cloud of ice or other particles left by the orbiter
with the LST will be swept clear by the residual atmosphere in a matter of
hours - or at most, days.
In examining the next major element in the optical path after the primary and
secondary mirrors, attention is brought to the focal plane folding mirror
(FPFM). This element directs focused radiation to the various SIP instruments.
Deposit contaminants have similar effects on the FPFM as on the primary and
secondary mirrors. Molecular or particulate clouds are not expected to be
present at any significant concentration in this area.
A discussion with Kollsman personnel indicated that the scientific instruments
of the SIP have closed optical paths which are not exposed to the environment.
The contamination critical surface therefore is the instrument window. Again,
the principle contaminant of concern is a film deposit on the window which can
result in blocking shorter wavelength radiation and in reducing total band-
width transmitted energy. Particulate deposits result in scattering with
ensuing decreased brightness sensitivity and signal-to-noise ratio. Molecular
or particulate clouds in the SIP are not expected to be present in significant
concentrations to effect instrument operation.
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Star trackers are sensitive to contamination which decreases target brightness
or signal-to-noise ratio. This results in increased system jitter caused by
electronic processing of the incoming signal. Film and particulate deposits
are therefore of concern. Although molecular clouds are of little concern in
the star tracker line of sight, they may be very significant is present in the
electronics section. Some electronics designs are open to the environment to
take advantage of in-vaccuo operation. If a residual atmosphere such as might
be caused by outgassing is above a critical level, high voltage arcing could
occur and damage the sensor. External particulate clouds scattering decreases
the signal-to-noise ratio and increases system jitter. Exceptionally bright
particles could cause false lock-on of the system.
A sun sensor for the LST has such an intense target that contamination does
little to affect sensor performance, and the required contamination control
techniques would be nominal.
Solar arrays operate at the red end of the visible spectrum where film and
particulate surface deposit effects are minimal. Analyses performed for Sky-
lab showed that retro rocket exhaust deposition has little effect on array
performance. Typical array surface temperatures in daytime range from 1300 F
to 170 0F and readily drive off moisture and other films. Each solar cell is
protected by a coverslide; however, the cell edges are exposed to the environ-
ment. Conceivably, water/contaminant mixtures could chemically attack these
areas; however, subsequent to the orbiter departure there should be no reason
for such mixtures to persist.
Thermal control surfaces of the LST include high performance insulation (HPI),
paints and coatings. The 24-layer aluminimized mylar HPI is located beneath the
micrometeoroid shield and external to the SSM pressure shell, and thus is pro-
tected from orbiter RCS thruster impingement. Moisture is detrimental to HPI
and could be a problem during pre- and post-launch periods. The specified
Shuttle bay air and GN2 humidity levels and temperature ranges result in dew-
points below expected LST surface temperatures which tends to alleviate
moisture problems.
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Reference 1 proposes that the exterior of the LST be painted with a white zinc
orthotitanate (Zn2TiO ) paint of low absorptivity to emissivity ratio (/We =
.12/.92 = .13) to minimize solar heating. Film and particulate deposits tend
to degrade both a and E optical properties toward 1.0 with the resultant effect
of increasing the ratio and solar heating. Orbiter RCS exhaust is probably
the major contaminant contributor in this regard. Inhibiting orbiter RCS
thruster operation, reduction of thruster size, and keeping the LST outside a
100 half-angle cone about the thrust axes are potential methods of reducing or
eliminating this contamination problem.
A review of the LST mission profile was made to identify during which period
major contamination can occur. Table H-8 lists the critical contamination
hazards by mission phase and summarizes candidate control measures suggested
in References Hi, H3 and H7. The basic contamination control approach is to
make the LST self-sufficient in a hostile environment. The techniques of
Reference H1 appear practical, effective, and impose reasonable requirements
on the orbiter. Orbital maintenance of the LST is considered to pose the most
critical phase of contamination control. Figures H-7 and H-8 taken from
Reference Hl depict the orbiter and LST contamination control system, respec-
tively, proposed for use during manned servicing of the LST.
H.1.1.3 EOS Contamination Control Requirements & Solutions
The Earth Observatory Satellite mission objective is to provide a space plat-
form for test of experimental sensors and spacecraft subsystems. Sensor develop-
ment will be directed toward environmental research, locating and mapping earth
resources, environmental management, and meteorology. The EOS will be placed
in a sun synchronous orbit such as at 990 inclination and 530 n.mi. altitude.
Early definition of EOS as given in Reference H8 identified an LOS A&B space-
craft generation for the 1976 timeframe. Sensors for this configuration were
essentially state-of-the-art and the 2600 pound spacecraft could be delivered
by a Delta launch vehicle. The next EOS generation (C&D) would incorporate
more advanced sensors, would weigh about 3800 pounds, and would be operational
in the 1980's timeframe, compatible with the Space Shuttle. A more recent EOS
configuration, shown in Figure H-9, incorporates on-orbit servicing capability,
advanced sensors, and weighs about 10,000 pounds.
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TABLE H-8
LST CONTAMINATION HAZARDS AND CANDIDATE METHODS OF CONTROL
MISSION CRITICALPHASEON CONTAMINANT CONTAMINANT CAUSE CRITICAL SPACECRAFT ELEMENTS CANDIDATE CONTAMINATION CONTROL METHODS
Pre Launch Film Deposits Atmosphere, surrounding LST Primary & secondary mirrors, Closed OTA aperture doors with GSE supplied 10,000
(After Leaving Particulate Deposits structure & equipment, orbiter SIP mirrors & instruments, class dry GN2 purge introduced via SIP area. LST
Clean Room) bay environment star trackers, thermal insula- interior pressure maintained at .01 to .1 psi above
tion, solar arrays ambient. Entire LST is enclosed in a clean bag to
reduce purge gas requirement. Removable covers
placed on star trackers.
Launch Same as above Particle migration accentuated Same as above Same as above except:
by acoustics & vibration. Orbiter supplies GN2 purge
Launch pad atmosphere at
liftoff.
Ascent Same as above Particle migration accentuated Same as above Same as above.
by acoustics & vibration. Outgassing can be significantly reduced by proper
Orbiter bay & LST outgassing. design and manufacturing practices in material
selection, cleaning, and bake-out.
LST Deployment Film Deposits o Orbiter bay & LST outgassing Same as above Same as above except LST supplies GN2 purge from
Particulate Deposits . Orbiter TPS outgassing time of orbiter/LST disconnect until orbiter is in
@ RCS plume, orbiter venting, stand-off escort. Clean bag removed and remains in
fuel cell water dump orbiter bay. Fuel cell water dump and other vents
inhibited during LST deployment. LST to stay outside
100 of orbiter RCS thrust axes. Use of 25 lbf orbiter
thrusters mitigates RCS contaminants.
LST Operation Film Deposits * LST outgassing Same as above LST purge terminated, aperture doors opened, star
Particulate Deposits a LST GN2 RCS operation tracker covers removed, inhibit orbiter domp & vent.
Molecular Clouds * Orbiter residual clouds Residual molecular clouds will disperse and be swept
Particulate Clouds clear of LST in minutes by earth's atmosphere.
Particulate clouds will require longer, -6 minutes
for lu particles and -5 hours for 50. particles.
Orbital regression and atmosphere rotation prevents
particle buildup on successive orbits.
LST outgassing essentially complete after first 48
hours in orbit. Molecular clouds caused by subse-
quent outgassing have little scattering or absorption
effects on light due to low column densities and
small scattering cross section of molecules.
Particulate & film deposits are essentially line-of-
sight dependent. LST aperture orientation away from
orbiter should suffice to prevent optics contamina-
tion by orbiter RCS.
TABLE H-8 (CONTINUED)
LST CONTAMINATION HAZARDS AND CANDIDATE METHODS OF CONTROL
MISSION CRITICALPHASE CONTAMINANT CONTAMINANT CAUSE CRITICAL SPACECRAFT ELEMENTS CANDIDATE CONTAMINATION CONTROL METHODS
LST Maintenance Film Deposits SSM atmosphere, personnel, Same as above Aperture doors closed and oriented away from orbiter;Particulate Deposits surrounding LST equipment & closed pressure bulkhead door; SSM egress door con-
structure nected to special orbiter clean area; 100,000 class
clean air provided by orbiter, filtered to 10,000
clean by LST HEPA filters for SIP area, SSM pres-
surized to 14.7 psia, trace contaminants controlled
by orbiter EC/LSS; personnel in clean room attire.
Reentry Film Deposits Atmosphere, orbiter bay en- Same as above Aperture, pressure bulkhead & SSM doors closed; GN2Particulate Deposits vironment, surrounding LST purge supplied by orbiter; LST interior pressure
equipment & structure maintained between .01 to .1 psi above ambient; LST
placed in clean bag if practical; star trackers
covered.
Post-Landing Film Deposits Same as above Same as above Same as for pre-launch.
Particulate Deposits
LA)
FIGURE H-7
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FIGURE H-8
CLASS 350/3500 (10,000/100,000) LST CONTAMINATION CONTROL SYSTEM LAYOUT (HYBRID VERSION)
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FIGURE H-9
TERRESTRIAL EARTH-ORBITING SATELLITE NO. 6B
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For purposes of this contamination evaluation the specific EOS configuration
definition is not essential and a reasonable assessment of contaminant serious-
ness and control may be made by examining typical sensors and spacecraft
elements. Table H-9 lists typical experiments as proposed in Reference H8.
It will be noted that the Sea Surface Temperature Imaging Radiometer (SSTIR)
operates in the near ultra-violet spectrum and therefore is critical to film
deposits on its optics, particularly the primary mirror. A hydrocarbon film
only a few monolayers thick will decrease and possibly shut out UV radiation
from the instrument. Since the SSTIR is also cooled, water vapor or droplets
in the vicinity could coat the unit as a film or particulate deposit. At a
900K detector temperature, H20 deposition does not require an initiating
nucleus. The subsequent sublimation rate of H20 is very low and a coating of
frost might persist on the SSTIR for the mission duration. Such a coating,
depending on its thickness and location, could cause light scattering and band-
width degradation.
The thematic mapper, while not operating in the UV regime, has stringent resol-
ution requirements and is also cooled. Film deposits on the instrument primary
mirror would degrade resolution. Frost films could destroy the unit's energy
sensing ability.
The EOS spacecraft utilizes certain control instruments which are themselves
sensitive to particulate and film contaminants. When the thematic mapper is
employed, precise station keeping and orientation is required to permit re-
tracing ground paths, to limit sweep distortion, and to permit precision
attitude determination. The attitude determination system would use star
sensor(s), horizon sensors and sun sensors. The effect of contamination on
star sensors and sun sensors was shown in Table H-7. The horizon sensor makes
use of the 14-16 pm CO2 absorption band in the IR spectrum. Film deposits on
the sensor's optics would not likely affect light transmission at this wave-
length.
EOS contamination control measures will be most effective if treated from both
a design and operational aspect. As with the LST, the most positive approach
to EOS contamination control is to make the spacecraft essentially immune to a
hostile environment.
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TABLE H-9
TERRESTRIAL EARTH ORBITING SATELLITE NO. 6B
SPECTRAL RANGE RESOLUTION DETECTOR COOLER
INSTRUMENT (m) 1 rad TEMP (oK)
Sea Surface 10.5-11.5 250 90 Primary mirror dia. = 8.8 cm. UV range sen-
Temperature Imaging 8.85-9.35 sitive to film deposits. Cooler sensitive
Radiometer 6.5-7.0 to frost and other surface deposits.
3.6-4,1
0.2-4.0
Oceanic Scanning 0.4-0.7 None Primary mirror dia. = 7.6 cm.
Spectrophotometer Ax=.015
Thematic Mapper - 0.5-0.6 33 None Primary mirror dia. = 40.6 cm. Resolution
0.6-0.7 33 None sensitive to film deposits. Cooler sensitive
0.7-0.8 33 None to surface deposits.
0.8-1.1 33 None
1.55-1.75 33 120
2.08-2.35 33 120
10.4-12.6 100 90
Passive Multichannel 6.01 cm None
Microwave Radiometer 2.81 cm
1.67 cm
1.40 cm
.81 cm
Upper Atmosphere 9.4-10 Cooling Req'd
Sounder 14.0-16.3 Temp?
14.5-16.7
20-40
Atmospheric Pollution 2-20 .001-350 ppm Senses CO, CO2 , S02, NO, N20, NO2 , NH3, CH4
Horizon Sensor 14-16 N/A Uses CO2 absorption band to discern horizon
Star Sensors N/A Used for precise attitude determination
Autocollimator N/A Used if star sensors are remote from refer-
ence block
Sun Sensor N/A Used for initial orientation capture and
solar array pointing
It is therefore proposed that protective covers be provided for critical ele-
ments; namely, the various experiment sensor optical viewports, star trackers,
and detector coolers. These covers would be remotely commandable to the open
position after EOS deployment from the orbiter and to the closed position prior
to orbiter approach and docking during revisits. The covers should be able to
control particulate contamination to 10,000 class cleanliness, and keep non-
particulates below 10 ppm and 15 ppm for low and high vapor pressure materials,
respectively. A dry GN2 blanket purge may be necessary to achieve these levels
during pre- and post-launch periods. When closed, radiation cooler covers
would be designed to preclude moisture condensation on the cooler in orbit.
Maintenance of the EOS on orbit as treated in Reference H9 is automated and
does not involve shirtsleeve personnel access. The controlled shirtsleeve
environment necessitated for the LST is therefore not required, rather concern
is focused on the orbiter external environment during service operations.
It is assumed that entire instrument modules would be exchanged rather than.
sub-elements which would involve exposing the internal light path of the sen-
sor. During the exchange process, temporary lens caps would maintain viewport
cleanliness until the module was installed. At that time they would be removed
and the contamination control covers closed. Clearly, orbiter effluents are
highly significant during the EOS service periods. Dumping and venting should
be inhibited at this time. Pressure relief vents should be designed to be
directed away from the payload bay and service area. Orbiter RCS firing,
particularly the pitch engines, might best be inhibited during critical periods
of equipment exposure. Once contamination covers are closed, this restriction
will not be necessary.
If RCS inhibit during spacecraft servicing is unacceptable, consideration should
be given to the use of smaller (e.g., 25 lbf) pitch engines and/or opening
orbiter attitude deadband limits. Reference H10 indicates that the smaller
engines require, and therefore emit, orders of magnitude less propellant mass
than the baseline 950 lbf thrusters. In addition, an increase in pulse width
is more tolerable for the small thruster. This has the advantage of shifting
most of the thruster duty cycle to the steady state rather than the transient
operating regime. It is well known that most of the objectionable RCS
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contaminants of unburned propellants, droplets, and catalyst fines are produced
during the start and stop transient periods. The smaller plume of the smaller
engines would also increase the payload servicing envelope within which RCS
exhaust impingement is insignificant.
During orbiter-to-payload docking and undocking operations, it may not be
possible to inhibit RCS thruster operation. Assuming the orbiter approaches
the EOS from its SAMS/EOS connector side, see Figure H-9, the spacecraft
critical view ports, solar array, and antennas are essentially out of thruster
line of sight. With closed EOS contamination control covers, RCS plume
impingement on the spacecraft should not be a serious problem.
During orbiter descent with the EOS, ambient atmosphere would be bled via
particulate filters into the volume enclosed by the contamination control
covers. If it is determined that non-particulate contamination will be a
problem during descent, localized GN2 purging could offer an alternate repres-
surization approach.
H.1.2 Conclusions
Both the LST and EOS contain scientific and spacecraft instruments which
necessitate meticulous design, fabrication and handling to maintain a high
degree of cleanliness. The cleanliness levels specified or implied for each
program are significantly more stringent than will be provided in the shuttle
orbiter bay. During deployment or maintenance operation, a less predictable and
perhaps uncontrollable environment will be encountered. It therefore appears
unreasonable to impress more stringent particulate cleanliness requirements
on the orbiter bay than the presently specified 100,000 class level. Rather,
it is proposed that the spacecraft contain provisions to assure that cleanli-
ness levels are maintained in an unclean environment. This may take the form of
protective covers, purges, and operational methods. These are considered to
be practical approaches since highly controlled particulate and non-particulate
levels are needed for only certain sensor optics, and generally involve small
areas of the payload. Such protective measures would also serve the payload
during pre-launch and post-launch periods while it is neither in the orbiter
payload bay nor in a cleanroom.
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It is desirable to keep the rest of the spacecraft as clean as practical.
This will decrease the likelihood of contaminant secondary emissions in
orbit when spacecraft instruments are in operation and exposed. Proper
ground handling procedures and the protection afforded by the orbiter bay
should be effective in such gross contamination control prior to spacecraft
deployment. After the payload leaves the orbiter bay, the orbiter becomes
the largest contributor to the degree of contamination deposited in the pay-
load. The policy of inhibiting orbiter venting and dumping in the deployed
payload vicinity, and minimizing or ceasing RCS operation during critical
spacecraft maintenance periods should be pursued.
A summary of suggested shuttle contamination control requirements consistent
with the above philosophy is contained in Table H-2.
It is to be understood that the contamination control techniques proposed are
for unmanned, automated spacecraft which operate free of the orbiter. Once
the orbiter withdraws from the spacecraft vicinity, the contamination which
may have been left by this vehicle will dissipate and become inconsequential.
Presuming intended performance of payload on-board contamination control
devices and procedures, orbiter effluent control may therefore be relaxed
compared to that necessary for palletized or sortie lab type operations.
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